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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the problems of protest, solidarity, organization 
and class consciousness in the history of the jute mill workers of Calcutta 
in the period 189Q to 1940. The jute workers were a very large labour 
force, numbering well over 250,000 in the years mentioned, who were 
involved in several strikes and other militant acts of protest against 
their employers. Yet they never formed strong and enduring trade unions 
and their sense of class-solidarity remained remarkably fragile, often 
giving way to internecine conflicts of religion or ethnicity. It is argued 
here that none of these problems can be reduced to purely political, 
technical or economic explanations. In particular,the thests examines the 
relationships of power and authority that the workers were involved in 
both inside and outside the jute mills. The consciousness of the Calcutta 
jute workers is shown here to be of a pre-bourgeois nature and this, it 
is contended, presents special problems in the development of labour-
capital relationship or of class consciousness among the workers in the 
Calcutta jute industry. The history of this group of industrial labourers 
thus provides grounds for reflection on Marx's theory of the working class 
which takes a hegemonic bourgeois culture for granted. 
This thesis is my o\i/n composition. 
Dipesh Chakrabarty. 
'A painting is a sum of destructions.' 
- Picasso. 
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Chapter 1 
PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES 
If Marx gave the working class a special place and mission in 
history, it is also clear that he situated this class within a framework 
of bourgeois relationships. The figure of the worker invoked in his 
exposition of the category of 'capital' was that of a person who belonged 
to a society where the bourgeois notion of eguality was ingrained in 
culture. Thus Marx considered labour to be a 'moment' ''i.e. a constituent 
element) of capital, and capital, according to him, 'is a bou^g^o-U, 
p^odiict^on fi^lcutlon, a production relation of bourgeois society'.^ The 
labourer of Marx's assumption had internalized and enjoyed 'formal 
freedom', the freedom of the contract (which brought legal and market 
relations together), and he enjoyed this not just in abstraction but as 
'the individual, real person'.^ Until this was ensured and so long as 
pre-capitalist, particularistic ties made up and characterized the 
relations of production, capital, as Marx understood it, was 'not yet 
capital ct6 6ach'J This is why Marx thought that the logic of capital 
could be best deciphered only in a society where 'the notion of human 
eguality has already acguired the fixity of a popular prejudice',** and 
hence chose the historical case of England as the one most illustrative 
of his argument. Indeed, as we now know from historians in our times, the 
'notion of equality before the law' was an essential ingredient of the 
culture with which the English working class handled its experience of 
the Industrial Revolution.^ This of course does not mean that everything 
about the culture of the English working class was bourgeois. Bourgeois 
society, Tlarx said, was 'itself a contradictory development' where 
'relations derived from earlier [social] forms' were still to be found 
in 'stunted' or 'travestied' conditions.^ What however made the society 
distinctively bourgeois was the predominance of bourgeois relationships 
over pre-bourgeois ones. 
Marx's discussion of the labour-capital relationship as it operated 
within the capitalist organization of work thus cannot be placed outside 
his assumption of a hegemonic bourgeois culture. This assumption, it 
will be shown in later chapters of this work, is a crucial one in Marx's 
understanding of the working class. On it rests his notions of 'industrial 
discipline', 'capitalist authority' and such like ideas which he used in 
analyzing the labour process in a capitalist factory. In other words, it 
is a key assumption in Marx's discussion of the power-relationship between 
labour and capital, and since 'power' or 'authority' cannot be thought 
of without linking it to 'consciousness',^ it can also be argued that a 
hegemonic bourgeois culture is an indispensable aspect of the social 
framework within which Marx locates his idea of working-class consciousness, 
I propose to illustrate this argument here by looking at the issues 
of 'discipline', 'authority', 'protest', 'solidarity' and 'organization' 
in the case of a particular working class® - the jute-mill workers of 
Calcutta - which was not born into a 'bourgeois society', but belonged 
rather to' a culture that was largely pre-capitalist. I shall seek 
to demonstrate how the predominance of pre-bourgeois relationships 
seriously crippled these workers in respect of their capacity to constitute 
themselves into a class by developing the necessary kinds of solidarity, 
organization and consciousness. 
This is not - and I must stress the point - an effort to see culture in 
a causal relationship to history. If anything, what we present here is 
CK/ 
more^negative argument than a positive one. It is an argument aQOuiyUit the 
primacy that is religiously accorded to the 'economic' in many Marxist his-
torical writings and analyses of society. In the particular case of Indian 
history, it also means opposing the Indian nationalist view of history since 
the 'primacy of the economic' has for long been an inherent characteristic of 
the nationalist thought that developed in India under conditions of colonial 
domination.^ In fairness to all however it should be emphasized that 
while we refuse to see the culture and the consciousness of workers as 
being ultimately determined by their economic and material conditions, 
the guestion of the determination of history by economic forces - even 
if only 'in the last instance' - remains an unresolved one within 
Marxism, the writings of Marx and Engels on the subject being open to 
opposed interpretations.^° The present work is thus also intended as a 
contribution to an on-going debate within the Marxist movement. 
II 
The particular history I use here to work out some of the general 
propositions outlined above is that of the jute workers of Calcutta 
betvi/een 1890 and 1940. The terminal dates selected refer mainly to the 
period for which I have examined the available historical documents 
but the argument presented here may well apply to years not covered 
by them. 
There was a stage in the history of Calcutta when the city owed its 
economic importance and fame to the jute mills that - thanks to British 
enterprise in India - lined the two sides of the river Hocghly both north 
arid south of the city. 'To write about Calcutta without saying a word 
about jute', said a tourist-guide to the city in 1906, 'would be as bad 
as to deprive the lamb of its mint s a u c e S t a r t e d in 1855, this 
industry by the 1910s was the most important jute industry in the world, 
consuming more raw jute than the 'rest of the world' put together.^^ The 
chief advantage that the industry had over its rivals in other countries 
was its proximity to the source of its raw material. India, and Bengal in 
particular, had a virtual monopoly in the production of raw jute. In 1945-46 
India produced 97 per cent of the total world-supply of raw jute and by far 
the greater part of it was produced in Bengal, eastern Bengal alone account-
ing for 'nearly 60 per cent of the total production of jute in the whole of 
I n d i a A c c o r d i n g to one estimate, Bengal produced more than 88 per cent 
of the jute grown in India between 1922 and 1931.^'* Bengal was thus the 
main producer of jute, and jute manufactures - mainly cheap packing and 
wrapping material - being largely meant for overseas markets, m.cst of 
the Indian jute mills came to be set up within a very narrow geographical 
region around the port-city of Calcutta. 'In 1940', writes T.R. Sharma, 
'95.5 per cent, of the jute looms in India were located in Bengal and 
all the jute factories containing these looms were situated in a small 
strip of land about 60 miles long and two miles broad, along both the 
Souru : SKarM^H^ VocyJ^ 
banks of the Hooghly, above and below C a l c u t t a T h e main centres of 
the Calcutta industry are shown in the map provided here. 
The Indian jute industry was thus much more localized, geographically 
speaking, than the other important industry of India, the cotton textile 
industry. Moreover, individual jute mills employed a larger number of 
workers than did individual cotton mills. 'While the average number of 
workers employed in the cotton industry [was] about 1,150 per establishment 
in 1929, the average number employed in the jute industry per establishment 
[was] nearly 3,635 in the same year'.^^ The jute industry therefore brought 
together a very large number of people and put them all within a narrow 
geographical area under broadly similar conditions of life and labour. 
At the peak of the prosperity of the industry, in the 1920s, this was a 
labour force well over 300,000 in number. Even in the 1930s, when the 
industry suffered a depression, the number of people employed by it 
remained substantially greater than 250,000 (Table 1). 
As Table 1 shows, most of the jute labourers were adult males, 
women on an average forming about 16 per cent of the labour force 
between 1921-30 and 13.64 per cent in the decade that followed. Ranajit 
Das Gupta, who has made a detailed study of the supply of labour to the 
Calcutta jute mills, notes that before the lB90s the bulk of the labourers 
were Bengalis.^^ Before long, however, streams of migration set in from 
other provinces of India - mainly the United Provinces ^U.P.), Bihar, 
Orissa, Madras and the Central Provinces - and the majority of the jute 
workers in the twentieth century belonged to the category of 'migrants'. 
A census was taken of the jute-mill labourers in 1921. By this time, as 
Das Gupta says, 'the formation of the jute labour force [had been] 
TABLE I 
Year No. of factories 
No. of 
adult 
males 
No. of 
adult 
females 
No. of 
children 
1912 61 145,389 31,329 23,007 
1913 64 158,261 34,010 24,106 
1914 69 167,858 36,800 25,909 
1915 70 181,445 40,674 26,646 
1916 70 191,036 42,145 27,603 
1917 71 192,667 41,395 27,320 
1918 72 199,977 43,278 27,^09 
1919 72 20],009 43,112 28,628 
1920 73 207,255 44,545 28,521 
1921 77 207,908 44,^705 29,235 
1922 80 239,660 49,25^ 28,267 
1923 83 242,652 51,495 28,400 
1924 85 252,107 54,801 27,823 
1925 83 256,312 55,511 26,474 
1926 86 253,935 52,827 20,785 
1927 85 253,681 52,935 19,249 
1928 86 260,342 53,678 17,879 
1929 90 267,717 54,6"^0 17,278 
1930 91 264,417 52,114 11,646 
1931 93 222,573 42,254 3,462 
]932 94 212,505 40,294 1 ,515 
1933 92 208,246 3^,337 1,134 
1934 93 213,894 36,932 915 
1935 95 225,372 37,749 278 
1936 94 233,481 38,261 4 
1937 96 249,737 37,997 9 
1938 97 242,342 36,683 9 
1939 101 243,496 37,699 34 
1940 101 248,046 36,640 34 
1941 101 251,388 35,255 38 
1942 101 252,799 35,083 32 
1943 101 245,125 34,759 35 
1944 101 231,121 36,005 67 
Source: 5.R. Deshpande, Ro^ pofut, p. 6. 
completed'.^® The census gave the following picture of the areas of 
origin of the jute workers (Table 
TABLE 2 
Areas of Origin of Jute-Mill Workers in Bengal, 1921 
Percentage 
Province of total 
(280,854) 
Bengal 24.82 
Bihar 33.80 
Orissa 10.99 
U.P. 23.17 
Madras 4.30 
Other parts of India 2.88 
Outside India 0.07 
Source: Das Gupta, 'Factory Labour in Eastern India', p. 298, Table 7, 
The percentage figures have not been rounded off to add up to 100. 
The Indian censuses for 1911 and 1921 also gave some information 
regarding the caste-backgrounds of the workers. The details have been 
reproduced in Das Gupta's study. His analysis shows that the bulk of the 
labourers were low caste people and 'untouchables', 'cultivators with 
little or no land, members of traditional labouring and service categories 
and artisans from the declining crafts' of northern India.^^ The western 
districts of Bihar (Gaya, Patna, Shababad, Saran and Muzaffarpur), the 
eastern districts of U.P. ';Azamgarh, Ballia, Ghazipur, Benares and 
Jaunpur), Cuttack and Balasore in Orissa, Ganjam in the Madras Presidency 
were the main supply areas for jute labour in Bengal.^" In terms of their 
religious composition, about 30 per cent of the jute workers were 
Muslims in 1929 and a little more than 69 per cent Hindus."^ 
Though one of the largest working classes in the country, the jute-
mill workers were also among the lowest paid of the industrial workers in 
India (see Table 3). This was reflected in their dismal poverty and in 
their problems of housing, health and chronic indebtedness. Their wages 
were often not enough to support their families and most jute workers 
- it is difficult to say just how many - left their families at 'home' 
in the countryside and took long leaves to visit them as and when their 
means permitted.^^ The 'majority of the [jute] workers' then, as a 
government report put it in 1946, '[had] some connection with lands in 
their villages'. This however did not 'always mean that they own[ed] the 
land'. More often than not, 'instead of receiving income from agriculture, 
they have to meet certain incidental expenses regarding farming being 
done in the villages by their relatives', apart from having to provide 
money 'for certain conventional, although nonetheless obligatory expenses, 
such as marriages and funerals', when the workers had 'no option except 
to borrow money to meet these obligations'.^^ 
In the slums around the jute mills of Calcutta there thus lived 
thousands of unfortunate human beings whose cheap labour served very well 
the needs of the mill-owners but whose capacity for bargaining a better 
deal out of the latter remained always very low. The history of these 
people may therefore appear to provide an excellent subject for political-
economic analysis. What was the labour market like? What were the 'needs' 
of 'capital'? What was the role of the colonial state? These and other 
similar questions have usually engaged the attention of scholars who 
TABLE 3 
Average monthly money wages of workers in 
different centres, 1900 to 1939 (figures in Rs.) 
Average monthly Average monthly Average monthly 
money wages of money wages of money wages of 
Year workers in workers in workers in 
Bombay Ahmedabad Calcutta 
cotton mills cotton mills jute mills 
1900 12.29 11.35 12.0 
1901 12.58 11.35 12.0 
1902 12.59 11.35 12.0 
1903 12.59 11.35 12.0 
1904 12.59 11.35 12.7 
1905 12.59 11.82 12.8 
1906 12.59 12.44 12.8 
1907 14.36 12.59 12.8 
1908 15.36 12.76 13.5 
1909 15.46 13.33 13.5 
1910 15.46 13.45 13.5 
1911 13.40 13.45 13.7 
1912 14.11 13.45 13.2 
1913 14.21 13.45 14.4 
1914 16.37 13.45 14.5 
1915 16.75 13.45 14.6 
1916 16.78 13.45 14.6 
1917 17.01 13.70 14.8 
1918 21.08 17.70 14.8 
1919 24.75 20.06 16.4 
1920 30.75 22.77 18.4 
1921 30.63 31.89 19.9 
1922 31.69 32.58 19.9 
1923 32.75 33.27 19.6 
1924 32.75 33.44 19.4 
1925 32.75 33.62 19.8 
1926 34.56 33.80 19.2 
1927 34.56 33.80 19.3 
1928 34.56 33.80 17.7 
1929 34.56 33.80 16.5 
1930 34.56 33.80 14.3 
1931 34.56 33.80 16.2 
1932 34.56 35.69 15.4 
1933 34.56 35.69 14.6 
1934 27.25 35.69 14.6 
1935 27.25 33.46 14.6 
1936 27.25 33.46 16.9 
1937 28.44 30.96 18.3 
1938 32.13 32.98 19.6 
1939 35.37 35.00 19.6 
Source: A, .K. Bagchi, P^vaXz Inv&^tment in India 1900-1939 (Cambridge, 
1972), p. 126. 
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have studied this particular group of labourers. These concerns are 
understandable, for political and economic factors are of undoubted 
importance in the history of any working class. But a problem arises 
when they are seen as the most important determinants of a working-class 
history. One is left with no clues as to what role the workers themselves, 
as the willing subjects of their own history, played in it; or what role 
the bosses played, as human beings endowed with particular kinds of 
mentalities, in determining the nature of that history. It is not a 
question of reducing the Marxian concept of 'relations of production' 
to inter-personal relations, but of emphasizing that production-relations 
are relations after all, and as Marx once said, relations can only exist 
in ideas, in consciousness. And the logic of consciousness, we argue, 
cannot be derived from a techno-economic argument or from considerations 
about the nature of political institutions in colonial India. 
Economic, technical or political factors, on the other hand, do net 
operate in a cultural vacuum. Behind the jute industry's demand for 
cheap unskilled labour (or its problems of industrial discipline) lay 
the culture of the 'bosses' - a deeply entrenched mercantilist outlook 
and the cultural milieu of the British Raj in India. This culture did 
not even always act in the best 'economic' interests of the industry. 
So was the case with the jute-mill labourers. Their notions of authority, 
their modes of protest, the problems of their organizations, the weakness 
of their solidarity - all reveal, on inspection, the existence of a 
pre-bourgeois culture and consciousness which, in combination with the 
so-called 'economic' and 'political' factors, impaired their capacity to 
act as a class. This is what eventually leads us to emphasize the 
importance, in Marx's discussion of labour-capital relationship, of his 
assumption regarding a hegemonic bourgeois culture. 
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The subsequent chapters of this study will reflect these concerns. 
Chapter 2, which takes a long look at the history of the industry, 
documents its mercantilist spirit. Chapter 3 describes the working and 
living conditions of the workers, conditions that are usually seen as 
having a determining influence on working-class consciousness. We on the 
contrary argue that questions regarding the consciousness of the workers 
are built into the very structure of our knowledge of these conditions. 
The following three chapters, 4, 5 and 6 respectively, look at the 
problems of organization, protest and solidarity in the jute workers' 
history and attempt to relate these to the issue of consciousness. 
We sum up the argument finally in a brief concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 1 
NOTES 
1. Marx quoted in Roman Rosdolsky, The. hiaklng MaAx'6 'Cap-ctal' 
(London, 1 9 8 0 \ p. 184, n. 3. Emphasis original. For Marx's 
conception of labour as a 'moment of capital', see his 
foundcutlon^ o^ the CnAXlque Potlt^caZ Economy (Harmondsvi/orth, 
1974), pp. 293-301. CapUal, I, (Moscow, n.d.?^ p. 333, sees 
labour as 'a mode of existence of capital'. HegeX'4 Loggia (tr. 
W . Wallace; London, 1975), pp. 79, 113, uses 'moment' to mean both 
'stage' as well as a (constituent) 'factor'. Jinrich Zeleny, The. 
Log-ic 0^ MOAX ''Oxford, 1980^, p. xi, defines 'moment' as 'one of 
the elements of a complex conceptual entity'. 
2. Marx, GmndfvUie,, p. 464. 
3. ibid., pp. 296-7. Emphasis original. 
4. Marx, CapitciZ, I, p. 60. Admittedly, Marx made this statement with 
reference to the problem of deciphering the 'secret of the expression 
of value'. But then one has to remember that for Marx capital is 
self-expanding value and labour a moment of capital. For these and 
related points also see I.I. Rubin, E66aij6 on Ma^x'6 The.on.y o{) Value. 
(Montreal, 1971). 
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5. The classic statement is E.P. Thompson's The. Making o^ -the. Engti^h 
Woftking Clcui THarmondsvi/orth, 1968). 
6. Marx, G^undbvU^O., pp. 106-6. 
7. The point is developed in Chapters 3 and 5 below. 
8. Here and elsewhere in this work, the expression 'working class' is 
used in a designative manner i.e. without any connetations of class-
consciousness . 
9. See the discussion on Nehru in Partha Chatterjee's forthcoming 
book hiati.oncitU,t Thought. 
10. The crisis of Marxist theory on the question of 'determination' 
would be obvious to anyone familiar with the current debate and 
literature on the subject. A particularly interesting contribution is 
Alvin W. Gouldner, Tho. Two Contn.a(iLcXA,on^ and AnomatisJi 
In thz ddvelopmmt oi Th^o^ij (London, 1980'>. 
11. W.K. Firminger, ThackeA'^ Guide, to Calcutta (Calcutta, 19061, 
p. 237. 
12. See D.R. Wallace, Tht Romance oi Jute (London, 1928), p. 106. 
13. Tulsi Ram Sharma, Location lndu^tn.ie^ In India (Bombay, 1954), 
p. 89. 
14. H.K. Chaturvedi, 'On Jute Industry in Bengal', IhoAx-Ut l-i-UcelZany, 
Vol. 7, April 1946, pp. 94-143. I owe this reference to Stephen 
Gourlay. 
15. Sharma, Location, p. 89. 
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16. P.S. Lokanathan, IndiutAlal On.ganlzcuUon In India (London, 1935), 
p. 112. 
17. Ranajit Das Gupta, 'Factory Labour in Eastern India: Sources of 
Supply, 1855-1946 - Some Preliminary Findings', I.E.S.H.R. vol. 8, 
no. 3, 1976, pp. 277-329. 
18. ibid., p. 281. 
19. ibid., p. 315. 
20. ibid., p. 292. 
21. W.B.S.A., Com. Dept Com. Br., April 1930, A 19-20. 
22. See Radhakamal Mukherjee, The. Indian Working Cla66 'Bombay, 1948), 
p. 10. 
23. S.R. Deshpande, on an EnqtuAy Into Conditions o^ LabouA in 
tko. Jute. Mill JndiU^t^y in India (J)£.LlAi-, 1946), b. a ? . 
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Chapter 2 
JUTE: THE NATURE OE THE INDUSTRY 
A trader's mentality was what characterized entrepreneurship in the 
jute industry of Calcutta. 'In the working of a jute mill there [were] 
three distinct operations', said the Indian Jnvejstou' Ve^aA Book in 1911: 
'the buying of raw jute, its manufacture into fabrics, and the sale of 
those fabrics'. Of these three operations, buying and selling were 
considered 'the most important', requiring 'the exercise of much judgement 
and foresight', much more than the process of manufacturing did.^ The main 
products of the industry - jute bags called hessian and sacking - had 
remained the same for years and were to continue unchanged in the years to 
come. Crude and simple in their structure, these bags were produced by a 
technology that was essentially mechanical in nature and was easy to 
operate. The industry was guided by the belief that a 'good' management 
of costs and prices was the key to economic success. So long as they kept 
their products cheap, exploited successfully the virtual monopoly of Bengal 
in the production of raw jute, procured cheap labour and captured foreign 
markets - reasoned the leaders of the industry - their profits would remain 
assured. To help maintain the level of profits, the industry also developed 
a cartel-type combination in the Indian Jute [Manufactures (later Mills) 
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Association (I.J.M.A.) which frequently arranged for restriction of output 
by the members of the industry in order to match demand. I.J.M.A. thus 
represented the unity of the industry on which its restrictive trade 
practices were based. 
The very founding of I.J.M.A. in 1884 marked the end of a period in 
the history of the industry. Between 1855, when the first jute mill in 
Bengal was started, and the 18903, the industry had foundered from one 
crisis to another which were caused by a small and uncertain market. After 
the 1890s and up to the end of the First World War, the quasi-monopolistic 
policies of I.J.M.A. and the opening up of distant markets brought 
unprecedented prosperity to the Calcutta jute mills. After 1920 however 
the policies of the industry ran into trouble as advances in the chemical 
sciences and textile technologies made it possible to produce economic 
and better-quality substitutes for jute. Unfortunately for the Calcutta 
industry, its mercantilist economic philosophy had by then turned into a 
dogma. The leaders of the industry refused to see the problem in terms 
of technology or quality of output and clung more ferociously than ever 
to their age-old policies of price-manipulation through restriction of 
output. This created further problems as new companies, owned and managed 
mainly by Indians, entered the industry in the late 1920s and refused to 
join hands with I.J.M.A. This in turn severely affected the internal unity 
of the latter making any cartel-like arrangements harder to implement. 
The details of this history are set out below in terms of the three 
phases mentioned above - the initial uncertainties of the industry, its 
recovery with the widening of markets and the resultant prosperity upto 
the First World War, and the crisis afterwards. What follows is not a 
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strictly economic analysis of the industry; readers interested in such analyses 
may turn with profit to some of the works used and cited here. Our aim 
is to highlight the strong element of mercantilist spirit inherent in the 
economic calculations of the industry. Many of the problems of jute-mill 
labourers followed from policies dictated by this spirit. 
II 
The early history of the Calcutta jute industry cannot be separated 
from that of the industry at Dundee in Scotland. The Calcutta industry 
started as an off-shoot of the latter and some of its early problems 
stemmed from the fact of being a late-starter. The Dundee industry was 
at least twenty years older. 
A few words about the Scottish industry may be in order. After a 
chequered industrial career in the eighteenth century, when she produced 
coarse woollens, shoe buckles and tanned leather, the town of Dundee on 
the river Tay came to develop the linen industry as her most important 
manufacture in the second half of the eighteenth century.^ There were 
three other 'linen centres' in Great Britain - Belfast, Leeds and Inverness 
- but they differed from Dundee in that Dundee produced fabrics of the 
coarsest kind, both of flax and hemp.^ This meant that, unlike the other 
three centres, Dundee operated in a market for cheap products, where 
survival depended on keeping prices low. Faced with a rise in flax and 
hemp prices early in the nineteenth century - especially in consequence 
of the French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1801) and the Napoleonic Wars 
(1804-1815) - Dundee entrepreneurs started looking around for a cheap 
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'substitute for hemp in the manufacture of cotton bagging [i.e. bagging for 
raw cotton]' and for an 'adulterant of flax tow'.'' They tried tow and sunn 
before.settling upon jute in the 1830s. It was this use of jute for 
adulterating flax that gave both Dundee and jute a bad name in the early 
nineteenth century when some of the Dundee flax and hemp spinners felt 
constrained to guarantee their products '"free from Indian jute"'.^ 
In 1825-26 Thomas Neish, a Dundee merchant, persuaded the Dundee 
flax spinners, Messrs Bell and Balfour, to try spinning jute with their 
machinery.® The experiment was unsuccessful. Circumstances however soon 
combined to place jute in a more favourable position. There was a recession 
in the hemp bagging trade in 1831 followed by a failure, in 1834, of the 
Russian flax crop on which Dundee's dependence was total. In 1838, Dundee 
feared 'that there might be a war with Russia arising out of tension at 
the outbreak of the first Afghan War'^ in the event of which the flax supply 
would run out once again. All this led a few more merchants and spinners 
of Dundee and its neighbourhood to take a more serious interest in the 
jute fibre.® The shift may be seen in the fact that while in 1828 the 
amount of raw jute imported by Dundee manufacturers was only 18 tons, the 
figure rose to 300 tons in 1833. By then a large part of the flax machinery 
had been adjusted to jute, and 1833 saw the beginnings of the 'mechanical 
manufacture of jute yarns and fabrics'.^ In 1835 'pure jute yarn' was put 
up for sale for the first time, and 'within a few years jute appeared in 
the European market as a competitor of flax and hemp'.^° Soon after this 
the Dutch government placed with Dundee merchants 'what were then regarded 
[in 1838] as large orders for all-jute bags' for transporting coffee from 
the East Indies. The experiment was considered 'completely successful'.^^ 
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Linen however \i/as still the more important product of Dundee and 
'in 1851 Dundee imported 40,000 tons of flax'. But a Dundee factory 
inspector reported the same year that 'Dundee seemed prosperous and that 
an increase in the cost of flax, which was reducing the profitability of 
flax-spinning, was being ccmficnsated for by an increased production of a 
new fabric - jute'.^^ 
The fate of the linen trade was sealed by the Crimean War of 1854-
1856 which shut off the supply of flax to Dundee, and jute took its place. 
What placed the industry on a firm footing was the American Civil War. 
Lancashire's loss was Dundee's gain. Jute assumed the place of cotton, and 
'while the war lasted, jute packing and baggings were used very extensively 
in America for normal needs and to meet the insatiable demand of the 
war'.^^ A Dundee merchant wrote later of this period that 'during the 
American War little mills grew into big ones; big ones doubled their power, 
and new ones rose up everywhere. There never were such times'. And a 
Forfarshire man remarked: 'The money didna only come in shoals, but in 
barrowfuls' . ^  
Such popularity of jute, however, soon attracted competitors into 
the trade. The French set up their first jute mill at Ailly-s-Somme in 
1843, though their industry was not a serious threat to Dundee till 1892 
when the French government imposed tariff duties on imported jute products. 
The German jute industry was started in 1861 and was 'firmly established' 
by 1879. It had a rapid growth through the nineteenth century and imported 
more than 21?o of India's raw jute exports by 1914. Belgium and Austria 
started their industries in the 1860s, while It&.'iian hemp mills began to 
process jute in 1885. Dundee however retained her lead till the first decade 
of the twentieth century.^^ 
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These developments had an important bearing on the growth of the 
Calcutta industry. By the time this industry came into being (in the 
1850s and '60s) there already existed a world-market for jute manufacturers 
in which the Dundee industry predominated. The growth, behind tariff walls, 
of other European jute industries in the late nineteenth century would 
have only made the world-market even harder to enter. The first few mills 
in Calcutta therefore turned to the market that India traditionally served 
with her handloom products of jute - the network of country ports in India 
and some coastal markets in South-East Asia, mainly Burma. The first jute 
mill in Bengal set up in 1855 at Rishra even had 'a number of hand frame 
looms'^® and chose its location precisely because the neighbouring town 
of Serampore was 'a noted centre for hand spun jute and hemp', where 
'labourers possessing knowledge of hand-spinning and weaving were available 
in good numbers'.^^ Another factory, the Gourepore [Gouripur] Jute Mill, 
was started in 1862 with the express purpose of competing 'with the native 
weavers in the Indian markets', for 'at that time', as a 'Dundonian' was 
to put itlater, 'there was no rivalry between Dundee and India'. 
One feature of the early history of the Calcutta jute industry was 
thus the displacement of the older artisanal production. From a position 
of near-total predominance in the 1850s,^^ the traditional industry was 
relegated to absolute unimportance by the 1870s (see Table below) and 
disappeared altogether from the customs house statistics after the 1880s. 
For the first thirty years in the industry's career, i.e. 1855 to 
1885, most of its products were sold in the country and coastal market that 
the handloom industry traditionally served. These markets were small and 
uncertain so that profits remained a function of 'exceptionally good 
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TABLE 4 
Gunny Bags Gunny Cloth 
Y 
E 
A 
Total 
Export 
from 
Approx. Percentage 
share of 
Total 
Export 
from 
Approx. Percentage 
share of 
R India 
(in 
000s) 
Power 
loom 
Hand-
loom 
India 
(in 000 
yards) 
Power 
loom 
Hand-
loom 
1877 32859 89 11 6017 N.A. N.A. 
1878 26407 97 3 7297 98 2 
1879 45354 95.6 4.4 10427 96 4 
1880 55909 96.5 3.5 11322 96 4 
1881 52386 97 3 10766 97.5 2.5 
1882 42073 98 2 10840 97 3 
Source: 'The Cultivation of Jute' in Vundze. kdyjOJiXiMOJi, 17 September, 
1883, in A.C. Lamb Ccllection, Newspaper cutting No. 196 (23), held at 
the Dundee Central Library, Dundee; and [Anonymous], 'Calcutta Jute Mills' 
in The Vundee. V^oA Book 1887 [hereafter V.V.B.], (Dundee, 1888), pp. 
122-29. 
TABLE 5 
Country and 
Years 
coastal trade 1850 
(all 
handloom) 
as percentage 
of total 
export of 
1882 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 
jute products 70.2 49.19 59.98 49.33 29.85 19.42 11.9 
Source: for column 2, Dundee AdveAtiAeJi, 17 September, 1883; other 
columns derived from Wallace, Romance (1908 edn), pp. 10, 59. 
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business and high price g u n n i e s T h e precarious position of the 
industry is indicated by the history oT some of the oldest mills. The 
first of them, for instance, came to depend so heavily on the 'fairly 
good profits' it made off the fortuitous boom produced in the Bombay 
cotton market by the American Civil War that the termination of the war 
caused it to collapse as no alternative marl<eting outlets could be found 
to match its scale of production.^^ 'Several pioneer shipments having 
turned out disastrously', this company was 'wound up' and its property 
put up for auction.^^ 
The dependence on the 'traditional' market for handloom products 
had another implication: there was little pressure cn the mills to 
standardize their products. Consequently, entry into the world market for 
manufactured jute was even more difficult than it would have been 
otherwise. D.R. Wallace, a pioneer historian of the industry, v/rote 
thus of the problem: 
We have now [c.l870] got to five mills with about 
950 looms at work. Up to this time there was very 
little export trade in gunnies beyord Burma. It was 
not found necessary to be particular about regularity 
in weights or counts of the two or three qualities of 
bags in use ... But now it became necessary to seek 
foreign outlets. The Borneo Co. made the first serious 
attempt about 1868 bv shipping 400 bales of their 
2^8 lbs. twills as 2V2 lb 3 bushel twill bags to the 
United Kingdom. The result was disastrous. The bags 
averaged on arrival anything from 2 lbs to 3 lbs. the 
shotting varied from 7 to 10 per inch and the result 
was a claim of a pound per bale.^"* 
There are two points that this quotation makes. One is about the lack of 
standardization of the product, which came as a result of dealing in coastal 
markets. But it also indicates that the coastal markets were aleady proving 
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a little too small for the industry. 1870 is cited by Wallace as the year 
'when production, by the advent of new mills, outran the local and 
neighbouring country demand, and compelled the industry to invade foreign 
market with their g o o d s ' A t the present moment', wrote Elija Helm in 
1875, 
there is reason to conclude that ... the jute 
manufacturers of Bengal have been overdone. The 
production is large and increasing, and the 
difficulty of finding profitable outlets for the 
manufactured product is constantly becoming 
greater.^^ 
The smallness and uncertainty of the market encouraged a spirit of specul-
ation both in the promotion of the first few mills and in their management. 
Floating and selling off a jute mill was often seen as a more profitable 
proposition than running it in the interest of the shareholders. 
Naturally, quite a few of the early entrepreneurs were essentially 
fortune-hunters who had no long term interest in the industry. George 
Ackland, for instance, the founder of the first mill in 1855, a one time 
'middy' in the East India Marine Service, turned his attention to jute 
only to make good a loss he had suffered in Ceylon.^^ That accomplished, 
he was out of the scene by 1867.^® The Baranagar Jute Mill, which was 
set up by the Borneo Company in 1859, was sold to the Baranagar 
Jute Factory Ltd in 1872, after the former owners had got back their 
capital 'twice over'.^^ An observer from Dundee commented that 'the 
price which was paid by the Baranagar Company was £384 000, a figure 
far beyond what the mill could have been built for, and fully £125 000 
more than the concern was worth'. The high price was not justified by 
the value of the mill. It was meant 'to enable the firm [Borneo Co.] 
to adjust their accounts with an outgoing partner'.^" 
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The 'quick money' mentality is also evident in the history of 
another of these early mills, the Asiatic Jute Mill, or the Soorah Jute 
Mill as it was called later. This mill was built in 1874 by Charles Smith, 
a small mill-owner in Dundee. Smith's attention shifted to Calcutta when 
he faced business difficulties in Scotland; but investing in Calcutta 
was only a way of repairing his financial losses. He 'did not even wait 
to see the mill start, but took his profits from the firm of Jews who 
had financed him in the venture and r e t i r e d T h i s 'firm of Jews' -
Cohen & Co. - in their turn stopped all payments due to their creditors 
in 1878 and simply absconded from the trading scene of Calcutta; it was 
revealed that 'they had largely helped themselves to the manufactured 
goods and were indebted to the Company in over Rs 20,000'.^^ Yet another 
attempt by an Armenian trader to set up a jute mill in the late 1860s 
came to naught because 'he lost all his capital in speculation'.^^ 
The person who most embodied the spirit of the times was Richard 
Macallister. At one time a 'bus conductor in Philadelphia', he came out 
'to the Tudor Ice Company about 1869' and, as VJallace put it, 'with 
Yankee instinct decided to have a hand in the golden pie'.^"* In the 
early 1870s, when the gunny bag trade was seemingly, if briefly, 
prosperous, when 'it was only necessary to issue a prospectus of a jute 
mill to have all the shares snapped in a forenoon',^^ Macallister teamed 
up with 'the manager of a large bank' in Calcutta and formed R. Macallister 
& Co.^^ This company floated a number of mills in rapid succession: The 
Fort Gloster Cotton Mill (1872), The Fort Gloster Jute Mill (1873S The 
Oriental Jute Manufacturing Company (1874) and the Rustomji Twine and 
Canvas Factory Company United (1875). R. Macallister & Co. were in the 
trade for only six years. In those six years they made enormous profits. 
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They sold the Fort Gloster Jute Mill for Rs 13,00,000, the Oriental Jute 
Manufacturing Co. for Rs 18,00,000 and the cotton mill for about the 
same price, (the figure for the twine factory being unknown).^'' If the 
proceeds made on the cotton mill were any guide - and bearing in mind 
the popularity of jute mill shares in those years - the company would 
have profited by at least 40 per cent on each of these ventures. 
Besides, R. Macallister & Co. also got themselves appointed as the 
Managing Agents of these mills 'for five years certain at a remuneration 
of 3?o of the gross sales ... and an allowance of Rs 500 a month for 
office establishment in Calcutta'.^® 
Unsurprisingly, none of the Macallister mills were well managed. The 
twine and canvas factory - the idea 'not proving sufficiently remunerative' 
- was soon converted 'into a jute mill' - with very little thought, it 
would appear, as the 'spinning and preparing machinery' were reported to 
be 'all more or less intended for flax, and [were] too light for jute'. 
A Dundee correspondent worte in 1880: 'The concern was never worked at 
anything but a loss, and is now in liquidation, and when the last advices 
left Calcutta it was to have been exposed to public roup on the 1st 
March last'.^^ 
The directors of the Oriental Jute Manufacturing Company admitted 
in 1879 that the mill 'cannot work to a profit, burdened as it is with 
debts'. In 1880, the mill was stopped 'with a view to liquidation and 
reconstruction of the Company', when it was eventually taken over by 
Bird & Co., and renamed the Union Jute Mill.'*° Fort Gloster Jute Mill 
also had a very 'spasmodic' career. After a prosperous first year the 
mill soon tasted trouble, which only deepened with the trade crisis of 
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1875. On top of this, the shareholders and creditors had to bear the 
additional burden of their traumatic discovery, in 1878, that Richard 
Macallister had suddenly 'disappeared' from Calcutta 'on urgent private 
affairs' and that his firm had declared itself bankrupt. The later 
revelation that Flacallister had also 'misappropriated' Rs 33,370 from 
the funds of the mill, and that 'the reserve fund, Rs 40,000, [had] also 
disappeared and [that] in fact, it never had any existence except on 
paper', twisted the knife. 
A spirit of speculation thus reigned supreme in the flotation and 
management of these early mills, often to the detriment of the interests 
of the shareholders. The mills in the seventies were typically set up 
in years of temporary boom, and shareholders were drawn in by the 
immediate prospects of enormous dividends. It is this that explains the 
lumpy nature of the growth of the industry in this decade (Table 6 ). 
TABLE 6 
Year No. of mills set up 
Up to 1872 5 mills 
1873 4 new mills 
1874 7 new mills 
1875 1 new mill 
1877 2 new mills 
The initial dividends were sometimes attractive but their attractiveness 
was itself a symptom of the speculative mentality, as they were often 
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given away in a spirit of total neglect of the financial health of 
the mills. 
That in the ordinary course of working the mills 
would require serious repairs and replacements did 
not occur to any one, and no allowance of any kind 
was ever made from time to time for depreciation, 
and the consequence is that many of the mills are 
now [1880] burdened with debenture debts, they 
having no funds wherewith to pay for the renewal 
of and replacements in the mill, when such became 
absolutely necessary.'*^ 
A typical example was Rishra Mill which was made into the Calcutta Jute 
Mill in 1872. For a couple of years both profits and dividends were very 
good (20 per cent), but with the trade depression of the mid 1870s the 
mill found itself in a deepening crisis. 
Large repairs and replacements were urgently required, 
and as all the gross profits had been paid away in 
dividends (the words "depreciation", "wear and tear" 
not then finding places in the Indian millowners' 
vocabulary), it became necessary to raise money on 
debenture mortgages, and first £30 000 and then 
£10 000 were borrowed on the security of mortgage 
debentures bearing interest at 10 per cent. This, of 
course, had the effect of virtually raising the 
capital from Rs 12,00,000 to Rs 16,00,000 without 
any corresponding increase in the size of the mills. 
Since 1874 the company had declared no dividend, and 
the Rs 200 shares, which at one time were selling at 
Rs 290, can now be picked up easily at Rs 40.''^ 
The problem was of such a general magnitude that even in 1880, when 
the practice of having 'reserve' and/or 'depreciation' accounts was more 
common than before, six of the eleven Calcutta-owned mills had little or 
no such funds. 'The result of this mismanagement has been a very serious 
decline in the value of all Jute stock, and, with exception of two 
concerns, the scrip of all the Calcutta-owned companies have depreciated 
TABLE 7 
Name of Mill 
Paid-up 
Capital 
(Rs) 
Reserve, 
Wear and 
Tear (Rs) 
Debentures 
& Pref. 
(Shares (Rs) 
Other 
Liabilities 
(Rs) 
'Present' (1880) 
Market Value 
(Stock Exchange 
Quotations) ('Rs) 
Calcutta 12,00,000 6,554 4,00,000 1,59,803 1,80,000 
Gourepore 12,00,000 1,90,954 nil 1,16,965 7,44,000 
Seebpore 15,00,000 32,155 nil 1,51,228 4,50,000 
Mowrah 14,00,000 2,52,072 3,00,000 2,49,164 8,82,000 
Asiatic 3,99,900 3,858 nil 61,397 59,985 
Balliaghata 1,66,500 nil 3,30,500 18,865 33,300 
Kamarhatty 4,00,000 nil 4,00,000 4,62,115 3,20,000 
Oriental 19,00,000 nil 96,500 3,84,242 1,90,000 
Fort Gloster 14,00,000 nil 2,00,000 2,00,615 13,86,000 
Budge Budge 14,40,000 3,40,000 nil 2,18,339 4,06,000 
Baranagar 40,00,000 3,40,000 nil 3,90,373 22,00,000 
Total 150,06,400 68,51,285 
Loss to shareholders = Rs 81,54,755 
Source: JMB, p. 86. 
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to an enormous extent', wrote the correspondent from Dundee whom we 
have quoted before.'*'* (Table 7.) 
TABLE 8 
Name of Mill No. of Cost of Cost per 
(1880) looms block (Rs) Loom (Rs) 
Calcutta 260 14,64, 909 5632 
Gourepore 224 11,12, 472 4970 
Seebpore 250 13,93, 072 5572 
Howrah 275 15,27, 150 5918 
Asiatic 75 3,99, 812 5330 
Balliaghata 100 4,69, 302 4693 
Kamarhatty 202 10,20, 885 5053 
Oriental 350 18,97, 595 5421 
Fort Gloster 250 13,62, 176 5448 
Budge Budge 320 14,24, 299 4450 
Baranagar 516 39,61, 970 7619 
Source: JMB, p. 88, 
Behind this state of affairs lay the speculative spirit in which the 
mills were floated. Much of the initial paid-up capital raised was spent 
in buying the mills from their vendors, so that the mills often started 
with not enough working capital. The Oriental Jute Manufacturing Company, 
for instance, was bought from R. Macallister & Co., at Rs 18,00,000 out 
of a total paid-up capital of Rs 19,00,000.'*^ And promoter-speculators 
like Macallister hiked up the cost-price of a jute mill much above what 
could be considered an economic price for the period. The mills as a 
result often started with too much of their money invested in their 
stocks. The correspondent of the Vandze, kdvQJvti^Vi estimated in 1880 
30 
that 'a mill of 300 looms, with all needful accommodation, could be put 
up for Rs AOOO per loom, and, if this assumption is correct, no mill 
whatever its size, should be worth more than Rs 4000 per loom'. But the 
eleven Calcutta-owned mills for which he could collect the information 
had their cost figures as above (Table 8). The correspondent rem.arked 
that 'this would work out on the above an average cost of Rs 5,673 per 
loom; and as two mills only are above this average, it seems to follow 
that the average is too high'.'^^ 
Ill 
New and bigger markets had to be found and secured for the Calcutta 
industry before it could overcome the competition from Dundee and realize 
the benefits of its two 'natural' advantages, cheap labour and 
proximity to the source of raw jute. But this called for determined 
enterprise and, above all, contacts in the already established world-
market for finished products of jute. There is an element of irony in the 
fact that the eventual supremacy of the Calcutta mills (over their Dundee 
counterparts) owed a great deal, initially at least, to their Dundee 
connections. The Samnugger Jute Factory Company Limited (1874), which is 
credited with having done for the Calcutta industry 'more than all the 
other companies put together' in their search for new markets, was 
floated by four businessmen in Dundee - Thomas Duff, J.J. Barrie, and 
'the brothers Nicol[l] of A. and J. Nicol[ 1]' . ^ In the early 1880s, the 
four men held between them sixty per cent of the shares of the Samnugger 
Jute Mill and the Titaghur Jute mill (1883^''^ 
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Duff, Barrie and the Nicolls appear to have all come from middle 
ranking trading or manufacturing families of the town, and they all had, 
either individually or through their families, connections in the 
textile trading world. While these connections were important, it was 
their involvement in the Calcutta industry that made them prominent in 
Dundee. The Nicolls were one of 'the oldest members of Dundee's textile 
trade', yet when Alexander Nicoll died in 1909, he was remembered not for 
his doings in Dundee but as 'one of the pioneers of the great jute 
industry on the banks of the Hughli'. Joseph J. Barrie, who rose so high 
as to be made President of the Dundee Chamber of Commerce in 1887, 
started his career in a modest way as an apprentice to a firm of flax 
merchants. He gradually worked his way up and became a clerk with Messrs 
George Armistead & Co., a Dundee trading firm; in the 1860s he was their 
'market man'. At this time he resigned and 'began business on his own 
account, in which he proved very successful'. In 1874 he became a 
partner of Thomas Duff to promote the Samnugger Company. Thomas Duff, 
the key man in the Samnugger story, was born into an old artisan-
manufacturing family with long and established connections with flax and 
jute. His father Daniel Duff, 'machine maker and flax spinner. South Tay 
street works, Dundee', was known as 'the inventor of the jute teaser or 
devil, the softening elephant'. Daniel Duff himself had some ideas about 
starting jute spinning in Calcutta. Thomas Duff's elder brother Robert 
Duff was a gunny broker who made over his business to Thomas Duff in 1855. 
It was as a jute merchant that Duff came to be closely associated with 
R. and J. Henderson & Co. in whose Liverpool and London offices he had 
worked before. So when the Hendersons persuaded the Borneo Company to 
start the Baranagar Jute Mill near Calcutta in 1859, Thomas Duff was the 
person selected to be in charge of the mill. 'Mr. Duff's success in 
32 
India u/as so marked', commented the Pandee V^oA Book after his death, 
'that after 8 years' residence in the East he returned home with ample 
competency, and built a large jute mill at Barking, in E s s e x ' . B u t , 
as IJallace said of him, 'like the old horse, he smelt the battle from 
afar'.^° He sold his mill and joined hands with the Nicolls and Barrie 
to start the Samnugger Company. 
Thomas Duff's company did not go for the local and the coastal 
markets that other Indian mills normally served. Instead it managed to 
break into the Australasian market very early in its career. And once 
they got an opening into the Australian and New 
Zealand markets for cornsacks, woolpacks and hessian 
bran bags, the mill agents, without any organised 
combine, nursed this outlet by turning out and 
stocking bigger and bigger quantities of the goods 
in anticipation of the seasonal orders ... The 
'Frisco central hessian wheat pocket demand was 
fostered in a like manner.^^ 
D.R. Viallace, from whose account of the history of the industry this 
quotation comes, was at pains to emphasize the importance of the inherited 
Dundee 'connections' of the company to the success of their first few raids 
on foreign markets: 
They were particularly fortunate in their selection 
of an expert to conduct their business in the agents' 
... office. This gentleman, Mr. VJ. Smith, had forged 
his way from office boy in Messrs Cox Brothers, 
Lochee, to a confidential position with the firm. 
He was endowed with indomitable assurance and when 
he came to Calcutta had nothing to learn in the 
devious ways of jute. Backed by the practical 
experience and biUimM conmction o^ the. hoim boa/id 
{lOfi^ign moAkeX^, this company did more than all 
the companies put together to invade foreign 
markets.^^ 
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The phenomenal success of the Samnugger Company in these new markets 
in years when many of the other mills were struggling to survive must 
have set an example to the latter. 'In 1880', reported Sir John Leng, a 
Dundee M.P. who visited Calcutta in the winter of 1895, 'there was a 
great collapse in the industry consequent upon overproduction and the 
Calcutta mills not having made a market for their produce, for up to this 
time the demand was principally local'.^^ In this crisis that had been 
building up since 1875 - when 'the other mills languished or went to the 
wall' - the Samnugger Jute Mill with its overseas markets 
paid a steady dividend of 10 per cent, per annum, 
besides building up a huge reserve fund, enabling 
them to present their shareholders with 40 per cent, 
bonus shares in a baby mill, the Titaghur, floated 
in 1883, which has grown to rive its father's bonnet.^"* 
If anything, as the following table suggests, Wallace probably 
underestimated Samnugger's prosperity in those years. The annual report 
of the company for 1881 described its reserve and depreciation funds as 
exceeding, 'very considerably', 'the excess expenditure on Bdgs., Plant, 
Boats &c.', and 'over and above, the subscribed and fully paid up capital 
of the company' (Table 9). 
Such an object lesson in profit-making did not fail to have its 
effect on an industry desperate for profits and markets. Before long, other 
mills were also in the race for overseas outlets, and by the late '80s 
'had made a fair progress' in this direction.^^ One very important 
development of this period was the formation in 1884 of the Indian Jute 
Manufactures' Association, later called the Indian Jute Mills Association 
or I.J.M.A. The association was set up with the sole object of regulating 
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TABLE 9 
Samnuggar Jute Mills 
Financial 
Year 
Gross 
Profit 
(£-s-d) 
Reserve, 
Wear and Tear, 
and Insurance 
funds 
(£ -s-d) 
Cumulative 
Reserve 
and other 
funds 
(£-s-d) 
Dividends 
' 0' ^  , '0 
1877 26623-3-11 10767-7-4 N.A. 15 
1878 31257-7-11 7632-7-1 N.A. 15 
1879 22409-13-1 7009-13-1 259616-7-6 15 
1880 31879-12-7 13254-12-7 39171-0-1 15 
1881 59841-7-6 36216-7-6 74387-7-7 15 
1882 70538-1-1 39038-1-1 114425-8-8 20 
Source: T.D.A., Minutes of the annual general meetings of Samnuggar Jute 
Factory Company Limited for the relevant years. 
production of the industry so as to match demand. The idea had been 
mooted before. It was said in 1880 that 'if all the mills were to go on 
the single shift or short time movement the production would no doubt be 
sensibly diminished, and ... a rapid advance in the prices would 
naturally follow',^^ but the problem had been a lack of unanimity among 
the mills. A continuing gap between demand and production, coupled with 
the realization that the overseas markets would yield good profits if 
only Bengal's supply of raw jute and cheap labour could be carefully 
exploited, soon made the mills wiser. On 10 November 1884 the I.J.M.A. 
was founded and the next year 'under an elaborate voluntary indenture, 
the Associated Mills agreed ... to work short time'." The Calcutta 
agent of Thomas Duff and Company, one of the anxious architects of the 
short-time-working movement, assured his Home Board in December 1885 
with the telegram: 'Agreement completed commencing February second 
week'. His Home Board's response - asking him 'not to sell beyond about 
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a month forward in the anticipation that the reduced production will 
strengthen the market'^®- was as much an instruction as a statement of a 
point of view that was soon to become an article of faith with the 
industry and I.J.M.A. Throughout the period under discussion, I.J.M.A. 
sponsored and led several short-time movements in the industry, all in 
the belief that 'reduced production [would] strengthen the market'. 
These efforts soon bore fruit. By the late 1880s the Calcutta mills 
received 'regular orders' from the United Kingdom for flour and salt 
bags, and had also 'annexed' the 'Egyptian Diara contract' and 'Levant 
orders for grain sacks and other twill g o o d s B y the early twentieth 
century, they had found new, steady and extensive markets in Australasia, 
the United States, South Africa, and the countries of South America. In 
1913, for instance, of the total export of bags by the Calcutta mills, 
Australia took about 30 per cent, while of the cloth export, 60 per cent 
went to the United S t a t e s . T h e United States' import of jute manufactures 
from India in that year constituted 82 per cent of the country's total 
consumption, the rest coming from the United Kingdom. The progress that 
the Indian industry had made in the 1900s may be gauged from the fact that 
as late as 1897 India had supplied only 32 per cent of the total American 
import of manufactured jute goods, while the United Kingdom provided the 
balance.^^ The extent of change in the Australian market, which was 
once a preserve of Dundee's, is also reflected in the following figures 
for 1911 (Table 10). 
Once the Calcutta mills established themselves as a major source of 
cheap and coarse jute bags these markets were to stay for a long time 
with the Calcutta industry. On an average, Australia took !9 per cent 
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TABLE 10 
Jute bags and sacks imported 
into Australia in 1911 Percentage imported 
Type Quantity (in doz.) 
from India 
Corn and flour packs 813123 99.9 
Bran, chaff and 
259193 100 
28798 99.8 
compressed fodder packs 
Potatoes, onions 
and coal packs 
Ore packs 40368 100 
Wool packs 957047 99.7 
Source: [Anon.], 'Jute', AgMlcultuAal Gazette him SoLith OJale^, 
vol. 24, Pt 8 2 August 1913, p. 668. 
every year of the total export of gunny bags from India between 
1920-21 and 1929-30, and America, 66 per cent of the cloth exports 
between 1896 and 1930." 
The Dundee industry fell into increasing difficulties after the 1880s 
when rising tariff barriers in Europe and the competition from Calcutta 
effectively narrowed the market for Dundee products. In 1900, 'no exports 
of jute manufactures were recorded as being sent from Britain' to Italy 
and France, and the amount sent to Germany was a mere 1.3 per cent of that 
exported in 1878.^^ As one observer put it: 
in the 1880s and 1890s, the Dundee manufacturers, 
increasingly shut out from their established 
Continental markets, were simultaneously losing 
their extensive export outlets in Asia, Australia, 
and along the western sea-board of the American 
continent, to the Calcutta industry. 
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The intensity of Calcutta's competition forced Dundee to specialize 
after the First World War in finer products like carpet backing, leaving 
the market for coarser goods like hessian and sacking to the Calcutta 
industrialists.®^ A dramatic demonstration of Calcutta's supremacy came 
in May 1919 'when ... the Angus Jute Works in Dundee were sold and the 
whole machinery transferred to Calcutta', causing, understandably, 
'considerable surprise and resentment among the unemployed in Dundee'.®® 
That the rivalry between Dundee and Calcutta, and the consequent decline 
of Dundee, never quite assumed the shape or importance of the Lancashire-
Bombay conflict has been put down by A.K. Sen to 'three factors': 
First of all, it [the Dundee industry] was still [in 
the 1890s] a relatively unimportant part of the British 
economy, and the influence of Dundee was less than 
that of Manchester. Secondly, by this time the group 
of Scots who had been investing large amounts in 
Indian jute mills had become an influential force in 
itself ... [Thirdly] Indian jute goods exports were 
by the '90s playing a crucial part in the settlement 
of Britain's dollar purchase ... [i.e.] in the 
settlement of British balance of payments. Since this 
fact was considerably discussed [in Dundee and 
elsewhere], this too must have played its part in 
not allowing to develop in the case of the Indian 
jute mills the type of social ethos that developed 
against the Indian cotton industry.®^ 
As the market for the products of the Calcutta industry widened and 
stabilized - though not without some short-lived crises in the '80s and 
the early '90s - the old spirit of recklessness in the management of 
funds gave place to a more confident outlook. Towards the middle of the 
1890s even the companies owned in Calcutta, which had earned for the 
industry the notoriety of the earlier period, showed signs of financial 
health in their dividends and reserve fund figures. Referring to the 
latter, Sir John Leng remarked: 'Figures like these are enough to make 
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home manufacturers' mouths water. In the home textile trades for the 
same period of years such returns have been unheard of and u n k n o w n ® ® 
On his return to Dundee, Sir John warned the Dundee Chamber of Commerce 
that the 'time will probably never return when the jute industry in 
Dundee will advance again with leaps and bounds, and when large fortunes 
will be realized in a few years in a very rough and easy way'.®^ Indeed, 
by 1908, Dundee's intermittent outcries against some practices of the 
Calcutta millowners and managers appeared to the latter as 'nothing more 
serious than harmless wails from their small competitor on the Tay'.^° 
The tone of that statement speaks for itself; Wallace's book, from which 
it is quoted, is in itself a testimony to the growing sense of complacency 
that the Calcutta industry developed in the twentieth century. 
lU 
Wallace's book Romance. Jute, was published twice - once in 
1909 and then again, in a revised and updated form, in 1928. The 
differences between the two editions are indicative of the change of mood 
in Calcutta jute circles. The first edition ended on an optimistic 
note - it envisaged a future that 'would appear to be good ... for the 
Calcutta mills'. But its optimism was still cautious. The 'scandals' of 
the nineteenth century were still there like unhealed scars; so the 
'dedication' of the book carried a reminder of the 'early seventies of 
the last century' when 'Jute Mill Management' deserved the 'trenchant and 
businesslike criticism' they received from their friends from time to 
time.^^ By the time Wallace came to write the second edition he was close 
to retiring. The memories of the 'early seventies' had faded. Wallace had 
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seen the Calcutta industry pass through a phenomenal boom during the 
First World War when, according to one observer, in spite of large 
increases 'in the reserves and depreciation funds, the level of profits 
reached was incredible'. 'The ratio of net profits to paid up capital of 
the jute mill[s] ... was 58 per cent in 1915, 75 per cent in 1916, 49 
per cent for 1917 and 73 per cent for the first half of 1918'.^^ The 
importance of trench warfare in the VJar created a huge demand for sandbags 
and the fall in India's export trade gave the industry an almost captive 
supply of raw jute.'^ As the following figures for five individual jute 
mills suggest, the profits-rates of the years 1918-19 remained unsurpassed 
for most periods in the history of the industry (Table 11). 
Wallace wrote the second edition of his book when the industry was 
still gathering the fruits of the harvest it had reaped during the War. 
By 1925 the Calcutta mills consumed 'more than five times as much jute 
as the Dundee industry' and 'the reserve funds of the mills in almost 
every case' exceeded their c a p i t a l . T h e Qapi;taJi of 3 April 1924 - the 
mouthpiece of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce - looked at the profit 
figures for the industry for 1913 to 1923 'given below, Table 12) and 
remarked with unconcealed glee, 'What a wonderful decade it has been!'. 
The industry now developed a new sense of its own history. The 
murky past of the 1870s and 80s was forgotten, and the story of Calcutta's 
jute industry since 1855 was now seen as 'one of uninterrupted progress'.^^ 
The mood of the Scottish entrepreneur in Calcutta became highly self-
congratulatory. The speech Sir Alexander Murray, Chairman of I.J.M.A. in 
1917, made that year at the annual general meeting of the association 
contained an unusual display of statistics and rhetoric. We may take note 
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TABLE 11 
Profit Rs) per ton of manufactured jute 
for five jute mills 1916-1935 
Year Samnugger North Samnugger 
Titaghur 
No. 1 
Titaghur 
No. 2 Victoria 
1916 170.04 144.30 137.42 146.09 136.49 
1917 132.39 122.68 114.01 119.49 123.05 
1918 394.40 327.49 305.73 305.35 303.16 
1919 242.00 208.73 202.15 203.63 197.41 
1920 195.53 184.72 183.10 184.68 181.90 
1921 59.81 44.45 48.45 50.80 50.05 
1922 94.90 67.57 68.60 71.09 74.62 
1923 114.75 86.71 86.46 90.70 97.39 
1924 90.74 76.81 69.69 69.25 82.89 
1925 66.06 34.85 49.50 46.22 63.28 
1926 50.43 40.65 39.14 40.37 49.16 
1927 78.73 69.04 66.54 68.77 76.72 
1928 104.73 90.82 86.01 91.15 97.41 
1929 90.77 71.99 71.63 72.76 83.86 
1930 69.28 52.82 46.80 51.20 56.92 
1931 46.19 36.39 33.65 38.06 39.09 
1932 45.62 32.49 30.17 35.42 36.70 
1933 57.27 36.77 39.45 43.18 48.26 
1934 55.41 31.43 37.67 40.44 48.11 
1935 41.38 31.93 31.76 31.03 38.93 
Source: T.D.A. , Computed from the Confidential Monthly Financial 
Statements for the individual mills for the respective years. 
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TABLE12 
Year Profits before paying 
debenture interests (Rs) 
1913 24597553 
1914 9618614 
1915 42148960 
1916 64871041 
1917 42392573 
1918 122925767 
1919 116453696 
1920 125382066 
1921 49586033 
1922 35835863 
1923 49533808 
Source: Capital, 3 April 1924. 
of both of these elements, for the statistics give us a good idea of 
the growth that the jute industry had enjoyed in its recent past and the 
rhetoric tells us of the spirit of complacancy that this growth had 
generated. Both aspects are important to our story. Since 1879, Murray 
pointed out, the loomage capacity of the mills had increased by 500 per 
cent while the export of raw jute had just 'doubled and no more'. In 
1879 there were '4,946 looms ... giving employment to 27,000 hands', 
while 'the latest returns show 39,000 looms and 812,421 spindles at work 
in India, giving employment to 254,000 hands'. Besides, the export of 
gunny bags had increased 'over 500?o', and that of gunny cloth by an 
unbelievable 22,000 per cent. 'Is not that a record to be proud of, 
gentlemen?'. Sir Alexander asked his audience and answered it himself 
with another rhetorical guestion: 
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To increase the jute manufacturing industry from 
10,000 looms to 40,000 in the comparatively short 
period of 20 years, to provide the necessary capital, 
to secure the required machinery, to recruit and 
train.175,000 new mill workers, and all the time 
to have the satisfaction of knowing that we are 
enriching Bengal, improving the standard of Indian 
labour and earning a fair return on our capital, 
what better results can be looked for by the most 
ardent protectionist or free trader? 
'Don't these figures speak for themselves?'. Sir Alexander continued. 
'Don't they show the sound basis of which the jute manufacturing is 
established, so far at least as this country's trade is concerned?'.^® 
The reworked text of the second edition of VJallace's book was 
coloured by this prevailing mood of robust confidence. 'For all time' to 
come, it seemed to Wallace in 1927-28, the mills should be 'in a position 
to weather ... the fluctuating dangers of market'^^ so long as they 
followed the I.J.M.A.'s price - manipulative policies of restricting 
production to meet the demand. These policies, Wallace reckoned, were 
'a factor for good to the trade'.''® The revised 'dedication' of the book 
in this late edition no longer carried any references to the uncertainties 
of the last century. Instead, so strong was Wallace's optimism now that 
he broke into poetry: 
The writer who'll be West, before 
Some future scribe takes up the score. 
Yet still, what'er the Ebb may bring 
The tang of Bengal jute shall cling.^^ 
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V 
Hardly had the ink dried on Wallace's paper when world-events plunged 
the Calcutta industry into a period of serious trade-depression from which 
it never really emerged in the years that followed. What the depression 
revealed was how unfortunate the industry's sense of complacancy had been. 
Contrary to the beliefs of many jute pundits of the day, the crisis 
demonstrated how unstable and unsound the basis of the industry had 
become in the years after the First World War. The following Table 
summarizes the industry's situation in the nineteen thirties (Table 13). 
As the Table indicates, the beginning of the slump in the jute 
industry coincided with the world-wide depression of the early thirties. 
Jute bags were often called 'the brown paper' of world trade, and it was 
natural that a fall in the volume of that trade should reduce the demand 
for manufactured jute. But this was not the whole story. In 1937, the 
volume of 'world trade in materials ... was actually higher by 8 per cent 
than in 1929'.®° Yet the profits of the industry had dwindled seriously, 
and manufactured jute fetched a much lower value on the market than 
before. These facts point to more permanent changes occurring in the 
structure of the demand for jute products. 
In an article published in 1934, R.W. Brock, a former editor of 
Capital, analyzed some of these changes.®^ 'A more serious factor' than 
trade-depression, according to Brock, was competition. Competition came 
from two sources, the first of which were the jute mills abroad, mainly 
in Europe. Under tariff protection, these mills prospered in the twenties. 
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TABLE 13 
The Jute Industry in the 1930s 
Index of Index of Index of 
Index of Profit Net profit consumption avg. rate 
Year Investment Index as percentage of raw of dividend of paid-up jute by on ordinary 
capital the mills shares 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1928 100 100 100 100 100 
1929 101.9 85.6 104.2 104.4 75.7 
1930 104.7 37.9 67.2 110.9 37.3 
1931 109.9 8.7 18.1 78.9 21.6 
1932 110.7 12.6 4.9 73.7 18.0 
1833 113.0 19.8 12.5 75.4 26.3 
1934 108.6 34.4 23.0 90.2 34.9 
1935 110.4 39.8 36.0 96.1 23.9 
1936 110.4 39.8 36.0 96.1 23.9 
1937 114.3 25.9 33.6 104.7 23.8 
1938 121.1 11.1 16.4 125.4 15.5 
1939 122.4 48.8 13.6 107.7 12.5 
Source: Cols 1 and 2, R. Ray, Jndu^tfilcitizcutlon, p. 56; col. 3, Rdpon^. 
o/j tkz Bengal Juto, .EnqaiAy Comnlttz^ (1939), p. 80 and Ahmed, Thd 
the Jute Jndii^tn.y, p. 68; col. 4, S. Mukherji, 'Some Aspects of 
Commercialization', Appendices; col. 5, M.H. Copal, 'Trends of Profit 
in India', Sankhya, vol. 6, Pt 3, June 1943. 
The French jute industry increased its consumption of raw jute from 
357,000 bales in 1923-24 to 613,000 in 1928-29. The German jute industry 
became one of the largest purchasers of Indian raw jute in the 1920s; 
the annual average export of rau jute to Belgium shot up from 1000 bales 
in 1914-18 to 174000 bales after the war; the Italian industry also 
achieved 'international prominence' about this time.®^ Even through the 
world depression of 1930-34, the effects of this competition were visible. 
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In 1933-34, the volume of raw jute exports from India was 27 per cent more 
than in 1931-32, 'the most acute period of the depression', while 'the 
export of jute manufactures ... remained practically constant at the 
extremely depressed figure of 1931-32, which ... marks a fall of about 
30.8% as compared with 1929-30'.®^ 
A much graver threat however came from the prospect of effective 
competition from substitutes for jute products. This competition, Brock 
reported, 'has developed along two lines'. 
(1) the increased adoption of bulk-handling of grains is 
progressively eliminating jute sacks as containers for 
grain in transit; 
(2) the substitution of jute by paper, and to a lesser 
extent by cotton, for the making of bags.®** 
These developments had 'affected the demand for jute goods principally 
in the United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia, and America'. Both paper 
and cotton interests had recently carried out extensive campaigns in 
favour of their products; cotton was further helped by its 'low price 
... recently, its lightness and the conseguent saving in freight, its 
greater strength and more attractive appearance, especially from the 
point of view of retail t r a d e ' . W i t h respect to paper, 'the principal 
loss' had been the cement trade 'of the United Kingdom, South Africa, 
America, Germany and Denmark. 
A conservative estimate places the loss to the jute 
industry of Bengal involved in the change-over to 
paper in the United Kingdom and South Africa alone at 
upwards of twenty million cement bags per annum. 
Wide hessians have been displaced largely in the 
Australian dried-fruit trade by a product known 
as "Sisal-Kraft" ... In the United States cotton 
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bagging is gaining in use and popularity ... 
Agitation in favour of bulk handling of grain is 
active in the United States and Australia and has 
recently extended to ... Argentina ... In Egypt, 
government is banning the use of jute for cotton 
baling, while in-Australia the abandonment of jute 
woolpacks, in favour of some Australian alternative 
material — , is under active consideration.®® 
Behind the rise of paper or cotton (and other fibres) as likely 
substitutes for jute lay the advances made after the First World VJar in 
the application of chemical research to textile manufacturing. 'Follovying 
the war', explained S.G. Barker, a British textile scientist invited out 
to India by I.J.M.A. in 1934, 'there came a period when the modern 
implements of war, that is, the means of prosecution of chemical warfare, 
cordite, nitrocellulose and the like, together with the large factories 
and plants which had been constructed to produce them during the War 
period, had to be utilized and brought upon a peace basis'.®^ Thus grew 
up a whole range of chemical engineering industries which, in the words of 
E.J. Hobsbawm, were 'entirely based on scientific knowledge'. Their 
technical progress, unlike that in the case of nineteenth century factories, 
was 'a function of the input of scientifically qualified manpower, 
equipment and money into systematic research projects'.®® By the early 
1930s enough of this progress had percolated into textile industries other 
than jute to make effective substitutes of jute possible. 'Probably no 
other branch of textile manufacturing has made such advance as the 
application of chemical and other finishes to fabrics. This is more or 
less a direct consequence of the development of synthetic fibres on 
chemical lines'. So S.G. Barker wrote in a paper prepared in 1938, and 
added that 'in this regard, jute materials have, as yet, had very little 
attention'.®^ Sir Alexander Murray, who chaired the meeting at the Royal 
Society of Arts where Barker's paper was read, admitted that 
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This great industry ... has hitherto done no 
scientific research. It is a pity, but it is true 
... I believe we have lost markets thereby. Take 
the cement industry, for example. It may be that 
if we had possessed a scientific research department 
vi/e need not have lost that trade 
Yet it was not as though the Calcutta jute circles were unaware of 
the possibility of substitutes. In 1917 I.J.M.A. 'circulated to all [its] 
members ... a series of extracts and notes regarding possible substitutes 
for Bengal jute'. And one of the conclusions it had itself drawn from the 
experience of the war was that paper 'undoubtedly ... provide[d] a 
workable substitute for jute under certain conditions'.^^ Why then was 
the industry so unresponsive to the challenge posed by scientific and 
technical progress? 
Speaking in 1938, Sir Alexander Murray blamed it on an 'ostrich-
like policy' - 'Manufacturers have been content to take the proceeds and 
not worry about the f u t u r e B u t this criticism was prompted only by 
the crisis of the thirties. To someone of Wallace's generation, or even 
to the same Sir Alexander in 1917, the future had seemed hardly worth 
worrying about. Over the years the jute industry had come to recognize its 
strength in the cheapness of its products (deriving from the cheapness of 
labour and raw material) and in the policy of curtailing outputs that I.J.M.A, 
followed throughout its own career. The experience of the First World 
War seemed to confirm this view. The fabulous profits of the times were 
made in the context of a very slow rise in labour wages, raw jute prices 
and in the number of mills in the industry. ^ ^ These profits, the C a p p e d 
of 3 April 1924 smugly concluded, were proofs of 'the advantages 
attaching to a semi-monopoly'. As late as 1930, when the depression and 
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competition had already struck the industry badly, the I.J.H.A. chairman 
still saw this aspect of the industry as a point of strength: 
But when all these adverse conditions are detailed, 
we must remember our unique position, we are the 
only textile industry in the world which can control 
production to meet demand. Jute is only grown and 
harvested in Bengal and 60?o of it is manufactured 
within a radius of 30 miles of this room at much less 
cost than anywhere else.in the world, and we should 
not hesitate to take advantage of our fortunate 
position to ensure there should be no loss in 
manufacture. 
This 'semi-monopoly' was based on a small range of rather simple 
products. Both before and long after the war, the industry produced only 
four types of goods - hessian, sacking, canvas and twine - all meant for 
'rough uses upon which the vagaries of fashion or the finer points of 
textile science has little or no influence'.^^ This lack of variety in 
output and the coarseness of products meant a relatively stagnant 
technology. 'Hessian, sacking or canvas has not called for any large 
alteration in machinery', Barker reported in 1935.^® In the course of 
carrying out an investigation into the technical problems of the industry 
in 1934, Barker found a very old outlook at work. The Scottish 
entrepreneur in Calcutta, like his predecessor in Dundee in the 1830s, 
had always regarded jute 'as a cheap edition of a long fibre like flax 
for manipulative p u r p o s e s T h e technology employed to manufacture 
jute was simply a variation of the old flax technology which, being a 
rather simple proposition in mechanical engineering, did not require a 
highly skilled and expensive labour force. 
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At the bottom of Wallace's or Murray's complacency, then, there was 
a deeply-entrenched economic outlook which counterposed the cheapness 
of products and price-manipulative practices (like short-time working 
arrangements) to scientific and technological progress. This is why, as 
the Indian Inve^to/u' VtoA Book explained in 1911, the jute mills 
themselves saw the task of manufacturing as requiring much less thought 
than buying and selling of jute.^^ The industry acted with this mercantilist 
reflex when it faced the danger of substitutes: 'cheap jute' became its 
rallying cry. 'Our trade, the basis of which is after all the cheapness 
of the article we produce' was the ever-recurring refrain of many 
speakers at the annual I.J.M.A. meetings throughout the 1910s and 20s. 
Jute was described as a commodity 
whose principal claim to popularity is its cheapness: 
raise the price still further against them [European 
consumers] and you may be sure that the first effect 
will be to stimulate the search for a substitute, 
and one of these days Germany will find one and your 
industry will be in danger of following the path of 
indigo. 
The point was repeated like a chant at later meetings of the I.J.M.A. The 
industry assured itself in 1917 that 'it require[d] a remarkably cheap 
substitute' to compete with jute.^°^ What the chairman of the Association 
said the following year on possible competition was in the same vein: 
'The principal factor in the success of jute has been its comparative 
cheapness and we should use our utmost endeavour to keep it as cheap as 
possible'. ^ T h e point was repeated by R.N. Band, the chairman in 
1925, who strongly recommended 'cheap jute' as the weapon with which 
to fight substitutes and grain elevators then turning up on the market. 
'We know it for a fact', he said, 'that suitable substitues for jute can 
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be grown at a price in several parts of the world, all of which have 
hitherto proved a commercial failure owing to high cost of labour and 
the difficulty of extracting the fibre'. The lesson therefore was that 
the 'prices of our manufactures' had to be kept low so as not to 
encourage the manufacture of substitutes.^®'* 
The implications that the survival strategy of the industry had for 
its labour force are examined in the following chapters. We may briefly 
note here that the results were not very happy for the Bengal peasantry 
either. The industry employed several means to ensure a supply of 
cheap raw jute. It put constant pressure on the Bengal government for 
increasing the area under jute cultivation, and often the government 
was only happy to oblige.^"® The industry was helped by the total 
absence of any organization, economic or political, among the cultivators 
of jute who were distributed (according to an estimate in 1939) in 19 
different districts of Bengal and over six million individual and small 
plots of land.^°^ Further, by following an ever-changing and arbitrary 
system of grading the guality of the loose jute that they purchased, the 
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mills always carried big stocks of jute in order to depress the price of 
the raw jute on the market. As the official history of Bird and Company, 
one of the biggest managing agents in the Calcutta industry, put it: 'by 
carrying large stocks of jute they [the mills] were enabled to buy their 
raw material when the price seemed most favourable'.^"® 
lills often got a better deal than the peasantry.^"® And finally, the 
The policy of producing low-guality, low-price goods left the 
industry vulnerable in one important respect: its products suffered 
badly from a lack of standardization. Because of its neglect of the 
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scientific aspects of its own manufacturing process, the industry had no 
knowledge of the chemical nature of its raw material and depended for its 
classification of bad jute from good on purely outward characteristics 
like 'colour, shade and lustre'.^'" On the other hand, since jute was an 
agricultural product, its quality varied from year to year, depending on 
the 'degree of maturity at the time of harvest, time and conditions of 
retting, water facilities, amount of labour available etc.'. The industry's 
classification of its own goods therefore carried a 'wide margin of 
tolerance'.^^^ Every year, as a result, the industry heard complaints 
about the unreliability of its products. We cite here only two examples 
that are representative. In Hay 1914, Ralli Brothers, leading exporters 
of jute and jute products, issued the following circular to the Calcutta 
mills: 
We have to draw your attention to the deterioration 
in quality, the numerous weaving faults, over-
damping and under-shotting of gunnies produced by 
the Calcutta mills That a gradual lowering in 
quality has been going on during the past seven or 
eight years is generally admitted, but the sudden 
drop in quality and the innumerable weaving faults 
that have arisen is, to say the least, alarming.^^^ 
And in 1925, I.J.M.A. felt it necessary to draw the attention of its 
members to a letter it had received from A.F. Bemis, Chairman, Bemis 
Brothers Bag Company, a dealer in jute goods. 
Let me repeat [Bemis said] the big factor for each 
mill to aim for in developing merchantability is 
uniformity of product. The big outstanding obstacles 
to success in this field are the uncontrollable and 
crude nature of jute fibre and the relatively crude 
nature of jute machinery. Behind these two obstacles 
I am sure you Scotchmen will take refuge ... [But] 
Do you know that the strength of single strands of 
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the best 81b. jute warp yarn undressed from the same 
spindle will vary roughly 50 per cent, up and down 
from the average, say, from 4 lbs to 12 lbs? Low 
grade hessian weft might vary from 21bs to 14 lbs. 
The result is that in the same piece of cloth you 
get strength variations in good makes of 25 per cent, 
above and below the average and in the poorer makes 
40 or even 50 per cent. The variation just cited 
would be increased by atmospheric and seasonal 
differences.^ ^  ^  
'Whilst the going was good and there was little competition', as 
Barker put it in a note of 1934, the industry could afford to overlook 
these problems. ^  ^ T h e industry faced a demand curve of almost unitary 
elasticity, and cheap jute and price-manipulation guaranteed success. 
VJhen 'Indian mills reduced output, prices rose, and profit margins 
increased'.^^" But with improved fibre science permitting cheaper and 
more reliable paper and cotton bags, and grain elevators allowing bulk-
handling of goods, the elasticity of demand changed in favour of 
substitutes. Quality now became an important issue in the market and 
I.J.M.A. admitted in 1934 that 'jute goods have to a large extent lost 
their former advantage of cheapness'.^^® 
The Calcutta jute industry's refusal, in the twenty years between 
1914 and 1934, to come to grips with the scientific problems of its 
manufacturing process thus displayed the mercantilist spirit of the people 
running it. They did not try to obtain the technology that was being 
developed overseas, nor were they interested in creating an independent 
research-wing of their own. Also, the fact that 'jute goods practically 
sold themselves'^^^ even into the 1930s may have only strengthened their 
complacency. The industry had never had to seek orders for its products 
in the past, and up until 1934, I.J.M.A. had no 'organised system of 
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following up the uses to which its products are ultimately applied, and 
... it ... made no endeavour either to keep in touch with the consumers^^® 
Immediate financial gains were seen as the test of correctness of 
business policies. 'Some of us have been taunted that our only desire is 
to make money and that we pay no attention to competition overseas', 
observed R.B. Laird, the I.J.M.A. chairman in 1930. 
We plead guilty to the charge [he said]. The jute mills 
of Bengal were not built to satisfy any economic 
conditions, they were built to pay dividends to their 
owners, let us get that undeniable truth firmly fixed 
in our minds, and all our troubles will vanish, as 
mist before the Sun, as Lord Melchett once remarked. 
He believed in profits as the only motive force ... 
which makes the wheels go round. 
That is our confession of faith, we are not frightened 
to make money, as our friends who taunt us for our 
mercenary outlook seem to be, and no bogey of foreign 
competition will make us renounce our faith.^^^ 
This was no doubt a bold statement of the 'faith' which guided 
I.J.M.A. and its members. The tragedy was that it had become obsolete by 
the 1930s. This became abundantly clear when S.G. Barker, the British 
textile scientist mentioned before, carried out his investigation into 
the technical aspects of Calcutta jute mills in 1934. Barker's report 
placed the entire technological and organisational basis of the industry 
under question. A thorough overhauling of the technology and diversification 
into finer-grade products were his recommendations. But Barker's report 
came twenty years too late. And probably too suddenly, given the slow, 
nineteenth century reflexes of the industry. As late as 1930 the chairman 
of I.J.M.A. had been overly confident: 'Figures are available to prove 
that so far as India[n] Jute Mills are concerned foreign competition is 
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practically non-existent^^° Huge sums of money had been spent in ways 
dictated by this old mode of thinking; the call for restructuring the 
industry in a few years' time was now bound to appear 'uneconomical'. 
I.J.M.A. started a small research department in the late 1930s but it was 
not important till after the Second World War.^^^ None of the more 
thorough-going prescriptions of Barker were implemented. 'Whatever 
happened in the past', reasoned two ideologues of the industry in 1936, 
'it is a fact that if new manufacturing methods and processes are now 
developed suddenly, their outcome would be nothing short of the necessity 
of replacing practically all the existing machinery by new ones'. 
It must be realised that the changeover from old 
machinery to new types has taken place slowly and 
gradually in other industries and it can hardly be 
expected that it would pay to create a research 
organisation and change practically the entire 
machinery for the sake of certain improvements and 
some economy, the results of which could never be 
in proportion to the magnitude of the required 
capital investment.^^^ 
Given this mode of reasoning, the only option left to I.J.M.A., in 
the 1930s was to carry on with its 'cheap jute', production-curtailment 
and other mercantilist policies in an effort to recreate the earlier 
advantages it enjoyed before as a semi-monopoly'. Its first reaction, in 
1929, to the news of competition was to 'adopt the policy of increasing 
production' in order to 'kill' the rivals through a glut in the market 
for jute goods.^^^ This policy soon proving ill-conceived and resulting 
in the first general strike in the industry, I.J.M.A. adopted other 
traditional means of retaining its superiority. The mills reduced their 
working hours to 40 per week from 1931 and agreed to keep 15 per cent of 
their looms sealed. In March 1931 they 'dismissed close on 60,000 workers 
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in carrying out this policy'.^^'' Thus instead of taking note of the more 
serious implications of Barker's diagnosis, the Calcutta industry chose 
to treat the problem of substitutes, in essence a scientific-technological 
problem, as a cost-problem and hence as a price-problem for the industry. 
In November 1935 I.J.M.A. still maintained to the Government of Bengal 
'that the substitutes [could] only gain ground if jute products [became] 
relatively dearer than substitutes 
VI 
Three factors made the traditional policies of I.J.M.A. particularly 
ill-suited for the 1930s. Firstly, in the depressed conditions of the 
period, unity among different jute mills was hard to maintain. Secondly, 
a number of new mills that were set up in the 1920s refused to collaborate 
with I.J.M.A. And thirdly, this period saw intense racial conflict between 
Indian businessmen (who owned most of the shares of the old mills and 
managed some of the new ones) and the established European (mainly 
Scottish) managing agency houses. To facilitate discussion we shall deal 
with these factors one by one and then bring them together at a later 
point in the chapter. Suffice it to say here that these developments 
combined to produce a serious crisis of trust and confidence among the 
jute mills which made I.J.M.A.'s task of working as a 'semi-monopoly' 
enormously difficult. 
This task had never been easy. The Association had of course been 
successful, on many occasions since 1885, in getting the industry to accept 
its short-term working arrangements but such agreements were neither easily 
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produced nor easily implemented. Individual managing agencies looked on 
each other with vying, competitive eyes. Their mills were often differently 
placed with regard to such variables as labour supply, loomage capacity, 
reserve funds, trading orders, etc. A trade crisis therefore always 
contained a potential, and sometimes real, threat to the 'unity' of 
I.J.M.A. 
The substantial degree of economic concentration that existed within 
the industry no doubt contributed to the strength of I.J.M.A. The four 
biggest managing agencies in the industry - Messrs Bird and Co., Thomas 
Duff and Co., Andrew Yule and Co., and Jardine Skinner and Co., -
controlled, between them, 41 per cent of the total number of looms in 1912, 
46 per cent in 1925, 49 per cent in 1928 and 55 per cent in 1936.^^® In the 
52 years of the existence of I.J.M.A. upto 1938, they had supplied 29 of 
its 52 chairmen and in 1937 controlled about 48 per cent of the votes in 
that body.^^^ 'It seems clear', wrote a partner of Bird and Company in 
1935, 'that if our group. Yule group, Inchcape group and Thomas Duffs 
are of the same mind, we can go a long way towards influencing or 
controlling the policy of the Association'.^^® The industry was also 
integrated through multiple and interlocutory directorships often held 
by a relatively small number of individuals whose interests spanned 
across several mills and managing agencies.^^^ 
But in spite of these factors, agreements pushed through at I.J.M.A. 
meetings were often difficult to implement. The history of I.J.M.A. is 
marked by an intense 'individualism' on the part of its members. A 
minimum-selling price agreement of the Association in 1890, designed 'to 
improve the mill sale sheets' in the face of a temporary depression, ran 
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into such trouble. 'All sorts of ruses to get round the minimum scale were 
adopted' and 'wily business dodges' became the order of the The 
Calcutta agent for Thomas Duff and Company found the 'scramble' among 
the mills for orders 'very sickening'. 'I can give you instances', he wrote 
to his Board, 'of some Mills booking orders at Association rates, but 
making the broker a present of a cheque to be handed to the buyer 
Such 'wily business dodges' were so characteristic of the managing 
agencies that their own commercial magazine CapiXaZ once remarked 'that 
these were three kinds of men, good men, bad men and jute men'!^^^ 
In 1912-13 the problem of disunity among the managing agencies assumed 
such proportions that 'an American organiser had to be imported in order 
to tell the Jute Mills Association the simple truth (which they all knew 
before he came) that they should organise their Association on a stronger 
basis'.^^^ Even in the prosperous 1920s and into the depressed 1930s, 
the competitive spirit remained a problem to deal with. In 1930, for 
example, the Association noticed that the production-figures of individual 
mills were frequently at variance with their stated loom-statistics. 
Disturbed by this observation, the Association decided to have the looms 
of its member mills counted by two reputed firms of chartered accountants. 
'The result', in the words of R.N. Gilchrist, 'was astounding'. 
For several years .. - there had been an agreement that 
no Association mill should extend its loomage (with 
certain exceptions), and the enumeration by an 
independent authority showed a total of 58,639 
looms, as against 40,898 in 1921, and 52,929, as the 
previously officially registered number of looms, 
including [the exceptions] ... [Thus] the Association 
mills had for years been flagrantly breaking their 
own agreements ... [They] themselves had dishonestly 
and surreptitiously added about 11 per cent, to their 
productive capacity against their own agreements . .. 
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[But this] was not the only type of dishonesty 
practised. Time stealing was as common as loom 
piracy ... The appointment of two firms of Chartered 
Accountants to check the number of looms in itself 
was an unpalatable confession of weak morality. ^  ^  
Undoubtedly, the 'weak morality' of its members left I.J.M.A. weak 
as an organisation. As the chairman of the Association admitted in 1925, 
'the Association had no power to control its members'. The Association 
could draw up an agreement but 'it must be left to the members to see that 
the agreement was observed'.^^^ Without the dramatic prosperity that the 
First World War gave the industry, internecine quarrels between mills 
would have paralyzed I.J.M.A. quite early in its career, as it almost did 
in 1912-13 when the Association had to bring in an overseas consultant to 
cure its own internal problems. A year later however, before any of the 
recommended organizational reforms could be seriously considered, came 
the First World VJar with its 'unheard and undreamt o f profits. Here 
again, as in so many other respects, the war proved only a mixed blessing 
for the industry and its organization. For while it helped the I.J.M.A. 
on to its feet, it was no cure for its inherent weaknesses. The former 
spirit of mistrust and competition remained; the super-profits of the 
war-time and the '20s only made them more bearable. As Gilchirist 
explained, 'The old intense individualism of the mills did not matter 
now.'. 'Money poured in so fast that almost literally the owners did not 
know what to do with it', apart from distributing 'enormous dividends' 
and building up 'huge reserves'. Even 'loom piracy' (i.e. surreptitious 
additions to loomage capacity), a well known practice in the industry, 
did not cause as much worry as before: 
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indeed, [said Gilchrist,] it was regarded as something 
of a joke. No action was taken as long as trade was 
favourable; exposure had to wait for bad times. 
As conditions worsened from the late twenties onwards, the fissures within 
I.J.M.A. surfaced once again and the Association found it more and more 
difficult to maintain discipline among its members. 
These old problems of internal unity of I.J.M.A. were compounded by the 
establishment, after the First World War, of a number of jute mills under 
Indian management. These mills came to be known as the 'non-Association' 
mills as they refused to become (or stay) members of I.J.M.A. and abide 
by its rules of short-time working, l-ihen the I.J.M.A. mills agreed to work 
only 40 hours a week in 1931, these mills worked for 81 hours upsettina. 
the calculations of I.J.M.A. 
The non-Association mills had good 'economic' reasons for the policies 
they adopted. R.N. Gilchrist thus explained their behaviour: 
They are attempting to do their best, within the law, 
to earn a return on their capital. Their investment 
was made in the knowledge that there was an Association 
of manufacturers which prescribed the commercial policy 
of its members. They knew they need not join the 
Association or if they did they could resign from it. 
Soon after their investment was made, trade conditions 
deteriorated. They could not make money under the 
Association rules; they therefore had to resign and 
make their own policy. They had no reserves, no 
special standing for the purposes of credit [unlike 
the I.J.M.A. mills]. They simply had to make money 
or go to the wall.^ ^  ^  
Gilchrist's point that these mills had 'no special standing for 
purposes of credit' should be carefully noted because it is of importance 
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to our story. For there were other mills established in the post-war 
period - e.g., Meghna, Craig, Waverley, Nuddea etc. - whose reserves 
and dividends were much smaller than those of the pre-war mills. 
But they were set up and managed by old and established European managing 
agencies already belonging to I.J.M.A. 'On general grounds', Gilchrist 
remarked, 'one might have expected a division of interests into pre-war 
and post-war [mills], but the truth is that the bigger brothers have 
carried the younger children on their backs ... Thus the pre-war Gourepore 
sponsored the post-war Nuddea, the pre-war India the post-war Megna, the 
pre-war Alliance the post-war Craig and Waverley, the pre-war Ganges the 
post-war B a n s b e r i a ' T h e s e mills therefore did not pose any threat to 
I.J.M.A., they remained tied to the latter through their European 
managing agencies. The problem of the non-Association mills was precisely 
that they were all owned and managed by newly set-up Indian managing 
agency houses (most of them byMarwaris), except for the American Ludlow 
Jute Mill which declined to join the Association ostensibly on anti-Trust 
grounds. 
The fact that the non-Association mills were mostly Indian-managed 
may give their conflict with the European-dominated I.J.M.A. the 
appearance of yet another confrontation between imperialism and 
nationalism. There are problems, as we shall see, with this 
characterization. Yet the racial element in this conflict is important 
for the purpose of understanding the problems of the industry in this 
period. The confusion and distrust created by racism certainly contributed 
to I.J.M.A.'s inability in the t h i r t i e s to impose any discipline on its 
members. 
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VII 
The racial conflict between Indian (mainly Marwari) and Scottish 
businessmen in the jute industry was aggravated by a particular historical 
feature of the situation. While Scotsmen managed most of the mills and had 
an almost exclusive control over managerial positions, the capital they 
managed was for the most part Indian and became increasingly so after the 
First World War. 'Out of a total capital of £10 000 000 sunk in jute mills 
in India' in 1912, 'only about one-eighth [was] from Dundee and D i s t r i c t ^ 
The capital was largely raised in India - initially, as A.K. Bagchi has 
shown, mainly from European civilians and armymen residing in India, and 
later from Indians as well.^'*^ The Marwari Association of Calcutta 
claimed in 1922 that ' Indians held not less than 60?o of the shares in 
jute mills'.^'*'* By 1937 the figure was somewhere close to 67 per cent.^'*^ 
This is also seen in the place of registration of the companies.''*® Of 20 
jute mills running in Calcutta in 1880, only 4 were registered in the 
U.K.''*' In 1921, the number was 7 out of 65."*® 
The reasons for the unwillingness that established Scottish capital 
historically displayed over the question of direct investment in the 
Calcutta industry are difficult to determine. But the 'last period of 
heavy investment' in the Dundee jute mills was the year 1873, and the 
rise of the Calcutta mills 'coincided with a return of prosperity in the 
United States' when 'Dundee financial circles transferred their investment 
interest ... across the Atlantic'. In 1873 Sir William Reid, the then 
\'ice-Consul for the United States in Dundee, promoted the Oregon and 
Washington Trust Investment Company Limited which was financed by 25 of 
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the major Dundee financiers. The original Board of the company had such 
men on it as 'Thomas Bell and William Lowson, merchants; James Neish, 
solicitor; Thomas Couper, Shipowner; Thomas H. Cox, manufacturer; and 
John Leng, newspaper p u b l i s h e r ^ ^ 
It also seems quite possible that the early 'scandals' of the 
Calcutta jute industry left the important Dundee financiers and 
industrialists unenthusiastic about investment in that direction. Thomas 
Cox who was a senior partner of Cox Brothers, Dundee and who specialized 
in finance and investments^^" is a case in point. In 1872, a year before 
he decided to invest in the American company mentioned above, he turned 
down a proposal to invest in a jute mill in Calcutta which he thought 
would only be a 'very heavy financial burden on the business'. This is 
what Thomas Cox wrote to his brother Henry about the proposal in 1872: 
We note what you say about engaging in a spinning and 
manufacturing company at Chandernagore. After giving 
this matter due consideration, we concluded to advise 
you to get out of it in the best way you can. We see 
no great objection to your managing the mercantile 
part of it if you think you can accomplish it, but we 
would decidedly advise you against investing money in 
it. In such a climate, the deterioration and difficulty 
of keeping up a jute mill must be very great. No doubt 
the Borneo Co. saw it was time to get part of their 
immense place realised. Our Mr Williams was told by 
Mr Fergusson, one of the partners of George Henderson 
and Co., that the Barnagore [mill] at.that time - 10 
years ago - had never remitted any dividends home 
and we see Duff got out of it in as easy a way as he 
could. 
Thomas Cox's views were apparently shared by other Dundee investors. The 
special correspondent of the Pandee KdvOJiti^OJi who reported in detail on 
the financial state of individual jute mills in Calcutta in his book 
Tll^ JlU^ M M ^ Bziigal (1880) ended his series of reports by saying: 
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'our advice just now to people desirous of investing capital in the jute 
manufacturing trade at Calcutta is similar to that of Punch to those 
about to marry - "DON'T'".^^^ 
VJhile Scottish capital did not flow out to Calcutta in any large 
measure, Scottish enterprise did. The British Association of Dundee found 
in 1912 that the 'overseers, managers and mechanics in the Indian jute 
mills [were] almost wholly recruited from Dundee'.^^^ By the time of the 
First World War, the composition of the Dundee middle class had been 
perceptibly affected by fortunes made in Calcutta. An economic study of 
the town as it was in this period observed: 'Undoubtedly some of the new 
middle-class mill owners had emerged from the artisan class by means of 
a period of employment in Calcutta'. ^  
This domination of jute mill management by Scotsmen was not based 
on the proverbial Scottish enterprise alone. It was also based on a 
degree of clannishness. The Scottish managers and supervisors of the 
Calcutta jute mills did not owe their position to any special skills or 
qualification, as Bagchi has duly noted,^^^ but to their 'connections'. 
One VJilliam Ure, who was interviewed by Sir Edward Benthall of Bird and 
Company for employment with them in Calcutta, had no special qualifications 
'apart from a course in Book-keeping' that he had taken 'through the 
International Correspondence people'. Benthall even noted that 'he [did] 
not read, except in the winter, when he [read] chiefly thrillers'. But 
what made him eligible were that he knew 'Anderson in Hooghly Mill and 
the two Golds in Birds' and that his father was 'Cashier in the Victoria 
Mill'. Besides, he had always 'wanted to go to India as does every young 
man in Dundee ...'. He was, Benthall said, 'just the normal type we take 
on in Calcutta' 
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This clannishness could easily give rise to racism. The 
Marwari Association of Calcutta complained to the Indian Fiscal Commission 
of 1922 that 'the European [mill] managers did not buy jute through Indian 
traders'.^^^ The complaint was voiced also to the Bengal Provincial 
Banking Enquiry Committee of 1930 which was told of the considerable 
'difficulty' that Indian traders of jute in Calcutta had to face 'in 
disposing of their stocks to the mills'. The mills did not recognize their 
marks and names and compelled them 'to sell through European firms of 
b r o k e r s ' . T h e practice was old and established. A Dundee gentleman 
visiting Calcutta in 1894 noticed 'a grave defect in the management of 
the Indian mills', which arose 'from the presence in the jute trade of 
Dundee men as sellers and brokers'. 'These men have friends or relations 
among the jute mill agents, who naturally place confidence in them and 
employ them in preference to others'. The Indian jute brokers had to 
'obtain a Dundee partner in order to qualify to enter the magic ring'.^^^ 
The story of the rise of the Marwaris in this European-dominated 
business world of Calcutta deserves a much richer and fuller account 
than can be provided here. According to Thomas Timberg, 'more than one-
half of the jute balers in 1900 were Marwaris. By 1907 they had started 
direct shipping of jute overseas and in 1909 formed their Baled Jute 
Association. Before the first VJorld VJar some Marwari merchants 'acquired 
a large number of "pucca" or expert-oriented jute presses', which were 
'formerly a European preserve'. In 1917, the most important Marwari firm 
Birla Brothers opened a branch office in London; by 1920 they were 'one 
of the top three exporters of raw jute' from Calcutta. During and after 
the war the Marwaris also entered the export trade in hessian and gunnies, 
and started speculation in jute mill shares, the value of which increased 
by 'three times' between 1915 and 1926.^^° 
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The nineteen-twenties also saw a very large increase in future 
trading in raw jute - and later in hessian as well - by Flarwari merchants. 
Known as the operations of the ^a-tka (lit. bubble) market or the bkiXoA 
bazoA (lit. inside or secret market), such speculative trading in jute 
was started in Calcutta about 1911-12 by one Jewanmal Bengani, a Marwari 
dealer in raw jute:^^^ 
as the number of ... speculators increased, an 
"exchange" was formed at 68 Cotton Street in the 
year 1912, where dealings in 25 bales or its 
multiples used to be carried on. There was no 
guestion of delivery [of jute] and only difference 
used to be paid. When the great war broke out and 
the jute trade was temporarily disorganised ... 
this "exchange" had to stop its operations. With 
the return of confidence by 1916, a limited 
company, styled the Calcutta Pat Association 
Limited, was started for those speculative deals.^^^ 
A temporary short supply of raw jute in 1925-26 helped the Calcutta 
Pat Association to do some brisk business till the government closed it 
down in 1926 under a Gambling Act 'on the complaint of a few parties who 
had suffered loss on this market'.^^^ Significantly, ten of the eleven 
men convicted in this connection were Marwaris. ^  Soon after the 
suppression of the Pat Association, a new organization called the East 
India Jute Association was formed with a view to running a futures market 
in jute. All its leading members were Marwari balers and shippers of jute, 
the Birlas heading the list. There were also two other, less formal, 
exchanges - called Gudri and Katni - where the units of transaction were 
kept small in order to accommodate small-time speculators whose ranks 
swelled as the trade depression of the late twenties deepened, adding to 
the profits of the balers who sold in these markets. 'It cannot be 
substantiated', wrote M.N. Roy in his 1934 pamphlet we have referred to 
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before, 'but the report goes that the drivers of motor cars, ... and the 
numerous Biri and panwallas, and Darwans occasionally buy and sell 5 bales 
in the Katni' 
While enriching themselves in the {^atka market, the Marwari balers, 
following the lead of the Birlas, also reached out for the foreign market 
in jute where their performance impressed even their competitors. 'The 
enterprise and efficiency of the modern Marwari Baler', wrote Benthall in 
a long note in 1935, 'cannot be appreciated abroad and this applies 
particularly in the case of large operators of the type of Cotton Agents 
(Birla Brothers) and Surajmal Nagarmall'. 
I understand that [a] number of [Maru/ari] Balers are 
frequently in communication now a days with their 
direct connections abroad by phone. They do not 
confine their operations to the London market but 
are directly represented in such markets as Dundee 
and New York, and there is a distinct tendency to 
encourage Continental business directly through 
Hamburg. In this connection the activities of 
Khubchand Sethia here on the London Market are a 
special feature particularly as regards Russian 
business which seems to have gone completely past 
us sometimes.^ 
Marwari incursion into the jute industry was thus only an aspect of 
their overall success in the world of Bengal jute. Here again the Birlas 
were among the leaders. In 1918-19 they set up their Birla Jute Mill which 
was followed soon by the Hukumchand Jute Mill, belonging to the Sarupchand 
Hukumchand family.^^^ By 1926-27 several other Indian traders made their 
way into manufacturing, the more prominent among the new mills being 
Premchand Jute Mill owned by Janakinath Roy, Gagalbhai Jute Mill belonging 
to the Mafatlalls, Hanuman Jute Mills set up by Surajmall Nagarmall, 
Agarpara Jute Mill owned by B.N. Elias and Company and Haji Adamji Dawood 
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Jute Mill owned and run by Haji Adamji Dawood and Company. By 1932 these 
were joined by some other smaller mills, e.g., The Calcutta Jute 
Manufacturing Company Ltd, Kedarnath Jute Mills, Shree Ganesh Jute Mill, 
Kathiar Jute Mill (owned by Hardutroy Chamaria and Sons) and the Swadeshi 
Jute Mill.^^® 
The appearance of the Indian 'intruder' on the scene naturally did 
not please the entrenched European businessman. 'The Indians are determined 
to get into the industry' was Benthall's grim comment on the margin of a 
letter he received in December 1928 form a Marwari firm of 'Stock and 
Share Brokers and Dealers'.^^^ A month earlier his partner M.P. Thomas 
had described the Indian mills as 'our new and undesired competitors'.^^" 
Benthall himself wrote in 1929: 'These people ... are hopeless gamblers, 
it will be to the good of India if they retire from the scene'.^^^ 
A special target of European hostility was G.D. Birla, the most up 
and coming of the Marwari entrepreneurs. Thomas reported to Benthall in 
December 1928 that Birla 'hias had more to do with encouraging New Mills 
than any one [else]'. 'If he can't get us by kicking us out he will try 
to get us out by unfair competition.'^^^ Even when he was away in England 
Benthall worried about competition from Birla. 'In Calcutta', reads his 
diary for 10 Eebruary 1929, 
the Birla party continued their efforts to control 
the jute trade and at the moment have paralysed the export 
business by [selling at] Rs 6 below the Calcutta packing 
cost and bearing the phatka while the forward position 
here commands a ruppee premium for each month. 
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In the privacy of his personal diary Benthall's hostility was frank and 
unconcealed: 
It is his [Birla's] policy (on a 5 year basis) to 
establish himself as the leading figure in the 
trade and it may be necessary to form a combine 
against him. A plan is being is hatched. Both in 
jute and gunnies his advance has been tremendous 
... It is a sign of the times: vue must dig in our 
toes and fight for our position.^^^ 
Indeed, the signs of the times were too obvious to be overlooked. By 
the middle of the twenties, the Marwaris were being openly assertive about 
protecting their business interests. This can be seen in the letters written 
by Marwari shareholders to the editor of the Capital complaining of 
arrogance on the part of some European managing agents of jute mills or 
in the references in Benthall's diaries to 'Bajoria's attacks' on 
Europeans at shareholders' meetings. ^  In 1926 the Marwari businessmen 
formed the Indian Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta with G.D. Birla as its 
President and took a leading role in the founding of the all-India 
organization of Indian employers, the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI).^^^ The following year they founded the 
East India Jute Association which soon evoked opposition from European 
businessmen in Calcutta and elsewhere.^^^ About this time Birla also 
managed to become 'the only Indian member' of the London Jute Association.^^^ 
It was in these years that reports of Marwari traders like 'Choudhri 
Chhajuram' buying 'considerable number of jute shares' led Benthall to 
make the unfriendly remark, 'The Indians are determined to get into the 
industry'. In February 1929 Benthall was still 'considering means of 
giving the Birla party a slap in the jute market' and was not pleased 
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to discover the next month that Birla was still 'up and by registering 
more shar©] in Titaghur is showing signs of intensified hatred towards 
1926-30 appear to have been the years when relations between Indian 
and Scottish businessmen in Calcutta reached a very low point. The 
peculiarly marginal position of the Scotsman in the world of Bengal jute 
- his domination being based more on enterprise and clannishness than on 
capital-investment - perhaps contributed to the intensity of the conflict. 
Once when asked by Benthall in 1929 if 'he hadn't been insulted' by 
'Scotchmen' while negotiating the sale of jute to a Calcutta mill, G.D. Birla 
gave the rather sarcastic reply, 'not more than usual'.^^^ The hostile 
exchanges were by no means confined to the verbal. In March of the same 
year, while Birla tried to reach the Viceroy's ear with complaints about 
'racial discrimination' by the Europeans in the jute t r a d e , B e n t h a l l 
had the following to note about Birla's jute mill near Calcutta: 
he [Birla] has had five fires in four months at his 
mill - due to his Indianisation policy and refusal to 
employ Scotsmen. Jute gone to dust and burnt: more 
burnt to cover up the delinquencies and then finally 
a fire in the finishing house (affecting also 150 
looms) which [even] if he recovers from the Ins-Coys, 
will about square the rest. 
It is a small monument to the racism of the day that Benthall held the 
Harwaris squarely responsible for these jute mill fires. 'These people 
[the Marwaris] carry racial hatred to [an] extreme' was his only gesture 
18 1 at apportioning blame. 
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Racism of course could easily be stretched into 'imperialistic' 
and 'patriotic' feelings on the two sides. G.D. Birla later recalled how 
he had always 'smarted' under the 'insults' he suffered in dealing with 
'Englishmen who were my patrons and clients': 'I was not allowed to use 
the lift to their offices, nor their benches while waiting to see them ... 
and this created within me a political interest Yet the Scottish-
Indian conflict in the jute industry never quite became an all-out war 
dividing the industry into two clearly defined, mutually opposed, ethnic 
interest-groups. The problem of unity that I.J.M.A. faced in this 
period would have been much less complicated had this been the case. In 
reality, the lines of unity and division in the industry ran in bewilderingly 
different directions, often across and within the warring races. The Scots 
and the Marwaris were, after all, interested in the same industry, often 
in the same mill, with the Marwaris as substantial shareholders in the 
twenties and the Scots providing the crucial managerial element. Each 
group stood to profit from the other's activities. To a managing agency 
firm like Bird and Company even the rival, non-Association mills were 
potential fields for their business activities. For all his anger at 
'vilification of us by Narayandas Sajoria to sundry Assembly members', 
Benthall was too good a businessman to lose sight of this. 'Adamji will 
not be friends ...', he noted with genuine regret on 7 March 1929. 'There 
is now no chance of obtaining his mill agency if hard times come ...'. 
Hence 'we must not make the same mistake ... and I must continue friendly 
relations with other new mill owners e.g., Magneeram Bangur, Flafatlall, 
Surajmull Nagarmu] 1 etc.'.^'^^ He even took care to write to his arch-
enemy Birla in December 1928 emphasizing his 'trust' in 'friendly 
relations'.^®'' The tie-up of economic interests between a colonial 
capitalist like Benthall and a 'nationalist' businessman like Birla comes 
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out clearly in the follov/ing extract from Benthall's diaries. It \i/as 
written on 26 September 1930 when relations between the two races were 
far from cordial. 
The most significant feature of the last few months 
has been the crash in Jute and Gunnies which has 
taken Birla far down with it. There is doubt whether 
he will survive: he owes us money at the end of 
October but if he fails after that we will be delighted 
... Even if he does not go, he should not be the danger 
that he has been, but without the support of B[irla] 
we may not get the tariff on paper. So I hope he 
survives, that he doesn't sell his shares or if he 
does, that they go into other Indian hands. 
The opposition between Scottish and Marwari interests was weakened 
also by serious divisions among the Marwaris themselves. Some of these 
divisions were caused by religious and cultural questions that had arisen 
in the community as a result of its contact with western ideas and 
institutions. The inevitable conflict between the 'orthodox' and the 
so-called 'westernizers', a familiar theme in the history of British 
India, seriously occupied the Calcutta Marwaris in this period, and such 
was the irony of the situation that G.D. Birla, the eye-sore of the 
European businessman in the city, was seen by the 'orthodox' Fiarwari as 
the leading 'westernizer' of the c o m m u n i t y . ^ T h e s e ideological issues, 
along with individual trade rivalries, often divided the Marwaris against 
themselves, creating strange alliances in a 'race war' that otherwise 
might have been total. Thus it was not only the Scotsmen who would have 
been 'delighted' to see Birla go down - 'so will [be] most of his own 
community!!!', wrote Benthall.'®^ The 'Swarajist' connections of a 
Bajoria or Birla could be countered by what Benthall thought was 
'inestimably more valuable, the support of the orthodox Marwaris'. It is 
interesting to note that in the 'open war' that Benthall privately and 
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unilaterally declared on Bajoria in the pages of his diary the combatants 
mentioned on his side were all Marwaris - 'three of the principal loose 
jute balers i.e., Hari Singh, Lohia and Surajmull Nagarmull', the last 
named being also the owner of one of the rebel mills. Indeed, Benthall 
received much of his 'secret' news about the business moves or the social 
situation of the Birlas from rivals within their own community - a 
'Sheokissen at Goenka's garden party tonight', or a 'Swedayal Ramjeedas' 
of the firm of 'Tarachand Ganshyamdas' would often volunteer the information. 
And as if to add to the confusion of this picture of 'war of all against 
all' Birla and Benthall had their own private parleys where it would now 
be Birla's turn to speak ill of the Marwaris 'by whom I was surrounded ... 
particularly ... Bunga and Chokhany'.^®® 
Thus what the European-Marwari competition produced in the end was 
an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust in the jute circles of Calcutta 
where men now saw each other as playing ambiguous games. Benthall's 
private correspondence gives indications of how people felt in such 
circumstances. Mungneeram Bangur, an important Marwari shareholder of jute 
mills, for example, left some of the senior officials of Bird and Company 
extremely unsure of his motives. M.P. Thomas wrote to Benthall in 
December 1928 that he suspected Bangur of being 'up to some dirty work': 
'I think he is keen on putting up a mill himself. He denies it and laughs, 
but I feel there is something in it'. Benthall himself was utterly confounded 
and angry that Bajoria should play such games with him. To all appearance, 
Bajoria behaved like a sworn enemy of Benthall's. He 'vilified' the 
Europeans in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. He also fought Benthall 
at shareholders' meetings of the Titaghur Mills with the help of men like 
'Mookerjee or Banerjee' who, Benthall wrote, 'was briefed for Rs 16/-
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to speak on their behalf and who offered for Rs 32/- to speak on our 
side'. But what left Benthall breathless was that Bajoria should also 'at 
the same time ... protest his friendship to me by the gift of a Benares 
cloth!'. 'Such a man is he!', exclaimed a disgusted Benthall.'®^ 
VIII 
We can now pick up the main thread of our story and see how the 
problem of racism and Indian competition affected I.J.M.A. The magnitude 
of the competition offered by the non-Association mills was as such not 
very large. They controlled about 2000 looms as against I.J.M.A.'s 
57,387 in 1932.^^° But even so, the situation posed a serious problem of 
'discipline' to I.J.M.A. at a time when this was badly needed. 
I.J.M.A.'s plan of retrieving the earlier monopolistic supremacy of the 
Calcutta industry thycjugh production and price agreements called for a 
certain degree of cohesion among different mills and their owners. This 
was where Indian competition hurt most. By producing an atmosphere of 
mistrust and suspicion it added to the complexity of I.J.M.A.'s task, 
already made difficult by the depression. 
'I will be glad when the matter is finished', M.P. Thomas of Bird 
and Company wrote to Benthall in November 1928 regarding a move for a 
fresh working-time agreement that he had been spearheading within I.J.M.A. 
'The position this morning is that with the exception of Birla, Angus, 
Barry and Gillanders, all have signed ... it's been a dickens of a worry, 
and the market has been mad, reacting hysterically to every fresh rumour'.^^^ 
The confusion created by the Indian competition and the feelings it aroused 
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in different quarters compounded the problem. Four Indian mills that had 
joined the Association briefly 'during the first half of 1930' left while 
the I.J.M.A. mills worked only 40 hours a week with 15 per cent of their 
looms sealed under an Association agreement. So feeble was the solidarity 
within I.J.M.A. now that even the prospect of the small competition that 
these four mills offered threw the Association into complete disarray. 
The Association now swallowed its much-vaunted principle of 'non-
interference of Government in industry' and involved the Governor of 
Bengal, Sir John Anderson, in coercing the non-Association mills into a 
temporary truce. ^ ^^ 
The Association admitted its organizational weakness in the petition 
in which it requested government intervention. It said 
The attraction of trebling production and thereby 
reducing overhead costs by 30 per cent is likely 
to prove irresistible to a few of the associated 
mills, and to all non-associated mills, and it is 
altogether certain that resignations from the 
association will be handed in very soon. The 
situation at the present moment is that, if measures 
are not taken by Government ..., the ability of the 
association [I.J.M.A.] to regulate [production] 
must disappear within a few months.^^^ 
The internal problems of I.J.M.A. in the thirties were also evident 
in a proliferation of rules and by-laws designed to 'tighten up' its 
organization.^^"* In the past the association had always depended to some 
extent on the informal social control that a small groupj^ex-patriate 
Scotsmen could exercise on itself. A 'word of honour', though often 
somewhat indifferently kept, served I.J.M.A. well enough in its better-off 
days; no policing of the members had been necessary.^^^ With Indians 
75 
breaking into the industry at a time when the trade took a turn for the 
worse, such informal control soon however proved inadequate. Working-time 
agreements had to be backed up throughout the thirties by an elaborate 
set of rules and, on occasions, governmental authority. To someone like 
Sir Alexander Murray the change from the earlier days of 'informality' 
was too marked for it to go unnoticed. 'They [the mills] have all signed 
agreements for five years', he said in 1949, 'which have been renewed for 
another five years, with rigorous rules and by-laws. I was the chairman 
of the Mills Association in Calcutta in 1913 ... and at that time there 
were no rigorous rules and by-laws by which to get people to work four 
days, or five days, or to get down hessian and sacking looms ...'. 
I remember once having to persuade members that the 
time had arrived for a short-term agreement. I get 
on fairly well until I came to an old Scotsman who had 
a grievance of some description. In the course of 
earlier discussions he had said: "I will not sign any 
more short-time agreements". Eventually he agreed ... 
[but] said: "No, we will not sign this agreement, but 
have you ever found me letting you down in any way? 
I can assure you my word is as good as my bond." I 
said "Thank you very much" and got up and walked out 
before he could qualify that in any way.^°® 
In the middle of the trade crisis, suspicions, bitterness and race conflicts 
of the 1930s such informal arrangements were no longer possible. 
The more desperately the Association pursued its elusive goal of 
monopoly in the 1930s, the more deeply the Calcutta industry became 
embroiled in its own contradictions. I.J.M.A.'s policy of restricting 
output ran up against the opposition of tlie mills that refused to join 
the association, which in turn endangered I.J.M.A.'s own fragile unity. 
I.J.M.A. hoped, on the one hand, to undercut 'substitutes' and foreign 
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competition through the cheapness of its products; on the other hand it 
wanted to deal with the competition from the non-associated mills by 
forcing them to buy their jute dear. This nieant a price-war over raw jute 
and frequent fluctuations in jute prices as a result of interested 
manipulation. Such fluctuations, on the other hand, encouraged 'substitutes' 
which enjoyed a comparative price stability.^ 
The market [wrote G.B. Morton of Bird and Company to 
Benthall in August 1935] undoubtedly fears the results 
of conflict between outside and Association Mills and 
this is undoubtedly part of the reason for uncertainty 
and may be the root of the trouble. Association Mills 
hold large stocks of cheap Jute and therein lies their 
strength in a conflict. To reduce the price of jute is 
to reduce this advantage, so it is [in] the interest 
of the outside Mills to get Jute prices down and keep 
them down. It will suit them also to have small margins 
now between cost and selling prices whilst restriction 
of hours still places Association Mills at a disadvantage 
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Unsuccessful in its attempt to eliminate competition through either 
restriction of output or manouevring of jute prices, I.J.M.A. decided in 
1937 to 'crush' the non-associated mills 'out of existence' by glutting 
the market. 'Their object was to spoil the market so that every mill would 
be incurring losses'. The strategy boomeranged. The 'outside' mills were 
generally smaller in size and their cost-structure saved them from heavy 
losses, while the price of jute manufactures plunged 'to [a] very low 
figure' and the Association mills suffered. 
Besides, what I.J.M.A. had not taken into account was a growing 
volume of 'excess capacity' that had been accumulating in its affiliated 
mills over the years, adding to their costs. High profits during and after 
the First World War had drawn more and more capital into the industry. 
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Even after the depression the trend continued as the industry continued 
to offer dividends from its large reserve funds. In 1935, the Government 
of India, when approached by the industry for the grant of protection, 
pointed out that compared to the years 'immediately preceding the war' 
the capacity had been 'increased by an addition of about 60% to the 
number of jute mills and of about 90% to the number of looms and of about 
60% to the number of spindles'.^°° The Jute Enquiry Committee of 1939 
reported that while the 'total loomage of the jute mills in 1932 registered 
an increase of 11.3 per cent over the quinquennial annual average of the 
years 1927-31, — the average consumption of raw jute by Associated mills 
had increased by only 1.8 per cent during this period'. 
The productive capacity continued to increase 
uninterruptedly till, at the end of 1938, the total 
loomage had increased by 9.4 per cent over the 
figures for 1932. The consumption of raw jute during 
this period had fallen by 15 per cent.^°^ 
Such excess capacity was bound to affect profitability especially as the 
price obtainable for jute manufactures fell and as the price could not 
be put up for the fear of substitutes, which revealed once again the 
dilemma of the industry. 
IX 
The story of entrep rineurship in the Calcutta jute industry is thus 
one of an old trading outlook persisting in the face of several changes 
in the political and economic environment of the industry. The outlook 
was an anachronism in a post-First-World-War era of close alliance 
between scientific research and industrial success. Barker's investigations 
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into jute mill technology gave the industry a moment of introspection but 
that moment was brief. In the perception of the people who mattered, the 
report came too late in the day. Nor do all of its implications seem to 
have been comprehended. Instead, the industry sought to face its new 
problems with its old strategies. These did not work very well in the 
changed circumstances. It is true that the crisis of the thirties shook 
the industry out of its earlier mood of complacancy but the old habits of 
thinking died hard. In 1932 the I.J.M.A. chairman John Sime e^vinced a very 
different mood for poetry than that displayed by Wallace in 1928. 'Let us 
not deceive ourselves', said Sime, 'conditions are changed and changing 
rapidly', and he went on to guote Shakespeare: 
Not poppy nor mandragora nor all the drowsy syrups 
of this world can ever lull us back to that sweet 
sleep that we had yesterday. 
Sime's love of Shakespeare was not matched by the accuracy of his 
quotation, but his choice of metaphor was apt. The Calcutta jute industry 
had chosen to sleep through scientific and technological changes in its 
rival industries for twenty years. Even when it woke up in the thirties 
it still behaved like a Rip Van Winkle of the industrial world and spent 
more than a decade looking for its old position in a trading structure 
that no longer existed. This anachronistic nature of the industry - the 
trading mentality that guided its economic policies and techmological 
choices - was to have a profound influence on the history of the labour 
force it created, especially in matters of discipline, authority and, 
consequently, workers' protest as well. While this was by no means the 
only influence shaping that history, it was an important one and is 
considered in more detail in the chapters that follow. 
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Chapter 3 
OF CONDITIONS AND CULTURE 
When the Government of India appointed a committee in 1946 to 
enquire into the conditions of the jute mill workers of Calcutta, the 
committee found that there was 'very little literature available' in 
regard to the subject.^ These conditions, in other words, had not been 
investigated before with any degree of thoroughness. Today, this creates 
a special problem for the historian, for any projected history of the 
conditions of this working class is soon bedevilled by the problem of 
paucity of sources. True, some of this scarcity of documents can be 
explained by the characteristics of the Bengali intelligentsia who 
seldom, if ever, produced social investigators like, for instance, 
Henry Mayhew. Some of it may also be explained by the non-literate 
nature of the working class. A problem however still remains. What is 
puzzling is the relative poverty of the information in the documents 
of the state - especially documents that needed the co-operation of 
employers, the factory inspectors' reports, for example - which 
compare rather badly, say, with the apparent richness of similar English 
documents that Marx, for one, put to such effective use in the first 
volume of Capital. 
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To find a way out of this impasse, \i/e shall treat the problem of 
'paucity of sources' as constituting in itself an important problem in 
the very history we are trying to understand. We will therefore read 
the available documents on jute workers' conditions for both what they 
say and their 'silences'. We will look at the conditions of production 
of these documents and in this way we hope to be able to make their 
'silences' speak. For, as we argue below on the basis of our reading 
of Marx, an attempt to analyze these silences invariably takes us into 
questions of culture and demonstrates a point central to our overall 
argument: that a theoretical understanding of the working class needs 
to go beyond the political-economic and incorporate the cultural. 
The discussion in the first volume of Marx's Cap-LtaJi raises the 
possibility of a relationship between the day-to-day running of 
capitalism and the production of a body of knowledge about working-
class conditions. Marx in fact presents us with the elements of a 
possible theoretical approach to the problem. Even at the risk of 
appearing to digress, it may be worthwhile to go over that theoretical 
ground once again, as the rest of this chapter will use that discussion 
as its own framework. Perhaps it should also be emphasized that what we 
are borrowing here from Marx is essentially an oAgamtnt. Marx used the 
English case to illustrate his ideas but the specifics of English 
history do not concern us here. We are not reading Marx as a historian 
cf England and this is not an exercise in conrparative history. 
As is well known, Marx used the documents of the English state for 
the wealth of detail they usually offered on the living and working 
conditions of the English proletariat. But Marx also noted in the 
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process that the English state's interest in closely monitoring the 
conditions of labour had an extremely usefu] role to play in the 
development of English capitalism. 'This industrial revolution which 
takes place spontaneously', wrote Marx, 'is artificially helped on by 
the extension of the Factory Acts to all industries in which women, 
young persons and children are employed'.^ This the Acts achieved in 
two important ways. First, they sought to make 'the conditions of 
competition' between different factories uniform: Marx referred in his 
discussion of the Factory Acts to the 'cry of the capitalists for 
equality in the conditions of competition, i.e. for equal restraint on 
all exploitation of labour'. Secondly, by regulating 'the working day 
as regards its length, pauses, beginning and end' - that is, by making 
'the saving of time a necessity' - they 'forced into existence' more 
developed and complex machinery and hence, by implication, a more 
efficient working class.^ 
For the Factory Acts to secure these aims, however, the state 
needed to ensure that the knowledge generated by the administration of 
the Acts was not influenced by the narrower considerations of any 
particular industrialist. Individual masters, it is true, were often 
in 'fanatical opposition' to the Acts. But the very fact that Marx 
derived a lot of his details of the 'cruelties' of early capitalism 
directly from factory inspectors' reports speaks of the 'political will' 
that the English state was capable of mustering, the will that allowed 
it to distance itself from particular capitalists and yet serve English 
capitalism in general."* 
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Marx's discussion clarifies some of the conditions for this success, 
The 'political will' of the English state did not fall from the skies. 
While Marx did see the Factory Acts as 'that first and meagre concession 
wrung from capital' by the government and the working people, he also 
noted that important sections of English industrialists were in fact 
themselves in favour of the Factory Acts, their humanistic impulses 
often spurred on by the forces of competition. Competition was the key 
to the demand for 'egual restraint on all exploitation of labour'. 
'Messrs. Cooksley of Bristol, nail and chain, &c., manufacturers', 
Marx noted, '^pontamoLUly introduced the regulations of the Factory 
Act into their business' (emphasis added). The Children's Employment 
Commission of the 1860s explained why: '"As the old irregular system 
prevails in neighbouring works, the Messrs. Cooksley are subject to 
the disadvantage of having their boys enticed to continue their labour 
elsewhere after 6 p.m."'. Marx also gave the instance of one 'Mr. 3. 
Simpson (paper box and bag maker, London,'' who told the Commission 
that 'he would sign any petition for it [legislative interference] 
...'. Summarizing such cases, the Commission said: 
It would be unjust to the larger employers that their 
factories should be placed under regulation, while 
the hours of labour in the smaller places in their 
own branch of business were under no legislative 
restriction ... Further, a stimulus would be given 
to the multiplication of the smaller places of work, 
which are almost invariably the least favourable to 
the health, comfort, education, and general 
improvement of people.^ 
Even if competition in the economy is regarded as instrumental to 
the autonomy of the English state, one still has to explain why the 
factories, in the first place, produced the necessary documents without 
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the state having to do much policing. Marx's answer lies in his discussion 
of the industrial discipline that the capitalist system of manufacture 
involved. In the process of 'disciplining' the labour force, the 
interests of individual capitalists and those of the state meshed, 
since, in England, the pressure towards discipline arose both from 
u/ithin and from without the factory. If one effect of the factory 
legislation was to produce 'uniformity, regularity, order and economy', 
within 'each individual workshop',^ these were also produced internally, 
according to Marx, by the capitalist division of labour: 'continuity, 
uniformity, regularity, order are also the words that Marx used 
to describe discipline.^ 
Discipline, in Marx's discussion, had two components. It entailed 
a 'technical subordination of the workman to the uniform motion of the 
instruments of labour'; hence the need for training, education, etc. 
Secondly, it made supervision - 'the labour of overlooking' - an 
integral part of capitalist relations of production. The supervisor or 
the foreman was the executor of the 'private legislation' of capital, 
the 'factory code in which capital formulates ... his autocracy over 
his workpeople'. The supervisor thus embodied the authority of capital, 
and documents representing factory rules and legislation - e.g. attendance 
registers, finebooks, timesheets - became both symbols and instruments 
of his authority. Supervision, so crucial to the working of capitalist 
authority, was thus based on documents and produced documents in turn. 
In Marx's words: 
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The place of the slave-driver's lash is taken by the 
overlooker's book of penalties. All punishments [in 
capitalist production relations] natuAolly resolve 
themselves into fines and deductions from wages.® 
(emphasis added; 
The every-day functioning of the capitalist factory, therefore, 
produced documents, hence knowledge, about working-class conditions. 
This was so because capitalist relations of production employed a 
system of supervision - another name for surveillance - that, in the 
language of Michel Foucault, 'insidiously objectifies those on whom it 
applied'.^ It was thus in the nature of capitalist authority that it 
operated by forming 'a body of knowledge' about its subjects. In this 
it was different from, say, pre-capitalist domination which worked 
more by deploying 'the ostentatious signs of sovereignty' and could do 
without a detailed knowledge of the dominated.^® 
In pursuing Marx's ideas on the relationship between industrial 
discipline and the documentation of the conditions of workers, we thus 
end up with the notion of 'authority'. Marx was quite clear that the 
supervisor represented the disciplinary authority of capital over 
labour; but 'authority', in Marx's hands, was never a one-sided affair. 
Quite early in his discussion on capital, Marx wrote: 'A ... cannot be 
"your majesty" to 8, unless at the same time majesty in B's eyes assumes 
the bodily form of A Or a few pages later: 
Such expressions of relations in general, called by 
Hegel reflex-categories, form a very curious class. 
For instance, one man is king only because other men 
stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on 
the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because 
he is a king.^^ 
101 
A particular form of authority or a system of power then implies 
a particular cultural formation producing and supporting it. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the labourer of Marx's assumption belonged 
to a culture characterized by the 'formal equality' and the 'formal 
freedom' of the 'contract', in this case the contract of the wage. The 
disciplinary power of capital embodied these very notions. If our 
exposition of Marx's ideas is correct then it would mean that 
such power was rooted as much in the factory codes that capital 
legislated out of its own needs as in the culture of the working man 
over whom the authority was exercised. The point seems important in a 
further respect. By assuming a particular kind of culture on the part of 
the worker, Marx assigns the working class a place? an active presence, 
in the whole process of disciplining by supervision and record-
keeping. And this he does, not just for moments of protest when the 
working class is obviously active and shows its will, but even when it 
does not protest and is seemingly a passive object of documentation and 
knowledge. 
Marx's argument can thus be used in two ways. It can be used as a 
measure of how different capitalism in colonial Bengal was from the 
one described by him. There is also another question he helps us raise. 
The Calcutta jute mill workers, being mostly migrant peasants from 
Bihar and U.P,, did not have a culture characterized by any ingrained 
notion of 'human equality' and were thus very unlike the workers of 
Marx's assumption. Their's was largely a pre-capitalist, inegalitarian 
culture marked by strong primordial loyalties of community, language, 
religion, caste and kinship. ^ ^ Since, in Marx's argument, the question 
of documentation of conditions of work within a factory was linked to 
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the problem of 'disciplinary authority', and that in turn was linked 
to the question of vi/orking-class culture, the cultural specificities 
of the Calcutta working class raise a whole series of problems. Were 
relations of production within a Calcutta jute mill still characterized 
(in spite of differences in working-class culture) by the disciplinary 
authority that Marx described? The answer would appear to be in the 
negative. What then was the nature of 'supervision' in a Calcutta jute 
mill? Did it behave like a huge apparatus documenting the conditions of 
labour? Did it have a bearing on the problem that a historian of the 
working class faces today: paucity of 'sources'? 
The following sections will pursue these questions. They have 
two objectives. They aspire to draw a picture, however incomplete, 
of the conditions of the jute mill workers of Calcutta in the period 
mentioned. At the same time, they seek to account for the gaps in our 
knowledge and argue that the gaps are as revealing of working class 
conditions as any direct reference to them. They provide therefore a 
history both of our knowledge and of our ignorance. And since knowledge 
of labour conditions ultimately relate to the problem of discipline and 
authority within the factory, the culture of the workers must occupy a 
special place in the history of such knowledge. 
II 
Government interest in working-class conditions in India is of 
relatively recent origin. It was only after the end of the First World 
War that the conditions of Indian workers became an object of 
knowledge for the Government of India. A Labour Bureau was set up in 
May 1920 'to collect all available information on labour conditions in 
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India, and classify and tabulate it'.^'' One important factor contributing 
to this development was the establishment of the International Labour 
Office (I.L.O.) immediately after the war. The Indian government had 
been an 'active participant' in the process of the formation of the 
I.L.O. and was pledged to its goals.^^ A second important factor was one 
internal to the Indian political scene. The conclusion of the war and 
the subsequent period of nationalist agitation had seen trade unions 
mushroom all over the country on a scale previously unknown. This was 
accompanied by a countrywide outburst of labour unrest. With the 
Russian revolution still fresh in its memory, the Government of India's 
reaction to these developments was coloured by its fear of Bolshevism.^^ 
'Labour is growing more conscious of its own wants and power', the 
Government warned its provincial heads in 1919, '[and] it is showing 
signs of a capacity for organization'.^^ By its militancy, therefore, 
labour was drawing upon itself the gaze of the Government. 
What distinguished this new outlook on labour from the traditional 
law-and-order view of the state was a desire to reform the conditions of 
labour and thus change the nature of the workforce. In an impressive 
range of labour legislation considered (and partly enacted) in the 
'twenties and afterwards, the Government of India sought to take a 
direct role in structuring the situation of the working classes. The 
amended Factories Act (1922), the Workmen's Compensation Act (1923), 
the Trade Unions Act (1926), the Trade Disputes Act (1928), the 
Maternity Benefits Bill (1929), the Payment of Wages Act (1933), etc. 
were all aimed at creating a working class different from the traditionally 
held image of the industrial labour force in India, The worker was 
henceforth to receive a new 'legal' personality, more welfare, and even 
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some official help in organizing into trade unions (naturally, of a 
non-communist kind). Introducing a bill for the 'registration and 
protection of trade unions', the Government of India wrote to the local 
governments in September 1921 that 'in so far as the [trade union] 
movement makes for the organization of labour, and for the steady 
betterment of the conditions of labour ... every facility should be 
offered for its development along healthy lines'.^® 
The Government's concern for a 'steady betterment of the conditions 
of labour' was sustained and animated by a recently-acquired vision of 
a burgeoning industrial growth in India. The war had left the Government 
in a 'developmentalist' mood^^ from which sprang the arguments regarding 
working-class conditions. 
There are indications of a considerable expansion in 
the near future in the number and size of industrial 
establishments. Moreover machinery and power are 
being employed in factories to a much larger extent 
than ... before. Hines are being worked at greater 
depths ... The transport industries are developing. 
With these words the Government pleaded in August 1921 the case for 
creating a system of rules for compensations to be awarded to workmen 
injured in accidents in the course of work.^° The argument was 
elaborated during the discussion that followed. The Government of 
India explained that the 'growing complexity of industry ... with the 
increasing use of machinery' required a more efficient labour force 
than had hitherto been available. It was therefore 'advisable that they 
[the workers] should be protected ... from hardship arising from 
accidents', because this would not only increase 'the available supply (f]^  
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labour' but also produce 'a corresponding increase in the 
of the average workman 
'Efficiency', in this logic, vi/as a function of working-class 
conditions. The Government noted in 1919 that while there was 'a keen 
and increasing demand for factory labour' in India, there was 'little 
apparent desire on the part of the labourers to increase their 
efficiency', and - more to the point - 'little prospect of their being 
able to do under present C-OyidltionA^ [emphasis added]. ^ ^ Improving 
efficiency meant improving these 'conditions', and they included not 
only 'education, housing and social welfare' but also such aspects as 
the 'comfort' and 'spare time' of the worker. 
The efficiency of workers is closely connected with 
their education, and their standard of comfort; the 
shortening of hours may not prove an unmixed good, if 
the workers are not put in a position to make a proper 
use of their spare time.^^ 
The argument was broader than it might appear at first sight. For it 
was not only a guestion of giving the workers 'spare time', but of 
structuring that 'spare time' as well, of ensuring that the workers 
made 'proper use' of it.^** It was thus that the Government's eyes fell -
for the first time in Indian history - on several aspects of the worker's 
life that had so far been held to be beyond the ken of capital. Issues 
of indebtedness, the 'monetary reserve' of the worker, his wages, food, 
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health, home life - all came under the scrutiny of the Government. 
'Efficiency' produced its own code of ethics which opposed the image 
of the vigorous and healthy worker to that of the overworked and 
fatigued : 
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They [the Government of India] believed that the 
longer interval [of rest] is desirable in order to 
enable the worker to maintain his v^gouA, and that 
its enforcement should ultimately prove beneficial 
to the employer. There are grounds for believing 
that the absence of sustained u/ork, characteristic 
of many factory employees in this country, has been 
due ... to the fact that the hours fixed did not in 
the past allow sufficient opportunity for the 
necessary to prevent fatigue.^® 
It was only in the context cf this search for an 'efficient' 
working class that working-class conditions became an object of 
knowledge in India. How did the Government of India propose to produce 
and gather this knowledge? Provincial governments were equipped with 
new departments who were meant to perform this task. For instance, 
under pressure from the Government of India, the Bengal Government 
established in July 1920 the office of the Industrial Intelligence 
Officer, later named the Labour Intelligence Officer, whose duty it was 
to 'maintain a proper watch over the industrial situation', and 'in 
particular to investigate and report on labour conditions and the 
facts and causes of labour disturbances'.^^ The Government of India 
also realized that much of this knowledge would have to be generated 
within the factories and that the provincial staff of factory inspectors 
might need to be employed on collecting and monitoring the information. 
Since 'leisure', 'rest', 'fatigue', 'spare-time', etc. were some of 
the key concepts supporting the Government's notion of 'efficiency', 
control over the labourer's working hours naturally emerged as a 
prcblem of the highest importance. The attendance registers maintained 
by individual factories and the factory inspectors' reports now came 
to be regarded as crucial documents from the Government of India's 
point of view. Viith this end in view, the Factories Act was amended in 
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1922 with a new section 35 which required the manager of a factory 'to 
maintain ... [an attendance] register of all persons employed and of 
their hours of work 
III 
The conditions of ji'te mill labour in Bengal were never as fully 
documented as the Government of India wished. The inaccuracies in the 
attendance registers of the jute mills were witness to this failure; 
the Chief Inspector of Factories admitted to the Royal Commission 
on Labour in 1929 that 'the records given in such registers [did] 
not represent the true conditions ... of ... l a b o u r T h e labour 
office of Bengal, moreover, suffered from a peculiar bureaucratic 
malaise, the history of which only indicates that the Bengal Government 
never shared the Government of India's enthusiasm for knowledge of 
labour conditions. For one thing (as the Labour Commissioner of Bengal 
recalled in 1939) the office was set up with 'no immediate purpose of 
having a large investigating office, with cost of living indices and 
other standard concomitants of an organized labour office'.^" Besides, 
so low was the priority of his office in the eyes of the Bengal 
Government that when 'the first Retrenchment Committee' reported in 
1921, 'the Labour Office seemed bound to go'; but 'instead of abolishing 
it, the [Bengal] government changed its character'. To economize, the 
Labour Intelligence Officer was saddled with various other responsibilities 
and his investigative functions suffered badly in consequence. He was 
placed 'in charge of the Commerce Department, and later of the Marine 
Department'. He was made responsible for the administration of all the 
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labour laws that were to come in the 'twenties, as well as for other 
legislative measures only 'partly concerned with the welfare of labour, 
e.g., the Boilers Act and the Electricity Act'. The Labour Intelligence 
Officer thus became, in his own uords, 'an ordinary secretariat officer' 
who had little time to investigate the conditions of labour. 
With the growing volume of office work and the 
addition of one duty after another, the Labour 
Intelligence Officer found it impossible to 
continue his personal investigations regarding 
every strike, and also to some extent, his visits 
to factories ...; although, as far as possible, he 
continued these visits up to 1929 when the enormous 
increase of work due to the advent of Whitley 
Commission tied him completely to his desk.^^ 
The atrophy of the Labour Office was not a matter of simple 
bureaucratic mindlessness. What calls for analysis is precisely the 
'mind' of this bureaucracy. To this 'mind', any interest in labour 
conditions beyond that called for by the immediate needs of capital 
or of law-and-order, was suspect. 'For some peculiar reason', wrote 
a rather frustrated Labour Commissioner in 1935, 'in Bengal, interest 
in labour matters or desire for knowledge of labour developments is 
read as sympathy for the labour point of view'.^^ 
The 'reason' for this suspicion is not difficult to see. The 
Government of India's 'desire for knowledge of labour developments' 
assumed that the investigating authority would be capable of maintaining 
a degree of independence from the point of view of particular capitalists, 
The Government wished to stand above the 'unevenness' of such particular 
views. For example, in insisting on 'uniform rules' for fines or 
accident-compensations, the Government of India argued that the question 
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of the 'welfare of the working classes' could not 'any longer be left 
to the uneven generosity of employers'." Such 'neutrality' by the 
state threatened to rupture the almost 'natural' unity that had 
existed in Bengal for years between the provincial government and 
owners of capital (specially those represented by such powerful 
organizations as the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and I.3.M.A.). 
This 'natural unity' had received its fullest expression in the 
nineteenth century when the moral order of the day had been unashamedly 
pro-capitalist and when the Government of Bengal plainly considered it 
its duty 'to do all it can to afford moral support to the [jute] 
millowners' in the face of labour unrest.^'' In the 1890s even the 
meagre provisions of the first two Factories Acts of India were seen 
by senior officers of the Government of Bengal as 'needlessly 
harrassing to the [mill] managers'.^^ A factory inspector who once 
insisted on age-verification for all jute-mill child-workers in his 
jurisdiction was sharply pulled up by the Chief Secretary of the 
Government of Bengal. 'Inspectors', he was told, 'by making the 
[medical] examination of every child compulsory, would give to owners 
or managers of factories the maximum of trouble, and to the government 
the maximum of expenses without conferring any compensating benefit 
on the majority of the children employed'.^® 
It would not be very profitable to see this merely as an instance 
of ruling-class liypocrisy. The evidence yields more value when treated 
as an expression of ruling-class outlook on conditions of labour. The 
Bengal officials were not just displaying their lack of respect for 
the factory laws; underlying their statements was also the conviction 
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that the labour conditions themselves did not leave much to be desired. 
To most of the factory inspectors, therefore - contrary to the aims 
of the factory legislation - the conditions always seemed satisfactory. 
A typical example of their attitude is to be found in the report of 
the working of the Factories Act in Bengal for the year 1893. The 
'general conditions of the [mill] operatives' were found 'very 
satisfactory', they said; the coolie-lines were 'well laid out', 
their work was 'not arduous', the water supply was 'good', the latrines 
were 'well kept', the children were 'thoroughly healthy', their work 
'in no way detrimental to them', and the arrangements for medical care 
of the workers was 'satisfactory'. Even the 'fact' that 'five or ten 
per cent' of the children were 'weak, feeble in growth and stunted 
for their age' could not be attributed, it was said, 'to the work they 
perform in the mills, as about the same proportion of undersized and 
weakly children may be observed among the outside population'.^^ 
To such an official 'mind', labour conditions deserved investigation 
only when they posed law-and-order problems. A Government of Bengal file 
discussing a sudden outburst of working-class unrest in the jute mills 
in 1894-95 gave some attention to the question of housing of labour. 
But the concern here was merely with issues of public control and no 
more. The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal invited I.J.M.A. to 
'co-operate with the [Bengal] Government in improving both direct 
control [i.e. policing] over the mill-hands in case they should break 
into violence, and also indirect control which will make acts of 
violence less likely by butto^'tlnq the dondltioni, of the employees': 
Ill 
His Honor therefore confidently invites the co-
operation of the mill-owners to provide comfortable 
and well-ordered homes for mill-hands, and thus 
avoid such conditions as those at Samnagar and 
Titagar, which offer temptations to the disorderly 
and make control difficult. 
But the amount of improvement desired in the 'conditions' was severely 
limited. Too much 'bettering' of conditions might make the task of 
control harder. 'Rice is very cheap, and this makes them [the labourers] 
independent', was the diagnosis of a police officer in the same file, 
who quoted jute mill managers' views in support of his own: 'Experienced 
mill managers seem to think that ... when the labour market becomes 
once more over-stocked, as they said it will be, mill hands will grow 
less independent, and matters will quiet down to their normal state 
In taking a law-and-order view of labour conditions, then, the state 
incorporated within its own outlook the point of view of capital. 
Much of this nineteenth-century spirit can be read off twentieth-
century documents as well, especially those coming from the years before 
the First World War. There was for instance the Civil Surgeon of 
Serampore who thought (in 1909) that 'the mills in Hooghly need no 
legislation for the well-being of the operatives'; or the factory 
inspector who felt (in 1910) that he was 'legitimately entitled 
to place the telescope to his blind eye' if he came across 'a 
child of seven or eight years sewing or hemming a gunny bag in the 
vicinity of the mother', even though the law demanded 'the Manager ... 
be prosecuted for employing a child under nine'; or there was the even 
more striking case of C.A. Walsh, the Chief Inspector of Factories, 
boldly declaring in 1912: 'I see no poverty in the quarters surrounding 
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the great [jute] mills at Khardah, Titagarh, Shamnagore, Kankinara, 
Naihati, Budge-Budge or Fort Gloster 
The tone of the official pronouncements changed somewhat after 
1920, thanks to the efforts of the Government of India and of nationalist 
and radical politicians \i/ho espoused the cause of labour. 'The increasing 
solidarity of labour' entered the calculations of the Government of 
Bengal and the realization dawned upon it that 'industrial disputes will 
in future form an integral part of the industrial life of this p r o v i n c e ° 
Yet this did not mean any 'epistemological shift' in the status of the 
'conditions of labour' question. It never acquired any priority over the 
question of control. The Industrial Unrest Committee of 1921 recommended 
that the Bengal Government set up machinery for investigating strikes but 
made it clear that the machinery proposed 'must be designed for the 
purpose of alleviating unrest ... rather than for a detailed investigation 
of current labour conditions'.'*^ It was the same 'disease' that had 
warped the career of the Labour Office in Bengal. The periodic reports 
the Labour Intelligence Officer sent up to the Government of India 
were, it was admitted, 'nearly always' the view of the local police -
'merely thana officers' views', as Donald Gladding, a senior official 
of the Bengal Government, once described them. 'Neither superior police 
officers nor Magistrates go about seriously to find out the truth by 
questioning the workmen on the one hand and the employers on the other -
and this'. Gladding insisted, was 'polite and correct'.''^ 
The factory inspectors' reports bore ample testimony to this 
absence of a spirit of investigation. A good example is the treatment 
they gave to the question of the 'health' of the workers. This was an 
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important question from the Government of India's point of view, carrying 
obvious implications for the dietary conditions, the standard of living, 
the wages-situation and the efficiency of the worker.**^ None of these 
latter considerations, however, ever influenced the Bengal factory 
inspectors. For years, their reports carried a section called 'General 
Health of the Operatives' where the workers' health was always described 
as 'good' if there had been no epidemics. 'The general health of 
operatives has been good', said the Factories Act report for 1928, 'no 
outbreak of disease in epidemic form having been reported during the 
year'.'*'* Why was health a question of epidemics, and not one of diet, 
nutrition or standard of living? The following quotation from the 
factory inspection report for 1921 suggests the answer: 
The Naihati Jute Mills at Naihati, Baranagar Jute 
Mills at Baranagar, [etc.] ... reported a shortage 
of labour in the month of August last owing to 
outbreaks of malaria and influenza. The shortage ... 
was not serious and the general health of the 
operatives ... has on the whole been satisfactory.**^ 
Or, to put the argument in an even more precise form, as did the report 
for 1923: 
The general health of operatives during the year ... 
has been comparatively good, no shortage of labour 
on account of epidemic diseases or sickness having 
been reported by the mills. 
At heart, this was the employer's argument. In the jute mills, 
health-care for workers was essentially aimed at prevention of epidemics, 
Information regarding diseases treated free by the doctors of twenty-
three jute mills in 1928 was collected by the Government of Bengal for 
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submission to the Royal Commission on Labour. It is interesting to 
observe that none of the diseases treated were of nutritional origin; 
chief amongst them were cholera, small-pox, malaria, enteric fever, 
relapsing fever, kala-azar, dysentery, diarrhoea, pneumonia, 
tuberculosis of the lungs, and respiratory diseasesother than 
infectious'.'*^ Clearly, most of them were infectious diseases or water-
or food-borne diseases, capable of affecting a number of people at the 
same time, specially under conditions of over-crowding. In other words, 
attention was confined to diseases that were potentially epidemic. It 
was epidemics that caused large-scale absenteeism and thus affected 
production; besides, they respected no class-barriers. Speaking to 
I.J.M.A. in 1918, Alexander Murray, then chairman of the Association, 
referred to a proposal put up by mills 'in four different municipalities 
up the river ... to spend anything up to Rs 100 per loom' in improving 
workers' housing, ard remarked that he could 'imagine no more profitable 
investment from a mill labour point of view'. Supporting this view, 
he said: 
In proof of this I might refer to the experience 
during the infleunza epidemic last year of the mills 
with which I am most closely associated. Our mill 
doctors' reports show that the hands living in the 
bazar suffered far more severely than those living 
in the mills' own coolie lines. At most of our mills 
the production for the week ending 20th July, which 
witnessed the epidemic at its worst, was anything 
from 15 to 30 per cent, below normal. But in the 
case of one of our mills which houses nearly all its 
labour in its own lines, the drop was only 5 per 
cent 
Clearly, to Murray, as to the jute industry, the measure of the severity 
of epidemics was the drop in production. Epidemics therefore became 
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the most important issue whenever the employers turned their minds to 
the question of the health of the workers. 
One implication of such an outlook was that large areas of working-
class life remained out of view. Once again, the health question 
illustrates the problem. As a result of the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Labour, an investigation was carried out into the 
condition of women workers in jute mills in 1931-32. The investigating 
doctor discovered several diseases that had never found their way into 
the records of the mill dispensaries. She noted that many of the working-
class children had 'a tendency to rickets, shown by slight bending of 
the legs and bossing of the forehead'. This was 'probably due to 
deficiency of vitamin D in the food'. While many children looked 'fine' 
'in the first year of life', a 'healthy appearance was less common' 
after that age. Venereal diseases were 'said to be wide-spread', yet 
there was 'no evidence on the subject'. In the lines of one mill, she 
came across a young girl 'obviously dying of a pernicious type of 
anaemia', but 'she was having no treatment'. 'In the lines of another 
mill', she found 'a woman suffering from a severe degree of osteomalacia, 
unable to walk. This is a very great danger in childbirth and with 
careful treatment can be cured or greatly relieved'. She noticed 
'several cases of children reduced to almost extremity'. Another time 
she saw 'a woman obliged to stop her work for blindness and suffering 
great pain in her eyes [which] ... would have been susceptible to 
treatment'. But a certain kind of 'blindness', in these cases, was what 
characterized the employer's outlook. The investigating doctor remarked: 
'None of these cases were known to the mill doctors, who always 
accompanied me when I visited the lines 
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Thus, in claiming as their own a view of labour conditions that 
really belonged to the owners of capital, the documents of the Bengal 
Government reproduced something else as well: the 'optical errors' of 
that vision. Significant aspects of working-class conditions remained 
hidden from it. This was what in the end undermined the Government of 
India's project for 'knowledge' of these conditions. The Government of 
Bengal lacked the political will necessary to distance itself from the 
employers in the jute industry. This was well known even to the 
Government of India who, however, never felt powerful enough to force 
anyone's hand. On 13 September 1928 Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, wrote to 
the Secretary of State: 
We had a discussion in Council this week on the 
contemplated enquiry into labour matters ... no 
Local Government except Bengal had any objection to 
our announcing now that such an enquiry would be 
held; but the Bengal Government entered a strong 
protest ... Bengal have on other occasions lately 
shown a disposition to act as a brake in questions 
of this kind; for example they stood alone in 
adopting an uncompromising attitude in respect of 
maximum wages, and they were nearly alone in pressing 
for the circulation of the Trade Disputes Bill when 
we asked if Local Governments would agree to our 
pushing on with it. 
Irwin's conclusion was significant: 'The influence of the employers -
and particularly the European employers - is strong there [in Bengal], 
and they were not likely to receive the news of an enquiry with joy'.^° 
It would once again be wrong to see this 'influence' as a conspiracy 
of state and capital against labour. Its expressions were too aboveboard 
and direct for it to be treated as such. It is better seen as part of 
the existing political culture. In deciding, for instance, if commercial 
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bodies like I.J.M.A. should be approached directly with the 
recomrriendations of the Industrial Unrest Committee (1921), Sir J.H, 
Kerr, a member of the Governor's Council, u'avered: 
We must walk warily [he wrote] ... Sir Alexander 
Murray warned me specially that the Jute Mills 
Association would have to be Jed, not driven, and I 
think we should be safer in leaving the matter in 
his hands.^^ 
Kerr feJt frightened even to start an office like a Labour Bureau with 
some pretension towards investigation of labour conditions. 'The term 
bureau frightens people', he wrote; 'I would not start anything in the 
nature of a Bureau even on paper without consultation with employers'.^^ 
So keen was the Government of Bengal in its desire to avoid any 
confrontation with the owners of jute mills that factory inspectors 
were actually encouraged to leave all 'controversial' matters out of 
their reports. Further, capitalists themselves sometimes had a direct 
role in weeding out statements unfavourable to their interests. The 
report for 1923 had to be redrafted because of objecticns from 
industrialists like Alexander Murray. As the Labour intelligence 
Officer explained: 
Normally the Chief Inspector of Factories sends in 
his report to Government without previous sanction, 
but last year owing to a number of controversial 
paragraphs being inserted, the report was first 
unofficially examined. The report had ultimately to 
be reprinted as strong objection was taken by Sir 
A. Murray and others to the remarks of the Chief 
Inspector. There is nothing objectionable in the 
report [now being] put up, but I have toned down 
some of the remarks 
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Even the attendance register that the 1922 Factories Act required the 
factories to maintain was modified in Bengal to suit the convenience of 
the jute mill managers. It was made into a less detailed document than 
it could have been and as a result, admitted the Chief Inspector of 
Factories in 1930, it became 'a type of register satisfying the view 
of the employers [in the jute industry] but futile and inadequate for 
ensuring establishment of the provisions of Chapter IV [relating to 
working hours] of the [Factories] Act 
Thus if working-class conditions in the jute mills never quite 
became an object of knowledge in the way envisaged by the Government of 
India, the 'failure' occurred at two levels. The industry never 
produced the necessary documents; and the Government lacked the political 
will to carry out its own investigations. 
lU 
The question of the lack of a 'political will' on the part of the 
Government of Bengal, its inability to force any issue on I.J.M.A. 
or the jute industry, can be partly comprehended as a negative 
illustration of Marx's argument. I say 'partly' because some of the 
spirit of co-operation prevailing between the state and capital must 
have derived from the tight racial bonds that existed between European 
employers and the British bureaucracy in colonial Bengal.^^ But one 
also has to note that the industry (or any sections of employers) 
never created any pressure on the Government to equalize 'the conditions 
of competition' between different mills. 'Conditions are different in 
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different [mill] centres', said I.J.M.A. to the Royal Commission 
on Labour. 'One mill provides housing accommodation for all their workers 
whereas another mill provides none whatever. One mill provides good 
water, another provides no w a t e r . A n official of the Government of 
Bengal was to use much stronger words in 1929: 
Perhaps in no industry in the world, situated in such 
a circumscribed area, is the wage position more 
inchoate. The mill groups under different managing 
agents work under wage systems which have developed 
many local idiosyncrasies during the long and short 
years of their existence. Even in mills under the 
same managing agents there are differences which to 
persons not acquainted with the position would seem 
incredible ... In ... groups of mills situated close 
to each other and under different managing agents, 
the wage-rates in individual mills are kept, or are 
supposed to be kept, strictly secret.^^ 
Yet the jute industry was always content to let all this be; there 
never arose any significant demand for the standardization of wage rates, 
At the instance of the Royal Commission, I.J.M.A. decided in 1931 
to set up a sub-committee to look into the latter problem. The committee 
admitted in its report the following year that 'nothing can be done in 
the direction of general standardisation [of wages] for all the mills' 
as there were 'circumstances which preclude any immediate steps being 
t a k e n ' . T h e report ended with extremely cautious recommendations for 
slow and gradual standardization of rates for mills 'in the same 
districts', but very little came of this. A confidential report on 
'Jute Mill Labour Conditions' written in October 1945 by J. Lee, the 
Senior Labour Officer of I.J.M.A., referred to the lack of 
standardization of wage-rates as a continuing problem: 
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Over the last year I have collected statistics of 
wage-rates paid in the mills and these have all been 
transferred into a rate paid as "pies per hour" ... 
I prepared a list of all occupations, and then gave 
the maximum rate paid as u/ell as the minimum. The 
differences in many occupations was very great, and 
in itself, was ... a good case for wage-standardization.^^ 
The lack of standardization of wages remained a problem even in the 
1950s. 
Why was it that the jute industry, notorious for the feelings of 
rivalry that mills often harboured against one another, was happy to 
carry on with an 'inchoate' wage-position? Several answers suggest 
themselves. To consider outside competition first, the relationship 
between the Calcutta and the Dundee industries was never one of straight-
forward competition - as between Bombay and Manchester. With Dundee 
branching off into finer products for survival and Calcutta providing 
a big employment market for Dundee technicians and managers, the pressures 
of that potential competition eased off a great deal after 1914-19. The 
kind of uproar that Dundee industrialists often caused in the 1890s 
over labour conditions in Calcutta,^^ became a matter of the past in the 
twentieth century. At the same time, the state of organization of the 
Calcutta jute mill workers was too weak for them to exert any effective 
pressure on the wage-question. Thirdly, the 'individualism' of individual 
(or a group of) mills was something that I.J.M.A. accepted as the 
price of its organizational unity, which the industry saw as crucial to 
its overall prosperity. And fourthly, one must take into account the 
concentration of economic power within the industry; this must have 
gone some way towards mitigating any spirit of competition between 
mills. 
1 2 1 
There were, however, two other factors which were perhaps more 
important than those mentioned above. Paradoxical though it may sound, 
the expenditure incurred by the mills per capita of their respective 
labour force might have varied in fact far less than the discussion on 
wage-rate differences suggests. In other words, it is possible that the 
'condit ions of competition' between mills remained more or less at a 
par and thus made state intervention superfluous. It will be interesting, in 
this respect, to depart from the practice of calculating bonuses and wages by 
themselves and try instead to study these along with other expenditures 
on labour, e.g. housing, sanitation, water-supply, health-clinics, etc. 
Since the amounts spent under these latter heads also varied from mill 
to mill according to differences in the volume of labour supply, 
employers who paid lower wages might well have ended up by spending more 
on housing etc. and vice versa. It then seems quite possible that the 
average amount spent per unit of labour worked out to be roughly the 
same for different mills, so that the disparities in the 'conditions of 
competition' did not matter very much. 
The point cannot be statistically verified here, detailed information 
on wage-rates and other matters being extremely hard to come by. But 
there is some evidence to suggest that the industry had developed 
certain informal means for equalizing 'labour conditions' between the 
mills (specially those close to one another) or at least for keeping 
the 'inequalities' well within 'tolerable' limits. For one thing, it was 
hard to keep the information about wages a secret however much the 
managing agents might desire this. 'The total earnings [for different 
occupations] are not necessarily kept secret', the Government of Bengal 
told the Royal Commission on Labour, and the piece-rates or bonus rates 
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could easily be 'ascertained by spy-\i/ork in the bazar'.Further, 
the worker's idea of a 'fair wage' often involved a principle of parity 
with those paid by mills in the neighbourhood. Localized strikes therefore 
often tended to bring local wage-rates in line with one another. 
Even more important perhaps was the fact that managers could 
effectively create an informal climate (and pressure) of opinion which 
also had a homogenizing influence on labour conditions. When an American 
firm, the American Manufacturing Company, started a jute mill in Calcutta 
in the early 1920s, it was said that 'the Directors in the States ... 
sanctioned large amounts to be spent on sanitation and welfare of 
workers, as they were accustomed to such outlay in connection with their 
jute mills in the United States'. Yet the eventual amount spent turned 
out to be much less than that sanctioned, for the managers of the other 
jute mills had objected. 
In many cases they [the Directors] would have been 
willing to go much further than they had actually gone 
e.g. to give electric light in the workers' houses, 
as well as a plentiful installation outside in the 
lines, but had been told that this had never been 
done here. So at present electric light is limited 
to the durwans' houses. 
It is significant that this mill ultimately settled for the 'district 
rate' of wages and followed 'the custom in jute mills in the district' 
in respect of accident-compensation. It also 'modelled' its leave-rules 
(or their absence) on those at the 'neighbouring jute mills'. And 
while the 'agents had been willing to put in as good a drainage system 
as possible', the actual 'type copied was that used by the other 
Calcutta Jute Mills' 
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A lack of standardization in wage-rates therefore did not necessarily 
reflect a competitive situation among the mills regarding their labour 
conditions. Any effective pressure from international competitors was 
also conspicuously absent. The Bengal Government's views on labour 
conditions were therefore governed solely by its relationship with 
capitalists in the jute industry, and in this relationship, the latter 
always predominated. What the state therefore reproduced in its 
documents was the blinkered vision of capital. 
V 
But that leaves us with the more crucial question: why was the 
'vision' of capital 'blinkered'? Why did the jute mills fail to produce 
the daily records that the Government of India had asked for? Or to 
put the question differently: why were the attendance registers kept in 
such a state that they did not 'reflect the true conditions of labour'? 
Once again, Marx's argument is useful. To understand the lack of 
documentation at the level of the factory we have to turn to the problem 
of 'discipline'. A discussion of 'discipline' has to begin by considering 
the nature of work and technology in a jute mill, for discipline is, 
in the first place, a question of training and skills, the 'technical 
subordination of the worker' to the motion and requirements of the 
machine. Discipline of course also involves supervision, but we shall 
take that up later. 
Work inside a Calcutta jute mill involved mechanical processes 
broadly similar to those in a nineteenth-century cotton mill, except that 
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jute vi/as a rougher material than cotton and the humidification necessary 
for cotton was not needed for jute.^'' After the raw jute had been sorted 
and batched as it came into the mill, it went through a process of 
softening and preparing for the eventual spinning and weaving of jute. 
Softening included passing the jute 'through a softening machine 
consisting of fluted rollers under heavy pressure when simultaneously 
an emulsion of oil and water ... [was] applied', the oil being necessary 
'to facilitate the succeeding process of manufacture as jute fibre 
contains no natural lubrication'. After softening came the preparing 
stage which included three distinct operations: carding, drawing and 
roving. The object of carding was 'to break down long stalks or strips 
of fibre into a continuous broad ribbon of fine fibres' and to lay the 
fibres parallel to one another. The carding process involved the use of 
two machines - the breaker card and the finisher card. The former 'breaks 
and hackles the stalks of [the] fibre' to make it into a broad ribbon 
'termed sliver in the trade'. About twelve such slivers were tfien fed 
manually into the 'finisher' card 'where the carding operation is 
continued on finer s c a l e T h e carded slivers were still not uniform 
or straight and were therefore subjected to processes called drawing 
and doubling, where the aim was to obtain 'a greater length of 
[uniform] fibre for the same unit of weight'. The operations of drawing 
and doubling were 'combined into one machine called [the] drawing 
frame'. Drawing thinned out the sliver, doubling counteracted it by 
combining 'two or more such drawn out slivers into one at the delivery 
end of the machine'. The last of the preparatory processes was roving, 
the object of which was to draw out the slivers even further, according 
to the spinning reguirements, while strengthening them by giving them 
a partial twist. The tuisted sliver was called 'rove'. The next step 
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was spinning, vi/here yarns were made by spinning frames which drew out 
further the rove, spun it, and finally wound it on spinning bobbins. 
Warp yarns were harder twisted than weft yarns. Winding followed next 
and 'the yarn forming the warp of the cloth ... [was] wound round ... 
bobbins into the form of comparatively large rolls, thereby obtaining 
a greater continuity in length'. The yarn for the weft in the cloth was 
wound into '"cops" fitting exactly into the shuttles employed in 
weaving'. Warp yarn, saturated with a starchy material to prevent 
breakage in weaving, was then 'drawn on to large beams' (the 'beaming' 
process) and placed at the back of the loom for weaving. The final 
stages in the manufacture constituted the finishing process, where the 
woven cloth was passed through the heavy rollers of a calendering 
machine for ironing and eventually cut and sown into bags. The bags 
again were 'made into bundles of 25 or 30' and packed by a hydraulic 
press. 
The technology accompanying these processes had been 'perfected' 
in the nineteenth century. S.G. Barker, who investigated the technical 
side of Calcutta jute mills in the 1930s and whose findings we have 
discussed in the previous chapter, found the technology so stagnant 
the?he likened the industry to a gramophone needle: 'It runs in a groove 
and plays a nice tune. If either needle or record gets worn, new ones 
are demanded'.^^ The 'groove' in Barker's description referred to the 
lack of diversification of products in the history of the industry and 
to the crude and rough nature of what was produced. This, as we know, he 
saw as a fundamental factor behind the technological stagnation of the 
industry. In Barker's words: 
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Jute being a cheap material producing fabrics for 
rough usage ... the machinery and technique in 
India became standardised upon an elementary 
mechanical basis. Simplicity of operation without 
the necessity for textile science, since changes [in 
output] were practically non-existent ... soon led to 
the mass production of the limited range of Indian 
jute products becoming almost automatic. The 
conversion of Jute fibres into fabrics therefore 
became a mechanical engineering proposition, a 
position largely maintained to this day. The 
mechanical influence was greatly enhanced by 
conditions in India, since spare machine parts and 
renewals were difficult to get from home> Thus each 
mill or group was equipped with an efficient 
mechanics' workshop, which not only maintained the 
machinery in excellent order but even extended to 
the construction of duplicates of existing looms, 
etc. Again the simplicity of the machine principles 
facilitated this ... Machinery in the mills in 
general, therefore, has had a long working life, 
perhaps too long.®' 
The industry considered this technology so adequate for its purpose 
that it placed very little premium on the scientific and technological 
training of its workers and its superior technical staff. Barker was 
surprised to discover many large and crucial gaps in the technical 
knowledge of the Scottish managers and assistants - gaps which they 
usually filled up with that rather undefined human quality called 
'experience'. The softening process contained a number of 'unknowns' 
like 'temperature, moisture content and distribution in the [jute] 
pile' as well as the optimum pressure between the rollers, 'the actual 
value for which seemir;gly ... [had] no criterion but expS-Zi-tence'. He 
was also struck by 'the lack of finality in technical knowledge of 
the carding process'. The same went for drawing and doubling, where 
'the ideal roller pressure' and 'the size of flutings for Jute ... 
[had] been determined by expe^-U-ence'. For the process of roving, the 
list of things unknown was formidable. 'Roller covering and pressure, 
surface speeds, spindle speeds, the flyer mechanism, the distribution 
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of fibre length in the rove, the degree of levelness along its length, 
fibre control and, in addition, the factors concerning twist and the 
form of bobbins' were all yet 'to be studied'. 
Barker's correspondence with some of the mill managers on technical 
problems dramatically revealed the low priority that the industry gave 
to technical education. Technical issues were often treated merely as 
matters of the ' expeAi.ence', 'opinion' or personal judgement of the 
people concerned: 
From my experience [wrote one manager to Barker] I 
have found that certain makers' machines are suitable 
for one class of fibre, while others are suitable 
for a different class ... A number of people favour 
pinning with light pins whilst [others] prefer a 
coarser pinning with a corresponding heavier pin, 
again only a matter of opinion. 
Another point which allows a certain latitude to be 
taken is roller speeds and ratios, but to my mind 
this item is not nearly as important as pinning and 
setting.®® 
If the manager's knowledge of the machinery had such a glaring 
'lack of finality' about it, one can imagine the want of understanding 
that separated the worker from the machine. This is not to say that the 
machine did not in any way affect the worker's life in the factory. The 
mechanical processes in a jute mill were continuous with one process 
feeding another, and the work was heavier and noisier than in a 
typical cotton mill.®^ The continuous motion and speed of the machinery 
was something that the worker had to adjust to. 'Continuous and even 
flow' of the jute sliver was the responsibility of the labourers working 
on the softening, carding, drawing and roving machines.^® 'The work of 
feeding the breaker cards', for instance, was 'heavy' and needed 
'constant attention'. The finisher card required the co-operation of 
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three women at a speed matching that of the machine: 'one arranges 
the slivers side by side at the feed end, one takes delivery at the 
other, and one c a r r i e s I n the spinning department, the shifting of 
bobbins 'must be done quickly for with bulky material such as jute, the 
bobbins fill fast and require frequent changing, which necessitates 
stopping the machine'.''^ But as the payment of the managing agents and 
managers often depended on the output, such stoppages were seen as time 
lost and therefore had to be as brief as possible. Pace also characterized 
the work in piece-rated departments like weaving or sack-sewing where the 
worker's earnings depended on how much, and hence how rapidly, he could 
produce. 
The 'subordination' to the machine that the worker suffered in the 
jute mill, however, was not very 'technical'. The worker did not come 
to terms with the machine on the basis of even an elementary understanding 
of its working principles. The story here is poignantly told in the 
nature of the accidents which occurred in the jute mills. Many of the 
fatal ones resulted from the workers attempting to clean the machinery 
while it was still in motion or from their (especially the women's) 
loose-fitting clothes being caught up in its moving parts.^^ Accidents 
of this kind revealed the emphasis that the mill managements placed on 
continuous running of the machinery, the laxity of factory-rules (e.g. 
about dress) and the little value attached to a worker's life, but also 
the worker's incomprehension of the running principles of the machinery. 
In fact, the worker's relationship to the machine, instead of being 
mediated through a technical knowledge, was mediated through the 
north-Indian peasant's conception of his tools, where the tools often 
took on magical and godly qualities. A religious outlook rather than 
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'science' determined this relationship, with the difference that in a 
jute mill, the labourer's tools were far more powerful and malign than 
the peasant's implements and were capable of taking lives at the shortest 
notice. The vivid details of the following report from the 1930s bear 
witness to this religious consciousness: 
In some of the jute mills near Calcutta the mechanics 
often sacrifice goats at this time [autumn: the time 
of the Viwoill festival]. A separate altar is erected 
by the mechanics of each of the four or five departments 
in the mill. Various tools and other emblems of their 
work are placed upon it, together with heaps of 
sweetmeats and decorations. Incense is burned during 
an entire day and ... the buildings are effectively 
filled with smoke. Towards evening a male goat is 
thoroughly washed, decorated with proper colors and 
flowers and prepared for a parade and final sacrifice. 
The little procession, made up principally of the goat 
and a band, then marches through the grounds and up 
and down the aisles of the department to the altar. 
The animal is fed as many sweets as he will accept, 
and is then decapitated at one stroke by a long knife 
and sword. With proper ceremony the head is deposited 
in the river, in this case ... the sacred Ganges, 
while the meat is retained for a feast in the evening 
... The factory and the power-machine have been 
readily adopted and given due place in religious 
ceremony 
It is of course not being claimed here that this religious outlook of 
the workers would have vanished only if they were given a scientific know-
ledge of the machinery. The fact that modern Indian 'holy men' have always 
counted a good number of Ph.Ds in physics among their camp-followers should 
act as a sufficient deterrent against any such view. The point is that the 
man-machine relationship inside a factory always involves culture and a 
techno-economic argument overlooks this. Relevant here is also the point 
that the Calcutta jute worker's subordination to the pace and requirements 
of the machinery was not effected through training and education. It was 
not, in that sense, a case of the 'technical subordination' of Marx's 
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description. The mills in fact were largely averse to the idea of giving 
their workers or their children any education at all. In 1929, the 
I.J.M.A. said to the Royal Commission that it did not think that to 
provide education was a 'duty' of the employers.^^ But their deeper 
attitudes were revealed in 1914-15 when the Government of Bengal, 
acting under pressure from Delhi, made some money available for the 
education of working-class children in the jute mill areas and was 
forced by I.J.M.A. to confine such education only to those children 
who were not yet old enough to work in jute mills. And the lessons, 
insisted the mill-owners, had to be confined to the teaching of 'the 
three "R"s' and nothing beyond.^^ 
The argument that I.J.M.A. put forward to the Government (and 
one that was accepted by the latter) explained the 'reason' for their 
lack of interest in workers' education: 
The character of the education must not be such as 
to draw the children away from the profession which 
they would adopt if they were allowed to continue 
illiterate ... it must not render them unfit for 
cooly work. 
Literacy, in other words, was irrelevant to work in jute mills. The 
reason for this, according to the employers, was that the work was 
easily learned and required no rigorous training. Indeed, the bulk of 
the labour force was made up of totally unskilled labourers (called 
coolies) employed without exception on manual work. The Census of 1921 
found that of a total of 280,854 workers in the Calcutta jute mills no 
less than 156,633 (i.e. over 55 per cent) were engaged in work involving 
no machinery at all.^® Even of the work that involved the use of machinery 
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it was said in 1937 by jute mill owners themselves that 'up to spinning 
... most of the work is mechanical or routine and can be easily learnt, 
and labour for these departments is plentiful; winding, weaving and 
[machine] sewing required skilled labour'.'^ How 'easily learnt' was 
explained in 1906 by the Chairman of I.J.M.A. who spelt out the 
different amounts of time that was needed to train in the different 
occupations in a jute mill: 
Coolie['s] [work] [one] week 
Women['s] [work: mainly 
preparing and hand-sewing] [one] week 
Shifter['s] [work] [one] week 
Spinner['s] [work] Graduate from shifters; may be 
a year or more on shifting 
VJeaver['s] [work] A year to be first-class 
workman.® ° 
This 'learning', again, was purely experiential. It was pointed out 
by several witnesses to the Royal Commission that there was no 
apprenticeship system in the jute m i l l s . I . J . M . A . said in its 
evidence that 'the bulk of the work in the mill is unskilled, and where 
training is necessary, as for instance in the spinning department, this 
is obtained in the course of actual employment, by the efforts of the 
worker himself'.®^ On the preparing side, 'a few weeks at any of the 
machines ... [was] long enough to make the worker proficient'. Weaving 
needed 'skilled' work 'but, generally speaking, weavers become proficient 
very quickly'. Even mechanics, joiners, blacksmiths had no system of 
formal training: '[they] ... start as boys, and are paid a nominal wage 
until they become of use'.®^ 
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The informality of the jute mills' system of recruitment and 
training - two important features of industrial discipline - was the 
subject of comment in 1945 in a note on 'Apprenticeship to Jute Mill 
Weaving Departments' prepared by the newly-formed Labour Department of 
the I.3.M.A. 'Notwithstanding that the Jute Industry has prospered 
and expanded upon the output of its many looms', the note said, 'there 
has never been established any common method of selecting recruits or 
of teaching young workers the business of weaving'. Worse still, such 
informal training as the worker could receive by watching or helping 
others was often a matter of breaking factory-rules or legislation: 
'[the] knowledge of power loom weaving could only be gained by the 
efforts of the novice himself in time spent, iMuatly 6uAAe.ptUU.0LU>ly, 
beside a friendly weaver already employed in a mill factory'. What 
permitted such a state of affairs to continue was the stagnation in 
technology which reflected, as we have seen, a lack of diversity in 
the products of the mills and their rather crude nature. This, again, 
was commented on in the note: 
Of recruits who had any specialised tuition in 
weaving there were none, and there are very few today 
... No lasting improvement of quality or quantity of 
outturn could possibly result from this system, and 
it is probably true that the oeprative himself is no 
better equipped technically to turn out good fabric 
today than was his grandfather fifty years ago. Pride 
of craftsmanship has not been fostered, nor have any 
efforts been made to improve or widen the outlook 
of the operative who frequently never attains greater 
proficiency than is needed for operating a loom 
weaving [only] one type of fabric.®"* 
This discussion helps explain why the owners in the jute industry 
took a rather selective view of working-class conditions. Given the 
easily-learned nature of jute mill work, individual workers remained 
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highly replaceable so long as the supply of labour was adequate. The 
task of structuring a labour force was therefore largely a supply-
proposition to the mills and not a question of skill-formation, training 
or efficiency. An 'ample supply of [cheap] male labour', and not 
efficiency, was what was always seen as an important key to the prosperity 
of the m i l l s . I t was in fact a concern with the supply of labour that 
often produced a certain atmosphere of laxity of rules within a jute 
mill. As the factory inspector explained in his report for 1893: 
A number of men, women and children can at most times 
of the day be seen in the grounds of the large [jute] 
mills, either asleep under the trees or shady parts 
of the building, taking their meals, bathing or 
smoking in a special shed ... built for the purpose. 
The question might suggest itself to some ... as to 
why so many are able to leave their work at all times 
of the day when in the Home Mills everyone is kept 
under lock and key. The answer is simple but a very 
striking one. There are 100 per cent, more hands 
employed in every Jute Mill in Bengal than is required 
to work a similar sized mill in Dundee.®^ 
The mills obviously found it cheaper to carry with them an amount of 
excess labour (to meet contingencies like epidemics and absenteeism) 
than to invest in a healthy, vigorous, efficient working class. As late 
as 1929, the Indian jute mill worker was half as efficient as a worker 
in Dundee. I.J.M.A. explained that this was not because 'the work 
[in India] is unduly hard'. Nor was it caused by the 'climatic 
conditions', but 'simply because this has been the custom so far as 
the Calcutta jute mills are concerned'.®^ 
In the eyes of the employers, then, certain aspects of working-class 
conditions gained priority over others and received more attention. And 
the knowledge produced as a result of this attention bore an unmistakable 
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stamp of the employers' concern about the supply of labour. The 'areas 
of origin' of the workers, for instance, became an object of investigation, 
especially at moments of inadequate supply of labour. Hence the 
availability of such information. Foley's report of 1905, itself a 
document on labour-supply, gave evidence of this. J. Nicoll of 
l.J.M.A. told Foley that 'he had experienced some difficulty [in 
procuring labour] in his three Jute Mills in 1902, and had theJi^Ofi^. 
caused a census to be made that year, showing the districts from which 
the hands came', and it was this data that Foley reproduced in his 
r e p o r t . B u t Foley also noted that such information was not collected 
except in times of labour scarcity. The average jute mill manager, who 
was 'usually a kindly Scot from Dundee', was 'generally ... unable to 
say from where his hands come, and if told the information would 
convey no meaning to him'.®^ Foley's impressions are confirmed by a 1921 
report on 'The Conditions of Employment of Women Before and After 
Child-Birth in Bengal Industries' by Dr D.F. Curjel of the Indian 
Medical Service. Of the twenty-five jute mills Curjel visited, none 
was able to offer any information about the number of children born 
to their female workers. Curjel was struck by the manager's lack of 
interest in working-class conditions. The manager of the Soorah Jute 
Mill 'did not concern himself with conditions affecting lives of his 
workers'. She found the manager of the Lawrence Jute Mill 'rather vague 
as to [the] class of labour employed', and he 'seemed to take little 
interest' in their conditions. The manager of the Union Jute Mill who 
•had been in charge 6 months' told Curjel that 'he had been too busy 
to think about the health of the workers'. This lack of interest was 
once again reflective of capital's view of labour conditions: they 
mattered only if and when they affected labour supply. 'It is interesting 
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to find', Curjel noted after talking to the manager of the Hou/rah Jute 
Mills, 'how little managers know of the origins of the labour employed 
in their mills. As long as the sirdars produced the required number of 
workers, it does not concern them from what district it is drawn'. 
Even more telling was the reception that Curjel had from the manager 
of the Ballighata Jute Mill. The manager 'would scarcely discuss' the 
subject of labour conditions with Curjel. He said 'he did not concern 
himself with the workers' lives'. 'He took no interest in modern labour 
questions [and] "thought it all useless'". Curjel notes why this was so; 
The manager who had been in this mill for many years, 
did not appear to be the very least interested in 
conditions affecting his workers, so long as he got 
the labour.^^ 
Thus it was that in the jute mills of Calcutta the employers' vision 
of labour conditions developed its particular blind-spots: the worker's 
health became a question of epidemics and not one of nutrition; in 
this connection sanitation became a matter of interest but not the 
worker's general standard of living;^^ and while areas of 'origin' 
of labourers became on occasion a subject of documentation and research, 
the individual worker remained largely undocumented almost throughout 
the period under consideration.^^ The political economy of the jute 
industry thus goes a long way towards explaining why the mill-managers 
were not particularly careful about the proper maintenance of records 
relating to conditions of labour. 
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VI 
The selectiveness with which the industry treated the question of 
labour conditions meant that the factory-documents covered a narrow range 
of issues, touching upon only a few aspects of the workers' lives. But 
apart from the narrowness of their scope, there was yet another problem 
that the authorities faced in handling these documents: their unreliability. 
This is why the attendance-registers of jute mills were described in 1930 
as not reflecting 'the true conditions' of labour. Factory inspectors, 
courts of justice trying cases involving jute-mill workers, the managers 
of the mills - all complained of this. 'You will admit', J.A. Murray 
of I.J.M.A. was asked by Sir Victor Sasoon of the Royal Commission 
on Labour, 'that it must be very difficult for the management to be sure 
that the attendance books that come before them are accurate?' 'It is 
difficult', Murray agreed.^"* The extent of the 'difficulty' was underscored 
in the Factory Inspector's report for 1927 where he quoted a letter 'from 
a Subdivision Officer' as only 'an example of the value' of such documents. 
The letter read: 
In connection with a bad-livelihood case one *** said 
to be the clerk in charge of the attendance register 
of the *** Jute Mills, was summoned on behalf of the 
defence as witness. He gave sworn testimony that the 
undertrial prisoner *** had attended the mill from the 
10th to 13th January 1927 and had drawn Rs 4-11 as 
wages. He stated that he had noted the attendance 
personally. It transpired, however, that the said *** 
was arrested by the Police on 30th December 1926 in 
connection with a dacoity case and since that day he 
was continuously in the Jail lock-up to the end of 
February 1927. The entries in the attendance register 
must be false entries ... The attendance register has 
been kept in a very slovenly manner and there are 
many unattested corrections and many entries are in 
pencil.^^ 
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Similar remarks were made by the Subdivisional Officer of Serampore who 
tried the 'Time Babu' of the Champdany Jute Mill in 1913 for employing 
a child on a basis of a cancelled medical certificate. 
I would point out [he said] that the provisional 
certificate shown to me does not bear any doctor's 
signature, and appears to be merely a blank form 
filled up by an unknown person. This suggests a lack 
of supervision, specially as I was told [that] this 
was the customary practice. 
The problem of unreliability of documents then takes us back to a 
question already highlighted in our discussion of Marx's argument - the 
nature and quality of supervision inside the mills. The 'subordinate 
supervising staff in the jute mills were of two classes. 'In the first 
class there would be the more or less educated babu who has never been 
a mill operative himself. Initially appointed as an apprentice, the 
babu was soon promoted to supervisory work under a Scottish assistant. 
The duties of the babu were to 'check attendances, to keep attendance 
registers', to prepare wage books and 'generally assist in the supervision 
and work of the department'. ^  ^  Below the babu was the 6aA.daA who was 
both a supplier and supervisor of labour and was often of the same social 
origins as the ordinary worker himself. The Government of Bengal pictured 
the 6OAdcui thus: 
The immediate employer of a worker is his sirdar. The 
sirdar gives him his job and it is by his will that the 
worker retains it ... The sirdars are the real masters 
of men. They employ them and dismiss them, and, in 
many cases, they house them and can unhouse them. They 
may own or control the shops which supply the men with 
food. The operative, too, pays his lump or recurring 
sum to the sirdar to retain his job. His life, indeed, 
at every turn is coloured by sirdarism.^® 
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The I.J.M.A. described the sardars and the under-sardars as constituting 
'the lower subordinate supervising staff of the mills'.^^ 
The i>aAdaJi assisted the babu in the letter's task of maintaining 
factory-documents. The process was explained in the conversation that 
took place between Victor Sassoon and J.A. Murray during the proceedings 
of the Royal Commission on Labour: 
Sassoon [S]: Is the only check as to attendance after 
men are at their machines? 
Murray [M]: That is right. 
S: Tokens[designating shifts] are not taken 
at the gate and put on their machines? 
M: No. The check is taken after the workman 
is at the machine. 
S: The baboo walks round the machinery and 
puts down the number of people he happens 
to see working at the machines or probably 
the itCUidoJi tells him are present? 
M: He is supposed to check up each worker 
individually. 
S: But I take it the ^cUidoA tells him who is 
there and he takes the word of the 6aAdaA 
to a great extent? 
M: That may happen. 
As the Government of Bengal's description of the ^aJidoA will have 
made clear, ^OAdcUvi was primarily about supervisory workers making money 
at the expense of the ordinary worker through such means as moneylending, 
bribery etc. SaAdaA6 'dismissed labour and engaged fresh hands just at 
their pleasure', the I.J.M.A. complained to the Royal Commission, and 
'each man who signed on had to pay for the In this the 6aAdaA 
often acted in league with the babu. 
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It is easy to see that the 'corruption' of the iOAdoA and the babu 
would have necessarily imparted a perverse character to the mill-documents 
relating to working-class conditions - wage-books, attendance-registers, 
fine-books, shift-tokens, medical certificates etc. This at any rate was 
the burden of the official complaints. One example that the authorities 
often gave to support their contention was the way the medical certificates 
of child-workers were treated in the mills. In point of law, these 
certificates were meant to protect the health of the working class by 
preventing the employment of under-age children. But the practice of 
each child-recruit having to bribe the a^Jtda/i6 and the babus made this 
impossible of attainment. As the Chief Inspector of Factories explained 
to the Royal Commission: 
The sirdar produces the children and, in many cases, 
allows them to be employed whether they are fit, 
certified or not, and he being illiterate cannot 
satisfy himself as to the correctness of the entries 
in the register. He must, however, keep the spindles 
going, if not directly to maintain continuity of 
production, to maintain his receipts on a child 
capitation basis. 
This apparently led to a fairly rapid turnover of children from individual 
mills, a process that contributed to the 'unreliability' of documents. 
Captain O'Connor, the Senior Certifying Surgeon of Factories, Barrackpore 
District, wrote: 'The principal reason why children migrate from mill to 
mill is that they are forcibly turned out by sirdars for pecuniary gain'. 
The result was that it became 'quite normal ... for a child to have a 
certificate in each of a number of mills in a district', and a child 
'whose certificate is cancelled for not being produced' could 'easily be 
re-certified under another name'.^°^ Colonel Nott, the Civil Surgeon of 
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Hou/rah, reported a case in 1913 in which the same child applied to him 
on the same day for certificates in t\i/o different names, one Muslim and 
the other Hindu - Pir Mohamed and Banojowah. Enquiries revealed that he 
had done it at the ^a/idoA's instruction. ^  
A similar phenomenon could be observed in the case of adult labour 
as well. 'When checking registers', wrote the Factory Inspector in 1930, 
'a woman under examination may give two or three names with a certain 
amount of persistence'.^®^ The manipulation of the attendance-registers 
(and other documents) by 6aAdaAJ> and babus invariably led to an inflation 
of the wage-bill. 'You may have 10 per cent of the names on your bocks', 
the Royal Commission suggested to the manager of the Caledonian Jute Mill, 
'who actually do not exist as far as working is concerned and that money 
goes somewhere?' 'Yes', replied the manager, 'it is divided between the 
baboos and the sardars and the man who is doing the two men's jobs'. 
Another manager admitted in his evidence that about 7% per cent of his 
labour force were probably such ghost w o r k e r s . T h e Chief Inspector of 
Factories however thought these figures to be underestimates. While 
'theoretically' and 'according to the register', the multiple-shift mills 
carried 22 or 25 per cent more labour than in single-shift mills, the 
Inspector knew that in reality it was 'considerably less than 10 per 
A study of the process of 'supervision' within a jute mill - i.e. a 
problem that Marx saw as central to the question of documentation of the 
conditions of work - turns on the problem of 'corruption' of the supervisory 
staff. Why was 'the labour of overlooking' in a Calcutta jute mill riddled 
with 'corruption'? How does one account for the widespread practices of 
falsifying documents? 
141 
VII 
One could obviously and easily develop a 'needs-of-capital' type 
argument in response to these questions. It could be argued, for instance, 
that the icUidoA existed only because he served the 'needs of capital' in 
the jute industry and that his so-called 'corrupt' practices - recruiting 
workers for bribes, housing them, lending them money at high interests -
constituted a kind of service to capital in a labour market that the 
industry had done very little to structure. 
There is a body of evidence that supports this view. The mills, it 
would appear, were prepared to tolerate the 'corrupt' practices of the 
6aAdajL as he was considered indispensable. Even though the I.J.M.A. 
bitterly complained to the Royal Commission about sardari 'corruption', 
they nevertheless insisted that 'you [could] not do without sardars'.^"^ 
The financial outlays made by the mills on wages to be paid to the 
labourers clearly allowed for a certain amount of leakage through 6aAda/u. 
corruption. Admittedly, this was not true of the (relatively) high-wage, 
piece-paid department of weaving; here 'a check [was] made by calculating 
the total production of each section of the department, so that the total 
amount actually earned by production must equal the amount to be paid 
out'.^^° In weaving, therefore, i>aAdcLXl extortion of ordinary workers 
took the form of bribery, money-lending etc.^^^ But in every other 
department the wage-policy followed the simple aim of keeping the 'corrupt' 
practices of the sardar and the babu (e.g. inflating the wage-bill by 
employing 'ghost workers') under control rather than attempting to 
abolish them altogether. 
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In each department throughout the works ... a 
complement is drawn up, showing the number of hands 
it requires to run satisfactorily; and against this 
number is shown the amount in wages that such 
departments are bound down to.^ 
There is also evidence suggesting a direct complicity, in some 
cases, of the Scottish overseers and managers of the mills in the 'corrupt' 
acts of the sardar and the babu. The Kankinarrah Labour Union (formed in 
1922) 'once exposed a case of bribery when Rs 3000 had been paid for the 
position of a Head Sardar'. The President of the union, K.C. Roy Chowdhury, 
noted in his diary that 'the money had been received by a friend of the 
manager of the [jute] mill concerned'.^^^ His diary also had the following 
entry which is even more revealing: 
Sen, the Head Babu of the Union [Jute] Mill, informed 
me today that numerous false tickets [tokens] are 
distributed every day at their mill. This means that 
tokens are distributed in the names of people who have 
not actually done any work. The money is then divided 
between the sardars, the Head Babu and the European 
overseer sahib. Bima sardar reportedly even supplies 
the weekly groceries for the overseer sahibs free of 
any cost. ^  
How did all this suit the 'needs of capital'? Why were the owners 
of capital in the jute industry prepared to overlook, and at best contain, 
this 'corruption' rather than stamp it out? Obviously, the 6aAdaA in his 
role of labour-supplier was important to the industry's view of its own 
interests. The Chief Inspector of Factories explained this in 1913: 
All mills have to rely on the Sirdars and Time-Babus 
of their various departments for the supply of labour, 
[and therefore] the Manager has either to overlook 
irregularities practised by these men or to deal strictly 
with them and face a shortage [of labour] which results 
in a reduced weekly outturn in tonnage of gunnies, and 
seriously affects his position with the Managing Agents.^^^ 
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But as Mie shall see, finding inexpensive ways of controlling labour \i/as 
a problem of even greater concern to the industry than simply the problem 
of labour-supply. This is why the .tcuidoji remained important even when 
the supply of labour was adequate. To understand why this was so, we 
have to look at the nature of the demand for labour that the industry 
created and the way it proceeded to meet that demand. 
A plentiful supply of labour was considered necessary for the progress 
of the industry. Between the years 1895 and 1926, when the industry 
enjoyed an almost uninterrupted period of prosperity and expansion of 
output, the number of workers employed in the mills grew from 73,725 to 
338,497. The supply of labour had to be adjusted to the I.J.M.A.-devised 
strategy of short-time working which frequently imposed weekly 'idle days' 
on the mills as a way of reducing output (to match temporary fluctuations 
in demand) and wage-bills.^^^ From 1913 onwards, the mills kept changing 
'from four to five days a week or from five days to six days a week and 
so on at different intervals', sometimes changing 'twice or three times 
a year'.^^^ But as the mills offered no incentives for long-term service, 
a temporary closure of a mill often meant a temporary loss of labour. The 
problem was an old one,^^® but assumed critical importance in the prosperous 
years of 1895-1926 when individual mills always wanted to conserve labour 
for days when they might be called upon to expand output. The means devised 
to meet this end was the multiple shift system whereby the labour force 
was worked in three or four shifts during the day and into the night.^^^ 
Between 1913 and 1926 more than 90 per cent of the jute mills worked on 
this s y s t e m . T h e main advantage of the system was not economy. An 
'abundance of labour or surfeit of it ... [was] a necessary concomitant 
of multiple-shift employment', as that was the only way it could be 
144 
ensured, at least on paper, that the workers did not work beyond the 
legally allowed hours.^^^ There was for instance an elaborate relief-system 
for weavers which necessitated employing extra 'daily-weavers^^^ It was 
generally agreed in 1929 that a multiple-shift mill carried 25 to 30 per 
cent more labour (at least on its books) than a single-shift mill.^^^ 
But therein lay its advantage, a reduction in the risk of a bottle-neck 
developing in labour supply should the trade ever demand an increase in 
output. 
By an accident of history, the industry's search for an ample supply 
of labour took place at a time that saw enormous increases in emigration 
of labour from Bihar and U.P. and other regions into Bengal. 'Twenty 
years ago', Foley wrote in 1905, 'all the hands [in jute mills] were 
Bengalis. These have been gradually replaced by Hindust[h]anis from 
the United Provinces and Bihar ... so that at present in most of the mills 
two-thirds of the hand are composed of up-countrymen'. ^ A n d once the 
flow started 'from upcountry', it flowed - as the Royal Commission on 
Labour was told - 'very strongly'.^^^ The situation was considered so 
satisfactory by 1895 that an official enquiry committee formed to 
investigate the question of labour supply to the Bengal coal mines felt 
that 'there was no necessity' to conduct any 'exhaustive enquiry into 
the subject of labour supply for jute mills'. Nor did the mills 
particularly press for one.^^® Foley was 'somewhat astonished' in 1905 
to find that large increases in demand for jute mill labour between 
1895-96 and 1903-04 had been easily met in spite of 'no recruitment on 
any systematic method ... at all' and without any 'material' rise in 
wages. ^ ^^ Even the problem of seasonal shortage of labour - e.g. during 
harvesting months - that Foley and other early observers of the industry 
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often commented on seems to have lost its importance in the later years. 
In their memorandum dealing with 'methods of recruitment' I.3.M.A. 
said to the Royal Commission in 1929 that 'labour is in good supply all 
the year round'. When asked about the seasonal shortage of the 'olden 
days', the I.J.M.A. representatives remarked that even those conditions 
had changed after 1914: 'the fact remains that since 1914 labour has 
never been scarce'. 
Evidence of the industry's sense of satisfaction regarding supply 
of labour may also be seen in certain significant changes in the 
geographical location of the mills. In the early days, when the mill-hands 
were local - i.e. 'mostly Bengalis' - an 'isolated site' for a mill was 
'recognized as an advantage, the hands ... living in the neighbourhood'.''^® 
In those years 'it was considered by the mills a matter of life and death 
to prevent a rival company settling down in proximity to their labour 
s u p p l y ' . T h e first two years of the Victoria Jute Mill built in 1885 
on the riverbank opposite the Samnugger Jute Mill were marked by what 
Wallace called 'the celebrated land dispute' between the two mills.^^^ 
'We are a little short of hands this week', ran a typically complaining 
letter from the Samnugger Mill to its directors in 1887, '... and this 
may affect us. The Victoria [Mill] has taken up all our spare hands ... 
[and] we do not have so many to fall back on and that injures us a bit'.^^^ 
The Hastings Mill's rather 'unremunerative'^^^ decision in 1894 to work 
day and night by electric light was 'said to have been suggested by a 
rumour that another ... firm contemplated putting up a large Mill near 
Hastings, whereupon the proprietors of the latter thought they might as 
well find employment for all the hands in the neighbourhood ... by 
running 22 hours, instead of from daylight to dark'.^^"" As labour became 
146 
'chiefly immigrant' and came of its own in abundant numbers, the situation 
soon reversed itself. Mills were no longer located in isolation from one 
another. Instead, noted Foley, 'it is considered now [1905] ... an 
advantage to have a site in a centre, such ... as Kankinara, where 
immigrant labour congregates'.^^^ This explains why the number of mills 
on the 24 Parganas side of the river Hooghly - where Kankinara, Jagaddal 
and other centres of immigrant labour were located in very close proximity 
to one another - eventually grew much faster than the numbers in other 
districts. 
TABLE 14 
District 
No. of jute mills in the year 
1880 1896 1911 1921 
Hooghly 4 6 7 9 
Howrah 5 6 9 12 
24 Parganas 6 15 31 38 
Calcutta 3 3 3 5 
Sources: For 1880, The J u U M M ^ oi BznQal (Dundee, 1880); for ^896, 
John Leng, 'The Indian Dundee' in his LeXie.^ ^^om India, and Ce-yjon 
(Dundee, 1896); for 1911 and 1921, Cen4a4 o^^ India 1921, Vol. M, Pt 1, 
p. 403. 
A significant aspect of this migration of labour from U.P., Bihar 
and other places into Bengal was that it enabled the industry to replace 
Bengali workers by their 'cheaper', up-country substitutes and this at a 
time when the industry was looking for ways of saving expenses. The 
I.J.M.A.'s move in 1886 to reduce wage-expenditure by short-time 
working was in fact preceded by 'most of the Mills ... taking action 
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to effect a reduction of wages', for 'the tone of the market ... [was] 
still very unfavourable'.^^^ Just how large these reductions were is 
suggested by a letter that the Dundee directors of the Titaghur Jute 
Mill received from their Calcutta manager towards the end of 1885. 
The letter reported, to the directors' delight, 'that the wages at the 
works have now been reduced Rs 1000 per week below what used to be paid, 
which the Directors considered very satisfactory and creditable to the 
M a n a g e r T h e prolongation of working hours with the introduction of 
electricity into the mills about 1895^^® also seems to have caused a 
decline in the Bengali component of the labour f o r c e . W h a t e v e r the 
specific factors aiding these changes in the social composition of the 
jute-mill working class, the result was that by the 1920s the labour-
force was of a predominantly migrant character (see Table 15 below). 
It is important to emphasize that the industry provided little 
service in helping these migrant workers to settle down in the city and 
in thus developing a permanently stable labour-force. The reason for this 
inaction lay in the very mercantilist spirit in which the jute mills 
handled their economic affairs. In the minds of the entrepreneurs 
in the industry, as we have seen in the last chapter, profit was 
firmly linked to the idea of 'cheap products'. It was thought that their 
cheapness gave these products - sacking and hessian of a very crude 
quality - a competitive edge over any natural or synthetic substitutes. 
Hence the insistence within the industry on keeping their products crude 
and cheap - a policy which resulted in a stagnant technology and an 
unskilled labour-force. A cheap product had to be produced at 
a low cost, and the availability of cheap labour in eastern India was 
seen as a definite advantage in this regard. Thus developed the 
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TABLE 15 
Areas of origin of jute-mill workers, 1921-41 
(figures in percentages) 
Year • 
Bengal Bihar Orissa United ^^^^^^ Central 
Provinces Provinces 
1921 24.1 33.4 11.4 23.1 4.6 N.A. 3.2 
1928 24.8 37.1 . 15.7 11.2 9.1 1.9 urissa) 
1929 17 60 , 5 14 4 N.A. Orissa) 
1941 11.6 43.1 3.4 36.4 1.6 N.A. 0.8 
(Figures have been rounded off to the first decimal place.) 
Sources: Ranajit Das Gupta, 'Factory Labour in Eastern India: Sources of 
supply, 1855-1946 - Some Preliminary Findings', Tho. Indian Economic and 
Social H-UtoKLj Vol. XIII, No. 3, p. 297, Table 6, except for the 
column for 1928 which is derived from W.B.S.A., Com. Dept Com. Br. April 
1930 A7-12. The 1921 figures apply to the whole of the labour-force and 
the 1928 figures relate to 25 jute mills. The 1929 figures are very 
approximate, and the 1941 figures were drawn from a sample survey of 
mill workers in the Jagaddal area and hence are not representative of 
the whole working class. 
labour-intensive nature of the industry, where labour alone accounted for 
about 50 per cent of the cost of converting raw jute into the finished 
material (Table 16). 
The bulk of this 'labour cost' was constituted by wages. Given 
their concern for keeping down the prices of their products while using 
labour-intensive methods of production, the owners of the jute mills 
were reluctant to spend on any individual labourer anything beyond such 
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TABLE 16 
Year 
Labour cost as percentage 
of the costs of conversion 
(figures relate to 
different mills) 
Remarks 
1880^ 45 40 Figures for two mills 
c. 1900"^ 50 Figure for a hypothetical 
Calcutta mill 
1927^^ 50 Figure for one mill 
1937^ 49.6 
55.4 
50.7 
49.5 
Figures for four mills 
Sources: for (a), The Jutz Mllti, Bzngal (Dundee, 1880), pp. 20, 47; 
for (b), Archives of the Modern History Department, Dundee University, 
Card Collection on Cox Brothers, card entitled 'Cost of Hill and 
Factory' (c. 1900); for (c), D.H. Buchanan, Cap-itcitLit EntQA-pfvUn, 
p. 250; for (d), C.S.A.S., B.P., Box 13, 'Paul' to Edward Benthall, 
20 Sept. 1937, Enclosures. 
minimum necessities as wages. And even the wages paid were single-worker 
wages; they were not enough to support a worker's family. According to 
an estimate of 1929 the 'average income' of a jute mill worker was Rs 5 
per week, while it would cost him at least Rs 7 to maintain a family of 
himself, his wife and, say, three children. ^ ° The increase over the 
years in investment in workers' housing was extremely tardy. An 1897 
survey of about 73,000 of the Bengal jute mill workers showed only 
13.5 per cent of them living in company-built coolie-lines. The rest 
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had had to make their o\i/n arrangements.^'*^ Thirty years later in 1929 
when the mill labour-force had increased to 339,665, only 30 per cent 
of the jute mill labour were housed by the mills, according to the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce and I.J.M.A.^'*^ Stability of labour 
was obviously not in itself a crucial concern to the industry - semi-
skilled or unskilled workers being highly replaceable - so long as the 
supply of labour remained abundant. 
One can also see this in the extremely underdeveloped nature of the 
factory-rules that were in operation in the jute mills. The service-rules, 
for instance, had been left largely uncodified. Graded wage-systems (with 
provisions for regular increments), pensions, provident-funds, sickness-
insurance, leave-rules - all the usual inducements for long-term service 
and stability - were conspicuous by their absence. Leave as a rule was 
without pay and the amount of pay due to a worker during his or her 
sickness remained 'a matter for the manager's discretion'. ^ ^ Sickness 
insurance was considered ' impossible' ^ a n d so were provident funds 
and pensions. When the workers of the Fort William, the Howrah and the 
Ganges jute mills went out on strike in February 1937, the Secretary 
to the Government of Bengal concluded that they could not have had any 
'serious grievances' as their leaders asked for 'such obviously 
impossible terms as provision of provident funds and pension'. ^ ^ 
For such an uncared-for and poverty-ridden working class, the 
^OAdoA performed functions that ideally should have been performed by 
the employers, such as supplying work, credit and housing. R.N. Gilchrist, 
the Labour intelligence Officer of Bengal, thus pictured the average 
migrant worker in 1930 'as he sets out from his village to find work': 
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The sirdar may oblige him with his fare and a little 
money to buy food on the way ... The sirdar may 
advance him a little more money, for a job may not 
be immediately available, and he may also direct him 
to live in certain quarters and to buy his rice at a 
certain shop. The day when there is a vacancy comes, 
and the sirdar may say: "Your pay on the books of the 
mill is twelve rupees a month, but I have incurred 
some expense for you. Usually when I give a job, I 
require thirty rupees down and one rupee a month for 
two years. You have no money to give me as a lump 
sum, so you will pay me two rupees a month for as 
long as I secure you a job. If you do not, I cannot 
be certain your job will last". The grateful youth ... 
gratefully accepts ... As he grows older and wiser, 
he gradually finds out that the sirdar owns the house 
in which he shares a room with six others and for 
which they all pay rent, and that he also owns the 
shop where he buys his rice.^'*® 
This of course was part of the 'corruption' that the industry and 
the government complained of. The ^oJtdaJu. practices undoubtedly constituted 
a kind of secondary exploitation of ordinary workers by their supervisory 
or superior colleagues. ^  ^ But it could be legitimately argued that the 
employers allowed such 'corruption' to exist because it saved them the 
expense of investing in institutions otherwise typical of capitalist 
control of labour. SOACLOAA. control was cheaper than housing, health-
care or an articulated body of rules guiding the conditions of work. 
VIII 
A ' needs-of-capital' type argument then tells us that the 6a/idaA 
existed along with his invariably 'corrupt' practices mainly because 
they were allowed so to exist. They suited the strategy of capital. 
This is an important consideration but it does not go far enough for the 
purpose at hand. Most important, it does not answer the question that 
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Marx helps us to raise: what was the relationship between the ^oAdoA's 
authority and his 'corruption'? As we have seen, it was 6ah.daJvi 
'corruption' that ultimately distorted the documents which the 
supervisors in a jute mill were required to produce and keep. The 
nature of supervisory authority in the Calcutta jute mills was thus 
significantly different from the one discussed in Marx's argument. For 
Marx, the supervisor's authority in capitalist relations of production 
manifested itself in the keeping of time-sheets, fine-books, attendance-
registers, wage-rolls etc. Such maintenance of documents implied a 
keeping of the wage-contract between capital and labour. And the notion 
of the contract took us back to Marx's specific assumptions regarding 
working-class culture, assumptions that informed his category of 
'capital'. Our jute mills, however, presented a very different picture. 
The supervisory authority of the 6CUtdan. (or of his accomplice babu) 
produced unreliable, falsified documents. One could in fact go further 
and argue that falsifying documents was integral to the operation of the 
power and authority that the icuidcui wielded over the ordinary coolie. 
What appeared to the state as 'corruption', 'abuse', breaking of the 
rules, etc. was precisely the form in which the 4C(AdaA's authority was 
manifested. Or to put it in another way, it was an authority that was 
incompatible with any bourgeois notions of legality, factory codes and 
service-rules. 
We would be mistaken, for example, to see the bribe that the 
ordinary coolie gave the ^oAdoA simply as an economic transaction. The 
bribe was also a sign, a representation, of the 6aJidaA's authority and 
its acceptance by the worker, which is why an act of refusal to pay 
the bribe was seen as a gesture of defiance and exposed the worker to 
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a degree of anger, vendetta and violence from the ^OAdoA that was often 
out of proportion to the amount of money involved. K.C. Roy Chou/dhury' s 
diaries mentioned the not untypical case of one Abdul, a u/orker of the 
Hukumchand Jute Mill, who was stabbed by the followers of a certain 
6aJidaA called Sujat for having refused to pay the latter his dcu^toohl, 
or customary commission/''® The nature of the 6aJidaA's authority and 
power is visible in the details of the following letter that some 
twenty-eight workers of the Budge Budge Jute Mill once wrote to a 
Bengali barrister in December 1906: 
We have to get permission for leaves from the Sahib. 
But we have to pay bribes to the babu and the sardar 
at the time of the leave; further, they take bribes 
from us every month and also when the Durga Puja 
season approaches. If we refuse to pay them they get 
the sahib to fine or dismiss us on false charges of 
bad workmanship. Till recently we felt compelled to 
meet their unjust demands. But as prices ran very 
high last year at the time of Durga Puja, we 
expressed our intention to pay them a little less 
than in earlier years. At this the Head Sardar 
Haricharan Khanra has been going around instigating 
the Assistant Babu Atul Chandra Chattopadhyay to 
collect even more poAbanl [gifts customarily due at 
times of religious festivals; paJiban - religious 
festival] than usual. The two of them have even 
advised the in-charge Panchanan Ghose, a nice 
gentlemen otherwise, to force us to pay a much 
larger poAbaivi this year. Vihen [in protest] we 
stopped paying any poAban-i whatsoever, they got the 
sahib to fine us on cooked up charges ... But, in 
truth, we are not guilty. 
A large part of the ^a/idan.'s authority was then based on fear: 'we 
felt Q.omp<lJUi2.d to meet their unjust demands'. So great was the fear of 
the -iO/tdoA's vengeance that several of the workers interviewed by the 
Royal Commission strenuously denied having paid any bribes for their 
employment. But their denial lacked the force of conviction. Sorju, 
an under-sardar of the Anglo-Indian Jute Mill, admitted that there 
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was bribery 'in every department' of the mill but claimed that there 
was none in his own. Kalil, a weaver in the same mill, said that he 
had heard 'that ^OAdciU take Rs 5 or Rs 10 but so far as I am concerned 
I did not pay anything'.^^° Harilal, a spinner in the Titaghur Jute Mill, 
insisted that he 'did not pay any bakihx^k for getting my job' while he 
thought it possible that 'other people might be paying bak^fvcih to the 
^ O A d o A ' A Hadrasi female worker of the Howrah Jute Mill told her 
interviewers that she got her employment only after promising the^oAdoA 
two rupees from her 'first wages'. On the statement being read out to 
her, however, she retracted it. 'It is probably true', remarked the 
interviewers.^ ^ ^ 
It is of course undeniable that much of this fear of the -icuidaA 
derived from the employers allowing him to 'dismiss and engage fresh 
hands just at [his] pleasure' (to repeat the words of I.J.M.A.j. 
Babuniya, a Bihari female worker of the Titaghur Jute Mill, thus 
expressed her fear to the Royal Commission: 
When I was first entertained I had to pay Rs 4 
bak6hAJ)h to the iaJidcut who appointed me. Each time 
I return back from the village I have to pay the 
same amount as bak^kLbh to the iOAdoA. I also pay 
him 2 as. every week. My husband paid Rs 6 when he 
was first appointed. He pays 4 annas a week to the 
i>cUidaA. If we refuse to pay the 6aAdaJU we will not 
get work. Every worker pays a similar amount to the 
^OAdoA. ^^^ 
Another important element in the ^ a/tdoA's domination was the use of 
naked physical force. For the ordinary worker, as we have noted, 
there was always 'the fear of being beaten'. The child-workers, it was 
said, would not normally speak up against the 6aAda/L for this very 
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reason. Narsama Kurmi, a female worker of the Howrah Jute Mill, was 
'obliged to leave' Howrah as 'she had trouble with a sirdar'. She 
returned only after 'she found [that] the sirdar who annoyed her [had] 
gone'.^^^ 
Like all domination, however, the ^OAdoA's domination was not based 
on fear alone. There was always an undercurrent of tension between the 
iOJidoA. and the ordinary worker and pushed beyond a certain point, the 
worker could become openly hostile. To be effective therefore the 
^a/idoA's authority also needed legitimacy and acceptance. Fear had to 
be balanced by respect. In fact, according to R.N. Gilchrist, the 
typical jute-mill ^oAdoA was more respected than feared. 'The sirdar 
[is] a man of considerable importance', Gilchrist wrote. 'He is ... 
respected, perhaps even feared'. 
What made the i,OA.daJt^ s authority effective? Our tentative answer 
would be 'culture', the culture to which both the sardar and the worker 
belonged. In essence this was a pre-capitalist culture with a strong 
emphasis on religion, community, kinship, language and other primordial 
loyalties. The evidence on this point is not direct but is extremely 
suggestive. It seems significant, for instance, that all the words used 
by the workers (and others) to describe 6aAdcUvl extortions - extortions 
summed up in the legalistic expression 'corruption' or 'abuses' - were 
words of pre-capitalist, pre-British origin: dcL6too^, bakAltcih, bcUta, 
poAbayii, 6CLlami, etc. Vou,toon.l, the most widely used of these words, 
came from the word dcu>tooK. which meant 'custom' or 'tradition'. Even 
the word 6a.KdaA in its meaning of 'labour supplier' - though literally 
it meant 'a headman' - was in vogue in the late eighteenth century and 
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perhaps even earlier.^^^ Besides, the ^OAdcUi's mode of operation had 
certain crucial pre-capitalist elements. He usually recruited on the 
basis of the often overlapping networks of community, village and kin. 
The Government of Bengal wrote: 
Sirdars in the jute mills, engineering u/orks, and 
other concerns recruit in their own native villages 
and surrounding areas; hence there is a tendency for 
people from the same village or the immediate 
neighbourhood to congregate in the same industrial 
area in Bengal. ^  ^  ® 
Much of the basis of the sardar's social control of the workforce lay in 
the relationships of community, kinship, religion etc. and in the ideas 
and norms associated with them. For example, it was usual for important 
up-country 6aJida/U, to build temples or mosques for the workers under 
them. On this depended a lot of the ^a/idoA's prestige and authority. 
Mosques in jute-mill areas are even today named after important saJtda/U 
and stand as monuments to their one-time enormous presence. 'Manbodh 
sardar ki musjid', 'Birbal sardar ki musjid', 'Ishaque sardar ki musjid' 
are, to give a few instances, the names of three working-class mosques 
that exist today in the Kankinara area.^^^ SoJidaAl thus seems to 
have been an instance of a pre-colonial, pre-capitalist institution being 
adapted to the needs of industrialization in a colony. 
The 6a/ida/i then embodied contradictory elements of authority. He 
owed his formal position of being a foreman to the managers and owners 
of capital and, in that sense, was a functionary in the capitalist 
production system of the jute mills. He was also different from the 
traditional village headman of north India in that '^O/tdoy'L-ships' could 
be bought and sold on the market. Yet he was not quite the industrial 
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foreman of nineteenth-century Western Europe whose role 'became 
increasingly technical' as time passed. ^ ^^ ScUidcUU Mieve selected not 
for any technical ability but for 'the authority which they display[ed] 
over their fellowmen' even before becoming sardars.^^^ 'Tumko apna 
6aAdaA ka hukum manna hoga' ('you vi/ill have to obey the orders of your 
own 6aAdaA') was one sentence that the Scottish managers and assistants 
in the mills were expected to learn in order to use it in dealing with a 
refractory w o r k e r . T h e sentence brings out the ambiguity of the 
6aA.da/i's authority. His hukum (order) was obviously subordinate to yet 
another imperative ('You will have to'), that of the manager, the 
representative of capital. But the word hukum (with connotations of 
hukumaX or sovereignty) - once again an ancient word familiar to the 
north Indian peasant - would have had long and deep resonances within 
the worker's consciousness and culture. 
In this situation, legally required factory documents on working-
class conditions were largely irrelevant to the exercise of the 
6aAdan.^ s authority which was rooted not in capitalist but in pre-capitalist 
modes of domination. The .^aAdoJi ensured obedience to his hukum through 
means that were either 'illegal' or that fell outside the rule of law. 
His was not the'disciplinary authority' that Marx outlined in his 
argument. VJhen the Government of India grafted a disciplinary apparatus 
of documentation on the culture that supported (and sometimes resisted) 
the sardar's domination, these documents found their own place and 
meaning within that culture: as additional vehicles of the 60JidaA's 
power and authority. The -ia-lda/i now proved his power by bending rules 
and falsifying documents. Hence the phenomenon of 'false fines'. 
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'cooked up charges', 'wrongful dismissals', etc. The very nature of 
this authority entailed, that is, 'unreliable' documents. 
IX 
We may thus repeat our principal argument. An attempt to vi/rite a 
history of the conditions of the jute mill workers of Calcutta on the 
basis of documents coming from the state and the owners of capital 
invariably reveals certain gaps in our knowledge of these conditions. 
Insofar as that knowledge has a history, the gaps have a history too. 
It was the same history that produced both the knowledge - enshrined in 
archival documents - and the gaps which also the same documents reveal. 
An examination of this history (with the aid of an argument borrowed 
from Marx) takes us into a closer study of the political economy of the 
industry and the nature of the 'industrial discipline' operative within 
the mills. Questions relating to the latter lead us to investigate the 
issues of 'supervision' and working-class notions of 'authority', and 
hence into the realm of culture and consciousness. We shall pursue these 
notions further in the chapters that follow. The problems of organization, 
militancy and solidarity in the history of the jute-mill working class 
will refer us back to these very guestions. 
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Chapter A 
THE PARADOX OF ORGANIZATION 
Most observers of labour conditions in the jute industry agreed 
that there was an urgent need for working-class organization. Even the 
Government of Bengal, who could hardly be suspected of pro-labour 
sympathies, were moved to remark in 1929 that the industry was 'full 
of anomalies, which could never exist were there a properly organized 
jute workers' union'.^ Besides, with the jute mills situated in very 
close proximity to one another, the industry often seemed to provide an 
ideal basis for a strong trade union movement. The government described 
this labour force in 1933 as 'perhaps the largest and the most compact 
group of workers with identical interests in the w o r l d T h e Bengal 
Labour Commissioner too wrote in the same vein in 1935: 'Nowhere in 
the world are there better territorial conditions for labour organisation 
than round about Calcutta. The jute mills are concentrated in a narrow 
range of, say, 20 miles north and south of Calcutta ... [and] employ 
about 300,000 persons'.^ 
Yet a striking feature of the history of the jute workers' movement 
was the absence, relatively speaking, of strong and enduring trade unions, 
A government enquiry in 1945 revealed that only about 18 per cent of the 
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workers - some 47,697 of a total of 267,193 - were members of any 
unions."* This u/as an uncertain estimate; 'it is important to remember', 
cautioned the author of the report, 'that membership figures of Trade 
Unions are not always very reliable'.^ An important trade union leader 
was to sound an even more cautionary note a few years later. Speaking to 
a convention of the All India Trade Union Congress (A.I.T.U.C.) held in 
Calcutta in 1952, Indrajit Gupta, the General Secretary of the Communist 
dominated Bengal Chatkal Mazdoor Union, reminded his comrades of 'the 
harsh reality that the oueAwheXm-lng majoK^y of them [the jute mill 
workers], perhaps 95%, [were] not organized in any trade union' at all.^ 
Both Gupta's conclusion and that drawn in the official report of 1946 
were the same. 'There is no doubt', the latter said, 'that Trade Unionism 
in the jute mill industry ... is in an extremely weak condition'.^ 'No 
healthy tradition of trade unionism has yet developed among the jute 
workers', was the view put forward by Gupta.® 
II 
The persistent weakness of jute workers' organization has been seen 
as somewhat paradoxical, given the history of their long-standing 
grievances and their tradition of militant and sometimes well-organized 
strikes.^ This militancy was especially marked in the 1920s and afterwards 
when strikes became much more frequent than before. In analyzing some 
eighty-nine strikes - twenty-seven of them in jute mills alone - that 
occurred in the Calcutta industrial area during the second half of 1920, 
the Committee on Industrial Unrest did not think it necessary 'to go 
back further than the 1st July 1920' as strikes were much less common 
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in the past. 'Before that time [1920]', said the Committee, 'a certain 
amount of industrial unrest had been evident in Bengal as in other parts 
of India, but in Bengal strikes had not been resorted to on any large 
scale as a means of enforcing the demands of the workers'.^® Their 
opinion was echoed by the Director of Industries, Bengal, in an article 
he wrote in 1921. He described the 'epidemic of strikes' that broke out 
in Bengal in 1920 as 'unprecedented in the history of the province', 
as strikes 'had appeared only in isolated cases' in the earlier period 
when 'the demands had more commonly been non-economic in character'.^^ 
Between 1921 and 30 June 1929, there were 201 recorded strikes in the 
jute industry, far surpassing the numbers in the preceding decades. ^ ^ 
It was not just the higher frequency of strikes, however, that 
made the authorities take notice of them; the authorities were also 
sometimes worried by their longer duration. A strike in the Fort Gloster 
Jute Mills in 1928 was described by the government as 'the most protracted 
strike in the industry' till then. It lasted from the 17th July to the 
31st December 1928 and was soon followed by a general strike that 
began in July 1929 and ran till the end of September. One 'notable' 
feature of this strike, the government thought, was its 'magnitude': 
'never before in the history of the jute mills in Bengal had anything 
of the nature of a general strike been attempted'.^^ The strike presaged 
the shape of things to come. After a temporary period of lull - 1930 to 
1933 - working-class militancy reached a peak once again in the mid-
1930s, culminating in a second general strike in 1937. 
What this militancy reflected in the first place was certainly a 
heightened sense of grievance on the part of the jute mill worker. The 
175 
Royal Commission on Labour (1929) was told by a jute mill manager who 
had been around for about thirty years that 'there was not so much 
discontent [before] as there is t o d a y ' . A . C . Roy Chowdhury, who 
carried out on behalf of the Commission an enquiry into the standard 
of living of the jute mill workers, reported that he had heard 'much 
discontented talk on the subject of low wages and lack of accommodation' 
Further, the Commission itself came across some particularly sharp 
expressions of workers' grievances over wages and living conditions. 
'Upon this [wage]', said Kamala, an Oriya woman employed by the Howrah 
Jute Mill, '... two people cannot live'.^^ Mangrul, a young boy from 
Patna working at the Titaghur Jute Mill, was equally forthright. 
'Formerly I was well fleshed', he said, 'but now I am weak as I do not 
get enough food'.^ ^  
What made for such 'discontented talk' by the workers? Partly, no 
doubt, their conditions, which seem to have taken a turn for the worse 
in the late 'twenties and 'thirties. From about the mid-1920s, as the 
industry experienced the beginnings of a trade depression, it moved 
towards a policy of reducing its wage-bill. An early 'sign of the 
change' was the decision of the Reliance Jute Mill in 1923 to switch 
over to the single-shift system of work, resulting in the dismissal of 
'over 2,000 workmen' and an important strike. 'There is no doubt 
whatsoever', wrote R.N. Gilchrist, the Labour Intelligence Officer of 
Bengal, 'that the condition of the industry at the moment is giving 
the Managing Agents furiously to think', and some of them were now 
'coming round to the view that perhaps it would be more economical to 
work 5 or 5% days a week on the single shift in preference to the 
multiple shift system'.^® By 1927, the workers had begun to feel 
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the pinck of the employers' policies. About one-third of the recorded 
strikes in the jute mills that year were due to 'the recently introduced 
change in the system of shifts'. The Government of Bengal informed the 
Government of India that 'in each of these disputes there invariably 
was a complaint on the part of the workmen concerned that the change, 
which was accompanied by the lengthening of the working week, resulted 
in a decrease in their weekly earnings'.^^ The same complaint provided 
the 'economic basis' to the general strike on 1929. VJhen the employers 
tried to explain the strike away by attributing it to 'the machinations 
of [political] agitators financed by Marwari "Hessian" merchants', Sir 
David Petrie of the Government of India's Intelligence Bureau retorted 
by pointing to the 'economic basis' of the strike, which 'did not seem 
to be disputed by anyone'; this basis lay, in Petrie's words, in 'an 
increase in the weekly working hours without any corresponding adjustment 
of w a g e s T o these grievances were added those of unemployment and 
actual reduction in the wage-rates in the 1930s. About 60,000 workers 
were laid off in 1930-31,^^ and this was followed by wage-cuts. As one 
government official wrote in August 1932, 
The majority of the mills are working for 40 hours a 
week spread over four or five days. Many operatives 
are now paid as little as from Re 1-10 to Rs 2-1 a 
week. In the present economic depression of the 
industry there is no possibility of any increase in 
the rates of wages 
The decline in the bargaining position of the working class in these 
years is reflected in the stagnant money-wage figures for the industry. 
They are in strong contrast to an apparent increase in productivity 
In addition, the figures for the remittances (money-orders) 
sent by the workers to their villages suggest a significant 
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drop in their earnings. The average value of such money-orders fell by 
nearly 17 per cent in the 1930s compared to the average for 1922-29 
Csee Appendix). 
There was thus enough in the jute mill workers' conditions to make 
them feel discontented. But we should not fall into the trap of thinking 
that working-class militancy was rooted in conditions alone or that the 
conditions by themselves were sufficient to generate such militancy. 
The persistence and volume of labour unrest in the 1920s and '30s have 
also to be understood as signalling a growing propensity, on the part of 
the workers, to protest and challenge the employer's authority. The 1929 
general strike, for instance, surprised the government by the 'apparent 
ease with which the jute mill workers were brought out' by the organizers 
of the strike.^^ 'One thing is certain'. Sir Edward Benthall privately 
remarked in his diary immediately after the strike, 'the best paid labour 
struck as easily as the less well paid'.^*^ It is indeed this growing 
presence, among the workers, of a will to resist the employer that makes 
their lack of organization seem truly paradoxical. 
Given the problems of documenting the consciousness of the jute mill 
workers, their will to resist and question the authority of their 
employers can be read only in terms of the sense of crisis it produced 
among the people in authority. 'Labour has come to a dim realisation 
of its own importance', discerned a concerned government official as 
early as 1924. 'This is not yet overt', he said, 'yet, as every mill 
manager will bear out, labour cannot be handled as it was in the old 
days. It now requires delicate management. Brutality, bullying, 
unfairness, all quickly lead to trouble - usually strikes.'^The 
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old argument of the government - that the strike was 'a private matter 
between the masters and the men'^^ - was found no longer tenable as the 
force and magnitude of the general strike of 1929 compelled the government 
to abandon such fine considerations and intervene in settling the dispute.^^ 
In the 1930s, the 'private' authority of the individual mill manager 
was increasingly viewed as an inadequate agency for controlling working-
class unrest. This may be seen in the direct and enlarged role given to 
the Labour Commissioner of the Bengal government in 1937 in monitoring 
labour disputes in individual jute m i l l s . T h e institution of Labour 
Officers that the I.J.M.A. created in 1937 was another attempt to create 
a new means of control.^^ In addition, the I.J.M.A. now set up its own 
Intelligence Service to receive timely 'warnings of developments and of 
the general trend of opinion' among labourers.^® 'The idea ... [was] 
to have paid spies in every mill or group of mills who [would] give 
information to the Intelligence Officers'.^^ Some individual companies 
even created their own labour officers, and Benthall's description of 
the physical construction of the office proposed for their own man, Col 
Spain, bears a distinct imprint of the wariness with which the employers 
now viewed the mood of the workers. Spain's office was to be given a 
'bolt hole at the back in case labour control[led] him instead of the 
0 ty 
reverse'. 
lie intend to provide him with an office in Titaghur 
Bazar on a piece of Kinnison land with an unobtrusive 
means of entry through the back into Titaghur [Mill] 
compound in case at any time a hasty retreat becomes 
desirable.^ ^  
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'The average cooly', wrote an angry jute mill manager in 1937, 
'has his point of view and thinks we are exploiting him all the time, 
which is borne out by the fact that they believe the most 
ridiculous things told to them by the outside agitators in spite of 
all we have done to try and convince them of the truth of affairs'.^'' 
This naive but important statement can serve as a measure of the growing 
sense of hostility and distance that formed an important element of 
capital-labour relations in the 1930s. The intensity of this hostility 
is inscribed in the currency that the word 'dalal' (an agent or stooge 
of the employer) acquired in the 1930s as a working-class term of abuse 
and in the strong emotions it aroused. Some of the Muslim League trade 
unionists and workers who tried to combat the influence of the Communist 
leader A.M.A. Zaman among the jute mill workers of Hooghly in 1937 
learned this at much cost to themselves. Mohiuddin Khan, one of their 
leaders, bitterly complained to his mentor, H.S. Suhrawardy, how 
labourers belonging to his union had been 'intimidated, threatened [and] 
molested' by the followers of Zaman. One of his 'Dalhousie [Mill] Union 
worker[s]', he said, had been 'assaulted by one Subhan of the Dalhousie 
Jute Mills'; his supporter, Mati Sardar of the Northbrook Jute Mills, had 
been 'chased [away] by some mill-hands'; and his follower Syed Habibur 
Rahman's life was in such danger that 'the poor man ... slept inside 
[his] room bolted from within and was literally boiled in this oppressive 
weather'. At the Champdani Jute Mill, an effigy of yet another worker of 
his union, Nurie, was 'taken round the mill by the partisans of Mr. 
Zaman ... [and was] spat on and beaten with shoes'.^^ Interestingly, 
Khan's own explanation of what caused such working-class hatred and 
anger to be unleashed against his men suggests the strongly negative 
appeal of the word 'dalal' to at least some of the labourers in the mills: 
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The supporters of Mr. Zaman ... abused and insulted 
us. [They] shouted that the Dallals had come and that 
nobody should listen to them [us] ... [Zaman] incited 
the mob to beat the dallals if they ever set their 
feet in Champdany.^® 
If the mere labelling of someone as a 'dalal' (i.e. as an agent of the 
employer) could trigger off such a violent response towards him, we can 
imagine how charged the atmosphere must have been with a spirit 
of hostility towards the owners and the managers of the mills and a 
cordial hatred of anyone seen acting in their interests. To be sure, this 
does not fully describe the consciousness of the workers - a pro-employer 
Suhrawardy otherwise would not have had any followers at all; but 
for any understanding of the history of jute workers' organization, 
this aspect of the workers' consciousness cannot be overlooked. 
Ill 
We can now formulate more clearly the apparent paradox in the history 
of the jute workers' trade union movement: so much militancy, yet so 
little organization! The 'harsh reality' was not simply that the 
'overwhelming majority' of the workers had not been unionized. An even 
greater problem was that the unions that had been formed appeared 
inherently unstable. Throughout the 1920s and '30s, the government 
continued to describe trade unionism in the jute mills as being 'still 
in its infancy'.^^ Or, to slightly vary the metaphor, the trade union 
movement in the jute mills appeared to have been born spastic. 
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One important symptom of this 'spasticity' was the spasmodic nature 
of jute-mill unions. Each outburst of labour protest, especially from 
the 1920s, resulted in some kind of organization. Once the outburst 
spent itself, however, the organization as a rule disintegrated. As the 
Government of Bengal put it to the Royal Commission on Labour, 'in almost 
every strike some sort of labour body was formed, usually after the strike 
broke out', but such unions remained entirely ephemeral.^® The Kankinarrah 
Labour Union, one of the oldest (1922) in the jute industry, complained 
in its submission to the Commission that while membership of the union 
'grew very rapidly during strikes or temporary excitements', it also fell 
'equally rapidly after the termination of disputes'.^® 
The pattern can be traced for the entire period under study. The 
'widespread unrest' among the jute workers during the anti-partition 
movement in Bengal (1905-08) coincided with the founding of the Indian 
Mill-Hands' Union, organized by the Swadeshi leader A.C. Banerjee. As 
the unrest continued, the union 'gradually extended the field of its 
activities, and by the end of 1907 ... was coming to be known by the 
more ambitious name of Indian Labour U n i o n s T h e enthusiasm it 
generated among the workers is revealed in the letters they wrote to 
Banerjee during these years, in these letters they expressed their 
feelings of 'undying gratitude' to Banerjee for the 'infinite good' he 
had done them by establishing this trade u n i o n . B u t the organization 
faded away once the period of working-class unrest came to an end. To 
quote the historian of the Swadeshi movement: 'l-Jhen the labour movement 
[in Bengal] revived immediately after the [1914] war, it was led by men 
of a new generation, and its Swadeshi pre-history was hardly ever 
recalled' 
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An idea of 'progress' obviously stirs within that optimistic word, 
'pre-history', but we would be wrong to suppose that the Swadeshi 
experience of trade unionism was superseded and made irrelevant by a 
future that embodied 'progress'. A longer view of jute workers' trade 
unionism would produce a distinctly contrary impression. The Swadeshi 
experience would then appear to have only foreshadowed the future 
developments. For example, some twenty odd jute mill unions were formed 
by the Khilafatists during the industrial unrest of 1920-21; six of these 
were outright 'abolished' within a few months of their formation,while 
the rest were described by the government in August 1921 as 'rather 
nebulous concerns'.'*'* The newly-formed Bengal Labour Federation which 
controlled some of these unions was stated to be 'collapsing' by the 
middle of 1921.'*^ The Howrah Labour Union and the Central Jute Mill 
Association (Howrah) were two unions whose 'existence and activities 
[had been] deposed to by their respective Secretaries before the recent 
[1921] Committee on Industrial Unrest', yet in a few months' time the 
District Magistrate advised the government that 'the local police report 
that the associations [were] both dead and [had] no members [was] 
correct'.'*® Trade unions had also been established among the jute 
workers of Barrackpore and Garden Reach (24 Parganas) in 1920. In 1921, 
the police described them as being 'in a moribund state', and Donald 
Gladding, an official in the Industries Department of the Government of 
Bengal, was reluctant to include them in his list of trade unions for 
that year 'because they are almost certainly of a very frail and 
nebulous character'."*^ 
The groundswell of labour protest in the jute industry during the 
two general strikes of 1929 and 1937 was accompanied by the same 
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phenomenon: quick flourishing and wilting of trade union organization. 
The strike of 1929 was preceded, as we have seen, by a growing volume 
of unrest in the mills over changes in working hours and wages."*® This 
unrest surely helped in the establishment of trade unions in some of 
the jute mills in the Chengail-Bauria region of the Howrah district. It 
also helped to revitalize the Bengal Jute Workers' Association at 
Bhatpara (24 Parganas) that had been formed in 1925.'*^ In both these 
areas, the leadership of the unions was in the hands of a group of 
young Bengalees, committed by their ideology to the cause of the working 
class. With the strike movement gathering momentum in the jute mills, 
the organizations at Bhatpara under Kali[das] 
Bhattacharjee and Gopen Chakravarti and those at 
Chengail and Bauria under Radharaman Mitra, Bankim 
Mukherjee and later Kishori[lal] Ghose amalgamated 
under a central organisation called the Bengal Jute 
Workers' Union with its head office in Calcutta.^® 
The Bengal Jute Workers' Union (B.J.W.U.) gave leadership to the 
general strike of 1929. As the strike began and while it lasted, the 
organization of B.J.W.U., 'began to extend' and branches were opened 
at Bhatpara, Champdani, Shibpore, Chengail, Budge Budge and Titagarh.^^ 
The popularity and fame of the union spread fast among the working 
classes of Calcutta. In the words of one of the organizers of the 
union: 
The Bengal Jute Workers' Union stood right at the 
centre of working-class movement in Bengal at this 
time [April 1930]. Its success in leading the general 
strike of three and a half lakhs of jute mill workers 
in 1929 had awakened the entire working class to a 
new state of consciousness and generated a new 
enthusiasm among them ... it [B.J.W.U.] enjoyed 
such fame that workers from any factory would rush 
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to this union to seek advice regarding their own 
struggles. It was under the leadership of the 
organisers of this union [B.J.W.U.] that strikes 
were conducted by the workers of the ice factories 
in Calcutta, of the Gramophone Company and of Stuart 
Motor Company.^^ 
Such popularity and spread notwithstanding, the Bengal Jute Workers' 
Union was to lose its vitality very soon. An intelligence report of 1934 
said: 
After the strike [of 1929] a split occurred between 
Miss Prabhabati Das Gupta [the acknowledged leader of 
the strike] on the one hand and Kali Sen on the other 
... Two unions came into existence; one controlled by 
Miss Prabhabati Das Gupta which g/iadualZy cUe.d out and 
the other controlled by the communists under Bankim 
Mukherjee and Kali Sen ... It not a poLveA^al 
o/Lgant^atxon. ^^ 
When some 60,000 jute mill workers were 'rendered idle' (to use the 
euphemism of the I.J.M.A.) in 1930-31, the jute workers' lack of any 
organization strong enough to resist the onslaught was painfully clear. 
The most that the retrenched workers could do was to go back to their 
villages. 
The thirties, too, do not fall outside the pattern. The police 
authorities of Calcutta reported in 1934 'a steady flow' of communist 
teaching ... by leaders of trade unions', many of whom were now using 
'Communist slogans and ... language characteristic of that movement'.^^ 
In May the next year, the Labour Commissioner of Bengal drew the attention 
of the government to 'the rapid development of labour organisations in 
the last few months'.^^ The following few years saw another round of 
confrontation between labour and capital in the jute industry, the high 
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point of which was the general strike of 1937 that lasted from 'early 
February until the middle of May' and that involved a good majority of 
the workforce - at least some 77 per cent.^^ 
Once again, trade union organization flourished dramatically and 
sixty-seven jute mill unions were registered with the government in the 
years 1937-38.^® During the general strike of 1937, many of these unions 
formed themselves into one central executive body, the Bengal Chatkal 
Mazdoor Union, which was affiliated to the A.I.T.U.C.^^ While the 
outburst of trade union activity of the 1930s may look like a 'definite 
advance' over the previous situation,^® the similarities with the past 
are too strong to be ignored. The Bengal Chatkal Mazdoor Union, formed 
to function as 'a single, centralised union', was described by one of 
its organizers in 1952 as 'never [having] functioned as such'.^^ When 
the A.I.T.U.C. leaders returned to trade union work among jute workers 
in 1943, they had only sixteen unions with a meagre strength of 3,000 
members altogether, an insubstantial minority in a 250,000-strong labour 
force. Abdul Momin, an important Communist trade union leader to whom 
we owe this information, admitted to his comrades in 1943 that none of 
the communist-led trade unions formed 'before the war' could be considered 
'powerful'.^^ The situation remained unchanged for some time to come. 
Both Gupta and Deshpande, as we have seen, have discussed the languishing 
state of the trade union movement among the jute workers even after the 
war and the coming of independence. 
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IV 
The paradox of 'strong militancy but weak organization' has been 
usually resolved by an implicit or explicit argument about the workers' 
lack of education. Organization was weak, or so the argument has run, 
because the structural and other features of the workers' conditions 
deprived them of any opportunity to acquire an understanding of trade 
union discipline and functioning. The effort therefore has been to 
understand why the workers remained 'ignorant', and persistently so, in 
spite of two or three decades of attempts to educate and organize them. 
Depending on their convictions, different authors have emphasized 
different factors - economic, social or political - to explain this 
'ignorance'. Obviously, the answers differ in terms of their ideological 
contents and emphases, but one broad fundamental agreement runs through 
the entire body of the existing discourse on jute workers' organization: 
that to organize was to educate. 
To the politically conservative trade unionist, this was simply a 
question of making the workers literate. K.C. Roy Chowdhury, the 
President of the Kankinarrah Labour Union, once cited the 'widespread 
illiteracy of the [Indian] working class' as an important reason why 
'unions [had] failed to s a t i s f y H i s union told the Royal Commission 
on Labour that 'illiteracy [was] the main cause of labour's helplessness' 
It is the conviction of the organizers of this union 
... that the plant of constructive trade unionism 
will not take root for many years to come until and 
unless the soil is weeded and workers receive primary 
instruction.^^ 
187 
Almost identical were the vieu's of government officials. If 'the 
Indian labourer' was 'notoriously difficult to organise in trade unions', 
as R.N. Gilchrist put it in 1924, the reason lay in their lack of 
education, without which no permanent unity of the working men was ever 
possible. 'Only education', wrote Gilchrist, 'and the mutual tolerance 
bred of education will soften the differences [of language, religion, 
etc.]'. 'Living in close contiguity in circumscribed areas, and service 
under one master, may lead to temporary unity ... but continuous and 
sustained common action is as yet out of the question'.®^ The Government 
of Bengal pointed tc the same relationship between education and 
organization in their memorandum to the Royal Commission in 1929: 
On the [jute mill] employees' side, the organization 
at present is in an infantile stage, and little more 
can be expected till the workers have some measure 
of education ... With education and proper guidance 
he [the mill worker] will inevitably build up an 
organ to express his obvious community of interest 
with his fellows ... It is in the interest of 
employers and community at large that the basis of 
this organization should be well and truly laid.®® 
To the more radical authors, however, 'education' has meant the 
'political education' of the worker and not simply the question of his 
literacy. One of the earliest Bengali-language tracts on trade 
unionism, T/iade UnionOA GodaK KaXka {Thz Fundam^ntaU Tmd^ Uruton^m} , 
published in 1934, had as its aim the correction and improvement of the 
prevalent ideas of the labouring classes. 'So many rival ideas have now 
entered the field of trade unionism [in Bengal] that the workers have 
problems in discovering the correct path, and the friends of the rich 
can ccme along and put all kinds of ideas into their heads'. Hence, the 
author said, 
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Every worker must read this book and explain its 
contents to ten others. He should organize his 
friends into a study-circle and meet three times a 
week to discuss in depth such issues as the 
sufferings of the labourers, the ways of the 
exploiters etc.®^ 
True to this spirit, the Bengali communists who went about organizing 
jute workers in the 1920s, '30s and '40s told them stories about Lenin 
and the Russian revolution,®® read out to them radical journals,®^ and 
started conducting 'study circles' among them.'° Imparting 'political 
education' to the worker was seen as the key to a strong trade union 
movement. Indrajit Gupta's suggestion in 1952 that 'serious attention' 
be given by communists 'to cultural and social activity' among jute mill 
workers 'through libraries, night schools, schools for workers' children, 
drama and music groups' was inspired by the same consideration.'^ 
The figure of the 'ignorant' worker (even if this 'ignorance' is 
defined in strictly political terms) has thus been central to all existing 
explanations of the problems of working-class organization in the jute 
mills. Factors such as the 'linguistic heterogeneity' of the jute 
workers (or the absence of 'a single means of communication' among 
them),'^ their 'linguistic separation' from the Bengali community,'^ 
the 'structural peculiarities' of this labour force, their 'amorphous, 
undefined and generally unskilled' n a t u r e ' , t h e i r 'half-pastoralist, 
half-proletarian' outlook,'^ and, of course, the suppression of left-
wing trade unions by the state'® have all been mentioned with varying 
degrees of justification to explain why the jute mill workers never grew 
out of their 'ignorance', political or otherwise. 
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It is not our purpose to contest the validity of these individual 
propositions, though some are obviously more true than others. The 
'linguistic separation of the majority of workers from the surrounding 
Bengali community', for instance, was indeed a problem that trade 
unionists had to reckon with. Abdul Momin writes in his reminiscences 
of the 1929 general strike that even when the strike spread from 
Alambazar to Titagarh with 'lightning speed' snd several people 
volunteered to help in the organization of the strike, language remained 
an important problem: 'Not all our volunteers could speak Hindi and in 
no other language could propaganda in favour of the strike be carried 
out in most of the [mill] areas'.^^ Given the necessary will, however, 
a solution was soon found to the problem. Before long, many trade 
unionists mastered the art of speaking Hindi. Momin mentions the following 
among the leaders of the 1929 strike who could make speeches in fluent 
Hindi - Bankim Mukherjee, Kali Sen, Bakr Ali Kirza, Prabhabati Das 
Gupta, Sachidananda Chatierjee, Moni Singh, Swami Biswanand, Shroff 
Nand Kishore Sharma and himself.^® Besides we should also remember that 
the leaflets distributed by B.3.W.LI. during the strike were after 
all printed in 'several languages'.'^ 
A more seriously crippling factor for the left-wing trade unions 
were the repressive measures that the state often adopted in dealing 
with them. The freguent use by the government of the section 144 of the 
Indian Penal Code to extern leftist leaders from their areas of activity 
was clearly aimed at minimizing the level of their contact with the 
working class. The common sense of purpose that united the mill managers 
and government officials in this effort proved a particularly formidable 
obstacle to trade-union activity. P.D. Msrtyn of the Indian Civil Service 
190 
saw 'something of life as it [was] lived in the huge jute mill suburbs' 
when he served as a Sub-Divisional Officer at Barrackpore early in the 
1930s. 
While there [he wrote] I played my part in coping with 
a strike with 60,000 operatives out of work. Coping 
with the situation included the passing of orders 
prohibiting the entry of certain agitators from 
Calcutta into the area. What struck me at the time 
was how helpful the jute mill managers (Scots to a 
man) were during these troubles.®" 
For us then the question is not one of disputing the statements 
made by individual scholars who have attempted to explain the weakness 
of jute workers' organization. Taken by themselves these statements 
contain a certain measure of truth and many of them do point to 
important factors that may have retarded the growth of unions in the 
jute industry. What we are concerned with here is the point at which 
these different and apparently dispersed statements meet. In the final 
analysis, they all seek to explain why the workers remained ignorant 
of 'trade union discipline and functioning' and enumerate the factors 
that supposedly deprived them of such education. The task of organizing 
is then seen in this entire discussion as essentially an exercise in 
making certain types of knowledge (literacy, self-awareness etc.) 
available to the workers, i.e. in educating them. 
It is here that I feel we can use the existing statement of the 
'paradox' of jute workers' organization to open up a deeper paradox 
that this one already contains. There is something fundamentally 
problematic about viewing organization simply as a matter of political 
education for the worker. To do this is to sidestep certain important 
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issues of culture and consciousness that are raised when we examine more 
closely the problem of working-class organization. Even within the 
framework of Marxist theory it is now recognized that the Leninist 
project of inserting a body of 'intellectuals' between the working 
class and the 'theory' is fraught with ambiguities.®^ This is only more 
so in a society entangled in a variety of pre-capitalist relationships. 
Besides, it would surely be a very elitist view of working-class history 
that did not ask if the 'educator' himself needed some educating as 
well! 
The cultural issues alluded to in the previous paragraph relate to 
questions of power and authority. Indeed, it may be argued that to raise 
the point about the jute mill worker's ignorance of 'trade union 
functioning and discipline' is to raise these issues. For, what is 
'organizational discipline' if not a way of resolving questions of power 
and authority within organizations? 
For the purpose of analysis here, the important point is that there 
are certain assumptions about culture - not just of the workers alone 
but of their leaders as well - inherent in the concept of 'trade union 
discipline'. Ideally speaking, the proper functioning of a stable, 
brcadbased trade union requires a bourgeois culture. As Gramsci once 
said, trade unions are organizations based on 'voluntary' and 'contractual' 
relationships; their emphasis on membership, subscription and other 
procedures of organizational discipline is based on the assumed existence 
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of such relations.®^ Trade unions also embody a principle of representation 
that manifests itself in elections. The trade union, properly conceived, 
is thus a bourgeois-democratic organization and is organized in the image 
of the bourgeois-democratic government. In the same way as the latter 
represents the 'people' - through ' voluntary' and 'contractual' 
relationships - the trade union represents its members and through them, 
the class. Gramsci made the point clearly and forcefully while discussing 
the nature of trade unions and political parties: 'These are organisations 
born on the terrain of bourgeois democracy and political liberty, as an 
affirmation and development of political freedom ... They do not supersede 
the bourgeois state'. 
In theory, then, the elected representative of the worker is his equal 
and is chosen as a representative precisely because he stands in a 
relationship of 'equality' - the equality of the 'contract' - to those 
represented. He does not owe his capacity to represent to any prior 
position of privilege and authority; his is not, in other words, the 
figure of the master. This is the crucial question on which trade union 
democracy turns and it must be set in contrast to that other kind of 
political representation that Marx once talked about with respect to 
the peasantry: 'Theycannot represent themselves, they must be represented. 
Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an 
authority over them 
If all this seems too theoretical and too much to expect in concrete 
historical situations, let me make two points. The model is always a 
useful measure of the reality. Secondly, and this is perhaps a more 
important point for the historian, the concept of trade-union democracy 
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explained above was precisely u/hat all organizers of labour aspired to 
realize. The notion of democratic representation was fundamental to all 
discussions on the question of organizing the jute workers. Listen for 
example to the anti-communist, pro-employer Labour Minister H.S. 
Suhrawardy arguing to the jute mill owners in 1937 that the 'mere 
availability' of mill managers was not enough to ensure sufficient contact 
with the working class: 
Contact between employer and employee should be 
made through the medium of the ejected representative 
of 0^ QCiYiAJ,(ld labour and so that this might be possible 
the existence of trade unions was absolutely necessary.®^ 
And now to the Communist Indrajit Gupta in 1952: 
Of course, organisation [of jute workers] must mean 
something more than mere formal enrolment of union 
membership The point is to function the unions 
democratically. 
and 
the essence of trade union democracy ... means, 
concretely, that the executive committee of the unions 
must be regularly functioning bodies, p^ope.Aly ejected 
by the members, participating in the day to day life 
of the union. 
Democratic functioning ensures that the unions will 
never suffer from a "shortage" of cadres, nor become 
dependent on a handful of leading officials or 
"organisers". On the contrary, it will encourage a 
regular flow of rank and file militants to come 
forward to discharge the multifarious jobs, ranging 
from manning the union office and collecting 
subscriptions to distributing leaflets, pasting up 
posters, addressing meetings etc.®^ 
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This ideal, however, was hardly ever approximated in reality. Trade 
union organization in the jute mills remained extremely inchoate all 
through the years under consideration. By 'inchoateness' I do not simply 
mean the 'traditional gap' or tension that exists in 'every political 
party or trade-union ... between the rank-and-file ... and the leaders'.®^ 
Such tension existed in the jute mill unions too. For example, despite 
their claims 'to represent all jute mill workers on the river', the Bengal 
Jute Workers' Union 'was unable [in 1929] to control workers in some 
important areas'.®® The 'excellent intelligence service and organisation' 
that the 'agitators' displayed during the general strike of 1937 was 
impressive encugh to win praise in the most unlikely places,®^ but the 
leaders nevertheless found it difficult to contain the militancy of their 
followers in every case. 'The result was', wrote a government official, 
'that the Shibpore Mills came out much earlier than ... was wanted and 
proved a great embarrassment to the plans [of the leaders]'.^" 
By themselves, these cases do not exhaust the definition of 
'inchoateness', since it is possible for organizations to maintain a 
certain degree of coherence and discipline in spite of such tension 
between the leaders and the rank-and-file. In our case the problem of 
incoherence went much deeper, for even at their liveliest, unions of 
jute mill labour were never organizations based on a relatively 
disciplined body of workers subject to such institutional controls as 
membership rights and obligations, subscription rules, union constitutions 
or even regular meetings. 'The very sight of a subscription book', wrote 
K.C. Roy Chowdhury in his diary, made the workers feel 'uneasy and 
suspicious'.^^ In his submission to the Royal Commission in 1929 as 
the President of the Kankinarrah Labour Union he further added that 'the 
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constitution[al] aspect of the union [was] unknown to them [the w o r k e r s ] ^ ^ 
Roy Chowdhury's comments are confirmed in a report by Thomas Johnston and 
John F. Sime who visited the Calcutta mills in 1925 on behalf of the 
Joint Committee of Dundee Jute Trade Unions to 'enquire into the 
conditions of the Jute Workers in india'. The authors found the Calcutta 
jute mill unions seriously crippled by acute financial and other problems 
of oroanization. 
There are, on paper, some three or four Unions among 
the [Calcutta] jute workers, but with one exception 
they are quite useless, have no paying membership, 
and serve no purpose unless to advertise some politician 
as honorary president. The honorary presidents, we 
believe, pay for the notepaper and headings, and 
that is all there is to the Unions.^^ 
The 'one exception' that Johnston and Sime mentioned was the Jute 
Workers' Association founded at Bhatpara by Kalidas Bhattacharya. 
Bhattacharya was a Bengali bhachalok with terrorist connections who had 
lost his employment with a jute mill for organizing and encouraging 
s t r i k e s . H e was described by the Dundee delegation as 'an able, 
intelligent workman who ... [had] the root of the matter [trade unionism] 
in him', and his Association, it was said, was 'definitely making an 
effort to remedy workers' grievances'.^^ Yet of a nominal membership of 
'only 3000' not more than 400 to 500 paid any subscriptions and, despite 
low union fees, the organization suffered from severe 'monetary 
limitations'. It was 'largely financed and inspired ... by an interesting 
and self-sacrificing little lady, Mrs. Santosh Kumari Gupta'.^^ The 
monetary problems of the Bengal Jute Workers' Assocation were to 
continue in the future when the union reportedly received financial 
aid 'in the shape of a monthly donation of Rs 100 from the Dundee Jute 
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Workers Association' up to 1927 and perhaps even a bit later.^^ In the 
1920s, Sime often received letters from trade unionists in India 
requesting monetary help during strikes in the jute mills. 'We had an 
appeal from Kalidas Bhattacharji in November last year and sent a 
donation of thirty pounds (£30) to him', mentioned Sime while responding 
to another request for help during a 'prolonged stoppage in the 
Howrah district' in February 1929.^® That this 'appeal' from Bhattacharya 
in November 1928 was not the first one of its kind is further suggested 
by the following letter that Sime wrote to him in June that year: 
Your cablegram duly received was placed before my 
Committee and I am instructed to cable at once a grant 
of Twenty five pounds (£25) towards the Wellington 
Jute Mills strike fund ... Enclosed please find copy 
of the "Dundee Free Press" to which I gave the contents 
of your cablegram thereby giving the matter publicity.^^ 
This persisting problem of finances, caused partly by the absence of 
a subscription-paying rank-and-file, was only an index - though perhaps 
the most obvious one - of the deep organizational maladies that afflicted 
the nature of trade unionism in the jute mills of Calcutta. After all, 
it is remarkable how the general strike of 1929 was conducted without 
the executive committee of the Bengal Jute Workers' Union meeting even 
once during the s t r i k e . M o r o v e r , no worker was ever a subscription-
paying member of the union as its leader, Prabhabati Das Gupta, was to 
admit later. She called it 'a peculiar labour movement' as the union 
'never had any subscription or anything^°^ B.J.W.U., however, was 
not unique in this respect; the Government of Bengal thus summed up 
the experience of trade unionism in the 1920s: 
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After the war, unions of some kind developed 
with almost bewildering rapidity, because in every 
strike some sort of a labour body was formed ... 
Such bodies had no constitution, no regular 
membership, and their power to control workers ... 
was extremely problematical.^"^ 
While the thirties and later decades marked some advance in certain 
directions - seen mainly in the growing popularity of radical ideas in 
the political circles of Calcutta - a crucial problem remained unresolved. 
It was the trade-union leaders' 'failure', to use Indrajit Gupta's words, 
'to translate their growing mass influence into organisational terms'. 
This 'failure' is well illustrated by the case of A.M.A. Zaman, the 
Communist labour organizer of Hooghly whose growing 'mass influence' we 
have had occasion to document before. During the industrial unrest of 
1936-37, Zaman formed a jute-mill union which got itself registered in 
1936. In September 1937 however the General Secretary of the union went 
to the court to complain of severe organizational irregularities. He 
described the union as a 'great fraud' and said that while as the General 
Secretary he was responsible for 'all correspondence', subscriptions, 
and for depositing the subscriptions raised in some bank 'in the name 
of the union', he found that in practice all of these rules were honoured 
only in their violation. 'Offices were opened and subscriptions ... 
raised through collectors but never deposited in any Bank'. He was 
'shocked' to see 'receipts being granted' by unauthorized persons while 
he was kept 'in the dark'. And when he 'insisted on accounts and 
explanation', 'the accused No. 1 [i.e. Zaman] ... put it off on flimsy 
pretext from day to day .,. and ... wanted your petitioner to resign 
from the post of the General Secretary giving a back date'.^""^ Such 
inchoateness of organization was to plague jute workers' trade unionism 
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for a long time to come. To quote Indrajit Gupta once again, as he put 
it in his report of 1952: 
With one or two exceptions, the organisational structure 
of our unions also [i.e. in addition to those of other 
political parties] is most unsatisfactory. The pattern 
is common to jute - periodical mass meetings and 
bustee or gate propaganda, i/iAQ,guZaA collection of 
subscriptions, and v^Ay nominal office 
If the organization of jute workers' trade unions was so inchoate, 
how did they resolve questions of power and authority without the aid of 
organizational discipline? Or to put the question in another way, if it 
was not submission to organizational discipline that bound the rank-and-
file of a union to itself, what did? The answer would seem to be: the 
power of the leader, the so-called 'representative' who, as in Marx's 
description of the French peasantry, always turned out to be the 'master' 
himself. The specific form in which this power expressed itself was to 
be seen in the personal loyalty, often temporary, that trade union 
organizers could elicit from the ordinary mill-hands. In contemporary 
trade union parlance, the word used to describe this style of leadership 
was 'zamindari'. Apparently, the style was endemic; Momin mentioned it to 
be so in a report to the Communist Party in 1943.^°® Of the different 
political parties that came together to form one A.I.T.U.C. union for the 
jute mills in 1937 - 'Congress, Socialist, Communist, Forward Bloc and 
other left labour workers' - it was said that 'a sort of territorial 
division of "spheres of influence" existed, with a particular leader 
exercising, as it were, "zamindari rights" in his particular trade union 
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One important characteristic of such power was of course its capacity 
to render organizational discipline redundant because it \i/as by nature 
independent of the niceties and rigours of any such discipline. This 
sometimes created serious problems for organizational unity, as factionalism 
at the top could easily split the followers. The Congress-sponsored Indian 
National Trade Union Congress (I.N.T.U.C.) experienced this in the early 
fifties when they failed to set up 'a single central Congress-led [jute 
workers'] union because of the'rivalries of the different groups within 
the West Bengal Congress itself. Their 'individual unions (area-wise, 
mill-wise, and even more than one in the same mill) remained', wrote 
Gupta, 'as the "zamindaries" of different leaders and groups', and could 
only be 'loosely put together into the Jute Workers' Federation'.^°® 
Sometimes, however, the same force of loyalty allowed a particular 
leader to be influential even if that influence took no firm organizatioal 
shape. A good case in point is again that of Zaman, if only because it is 
easier to document. As we have seen, Zaman's organization among the 
mill-hands of Hooghly went to pieces at the height of his popularity. But 
in no way did this diminish his influence. In July 1937, Zaman was 
convicted 'on charge of rioting during ... [a] strike at the Wellington 
Jute Mill in Rishra'. The workers, 'about 4,800 in number', risked their 
employment and 'came out on receipt of the news', such was Zaman's 
popularity with them.^°® Even in September 1937, when Zaman's union had 
suffered splits, mill managers, it was said, were 'afraid of proceedings 
being drawn up against the miscreants [i.e. Zaman's followers] as they 
believe that under such circumstances their respective mills might go 
on s t r i k e ' . ^ T h e personal nature of Zaman's control over workers comes 
out in the following description of events: 
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On 1.7.37 ... a worker was surrounded in his house 
by Mr. Zaman's partisans who would have assaulted him 
had he not given in to ... their demands. That very 
evening a meeting of Zaman's partisans was held and 
orders for getting all shops closed to those who had 
obeyed the orders of the Manager, Angus Jute Works, 
were passed as it was announced [that] ^ach wcu, MA.. 
laman'^ M-Uk. ^ ^  ^  
Or consider the case of Sibnath Banerjee, the Socialist leader of 
workers in the Shibpur-Ghusury Salkea areas of Howrah. After some fifteen 
years of trade-union work his authority still derived, according to 
Indrajit Gupta in 1952, from a display of 'considerable personal 
initiative' and an exercise of 'direct leadership'. 
They have one central union - the Howrah Zilla 
Chatkal Mazdoor Union which has no organisational 
form. Its activities revolve entirely around the 
person of Sri Sibnath Banerjee, whose claim to 
renown rests on his long years of labour activity 
in Howrah. It is out and out a one man show.^^^ 
We must not see these as isolated examples or cases of individual 
failures. The tradition of 'zamindari' leadership was strong and old. 
A.C. Banerjee, the Swadeshi trade unionist active around 1905, was a 
good example of this spirit. Even though his trade union activity spanned 
only two or three years, Banerjee felt that his 'influence with the 
millhands was so great and discipline so complete that he could make them 
do whatever he liked'.^^^ During the 1929 strike, a 'Barrackpore pleader, 
Babu Narendra Chatterjee ... very quickly gained ascendancy over the 
workers' of the Alliance, Craig, Waverley and Meghna mills. 'The 
managing agents ... said that after they had granted the concessions 
which the workers had demanded, the workers refused to go back to work, 
unless they received a definite order from this pleader'. ^  ^ C hatterjee 
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\i/as soon made the l/ice-President of the Bengal Jute Workers' Union even 
though 'his name had never previously been mentioned in any labour 
connection whatsoever'. 
He had no knowledge of the jute industry and had 
never previously been known to have any business 
connections in Bhatpara, yet certainly for no 
[ascertainable] reason ... and without any official 
position in any union ... he seemed to get control 
over a considerable body of men.^^^ 
The 'Naren Babu incident', the government pointed out, 'is not uncommon 
in local labour polities'. Not infrequently it happened that 'some 
persons entirely unknown ... even to the majority of workers suddenly 
assume[d] leadership during a dispute'.^^^ 
The truth of the government's statement is borne out by the case of 
Prabhabati Das Gupta, the most important leader of the 1929 strike. When 
the strike began, 'Miss Das Gupta was entirely unknown' to the 'average 
jute mill worker'.^^^ Soon afterwards however the government described 
her control over workers as 'absolute'. The workers called her 'Mataji' 
or 'Maiji' (Mother) and would go by whatever her wishes were. Das Gupta 
herself was only too aware of this. As she once put it to the government, 
'she only has to lift her little finger and the workers would obey'. The 
government had 'no doubt' that this was true.^^® Das Gupta herself later 
recalled that 'wherever I went I was welcomed by the slogan licutajl !zi 
jcti, llcutaji bl jol [hail the mother]. That was my reward'.^^^ And her 
rival trade unionist K.C. Chowdhury admitted in his diary that 
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Both male and female workers - at least those 
living in Kankinara, Titagarh and Champdany -
looked upon Miss Das Gupta as their "Maiji" 
[mother]. They would do anything to carry out her 
orders, and would not even listen to any other 
organisers of her union. 
Mark how independent such authority was of 'discipline' or organization; 
they would appear to be irrelevant to its mode of functioning. Indeed, one 
of the aphorisms that Das Gupta's friends sought to popularize among mill 
workers was, 'unions may come and unions may go but Dr. Prabhabati will 
remain for ever'.^^^ This is the important point for us - that what has 
so far been viewed simply as an absence of trade union discipline or 
training reveals on closer inspection the presence of alternative systems 
of power and authority. 
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The ideal, democratic principle of representation based on 'voluntary' 
and 'contractual' relationships was thus never realized in the trade unions 
of the Calcutta jute mill workers, and representatives instead became 
masters. Unions were run as though they were the leaders' 'zamindaries'. 
One could in fact go further and argue that in the eyes of the millworkers, 
being a master was a condition of being a representative. Only masters 
could represent. To see this purely as a function of the worker's 
ignorance is to overlook the necessarily two-sided character of the 
relationship. One is reminded of Hegel's discussion (in his Phe^nomanalogy) 
of the master-slave relationship, where the master's dominance is 
dependent on the slave recognizing him as the master, that is to say. 
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on the slave's will to serve. In referring to the bkadAatok trade union 
leaders as 'masters', then, u/e do not intend to portray the working class 
as a passive instrument of the leaders' will. At issue is the question of 
the worker's own will, his own consciousness, his shrewd realization that 
under the circumstances he could sometimes best exercise his power by choosing 
to serve. The relation therefore was pregnant with tension and had its own 
moments of resistance as well. One only has to remember that for all the 
loyalty the leaders could elicit from the workers, Prabhabati Das Gupta 
was once 'abused and insulted' by a number of jute workers towards the 
end of the first general strike, that Latafat Hossain once had his 
union-office burned down by a group of angry workers, and that Sibnath 
Banerjee was greeted by the workers in Howrah with suspicion and insults 
when he first approached them for votes in 1937'^^ - to give but three 
instances of overt tension between the workers and their leaders. 
Sumit Sarkar has rescued from the private papers of the Swadeshi 
labour organizer, A.C. Banerjee, a very instructive letter that gives us 
some insight into the nature of the leader-worker relationship and tells 
us how the workers perceived the 'oppression' they faced at work. Some 
twenty-eight workers of the Budge Budge Jute Mills wrote it to Banerjee 
in December 1906.^^^ They had to 'pay bribes to the babu and the 6aAdaA. 
... every month and when the Durga Puja season approached'; refusal to 
pay bribes led to unjust fines or dismissal 'on false charges of bad 
workmanship'. 
Till recently [they added] we felt compelled to 
meet their unreasonable demands. But as prices ran 
very high at the time of Durga Puja last year, we 
expressed our intention to pay them a little less 
than in earlier years. At this the Hec^ -d Sardar 
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Haricharan Khanra has been going around instigating 
the Assistant Babu Atul Chandra Chattopadhyay to 
collect even more pan^bani [customary dues] than 
usual. The two of them have even advised the in-
charge Panchanan Ghose, a nice gentleman otherwise, 
to force us to pay a much larger poAbayii this year. 
When [in protest] we stopped paying any pcutban-i 
whatsoever, they got the Sahib to fine us on cooked 
up charges ... But, in truth, we are not guilty. 
We have used this letter in the last chapter to document the nature 
of supervision in jute mills. 1 quote it once again to draw attention to 
an additional interesting aspect which lies in its collection of concrete 
details. It is obviously a long and detailed list of sufferings. 
Significantly, however, the workers who wrote the letter called it only 'a 
brief description' and expressed their 'desire to describe in even greater 
detail' their sufferings to Banerjee, if and when they met him in person. 
We must understand this 'desire', for in it lay the nature of the 
relationship we are seeking to explore. Why did the workers want to 
display their sufferings to men like Banerjee, to give such 'cruel 
publicity' to the pains their bosses inflicted on them? Or perhaps I 
should rephrase the question: what could be the relationship that permitted 
of pain being made into an object of display? 
Michel Foucault has discussed this problem in a different but 
relevant context. 'Can pain be a spectacle?' he asks, and answers: 
Not only can it be, but it must be, by virtue of a 
subtle right that resides in the fact that no one is 
alone, the poor man less so than others, so that he 
can obtain assistance only through the mediation of 
the rich ... if others intervene with their knowledge, 
their resources, their pity.^^'* 
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The poor man making a spectacle of his sufferings was, and still is, a 
familiar sight in societies marked by pre-capitalist cultures. In explaining 
the quality of life in medieval Europe, the Dutch historian Huizinga said: 
'Then, again, all things in life were of a proud or cruel publicity. 
Lepers sounded their rattles and went about in procession, beggars 
exhibited their deformities He could have written this of Calcutta 
today. 'Every time I emerged from my hotel in Calcutta wrote Claude 
Levi-Strauss of his brief stay in that city in the 1950s, 'I became the 
central figure in a ballet which would have seemed funny to me, had it not 
been so pathetic. The various accomplished performers made their entries 
in turn: a shoeblack flung himself at my feet, a small boy rushed up to 
me; whining, 'One anna, papa, one anna!', a cripple displayed his stumps, 
having bared himself to give a better view 
To see in all this only a 'single obsession', hunger - as Levi-Strauss 
did at first - is to miss the essential element of power in this 
relationship between the rich and the poor. The relationship involved 
the will of both, and this was what allowed such culturally-defined 
elements as supplication, pity, compassion etc. to circulate within the 
relationship. If the uninviting sight of a beggar in Calcutta made Levi-
Strauss shrink away from it, this was because he could feel the 'acute 
tension' (mark the metaphor of force ) that instantly developed between 
him and the beggar. Levi-Strauss' language here clearly refers to power 
and not to the physical fact of hunger alone. By his supplication, says 
Levi-Strauss, the beggar 'willed' him 'to be even more impressive and 
of power by workina on the material of compassion and p.ity. 
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Once we grasp this, vi/e understand why the Budge Budge Jute Mill 
workers desired to describe their sufferings in 'even greater detail' than 
they had in their letter. They saw Aswini Banerjee, a barrister and trade-
unionist, as a resourceful 'babu' who would respond to the plight of the 
'coolie' only if his compassion was sufficiently aroused. 'We write to 
you about the oppressive acts of our superiors at work and pray for an 
urgent redress. We hope you will save us soon from their despotism', was 
how the letter ended. 
One is indeed struck by the number of times the babu-coolie 
relationship surfaces in the middle of working-class protest and trade 
union activities. The terrain is admittedly difficult for the historian, 
and not only because the jute workers were predominantly non-literate. 
The written word that the historian relies on is in itself a rather poor 
conveyor of this relationship, as it usually presents only a fragment of 
reality. In real life, however, as any Bengali would know, the babu-
coolie relationship would have been represented many times over in many 
different ways - in manners of speech and dress, in body language 
expressive of hierarchy, indeed in the entire range of the semiotics of 
domination and subordination (and hence resistance) that the culture would 
have made available to both the jute mill worker and his bhacUialok trade 
union representative. While much of this would normally escape the 
historian's attention, a careful interrogation of the available documents 
yields considerable evidence of the existence of this feudal bond between 
the 'babu' and the 'coolie'. 
The historian for instance does not have to strain his ears to catch 
'the voice of the poor' in the clamour of protests that went up in the 
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Calcutta jute mills from time to time. Echoes reverberate even in the 
most elitist of sources. 'In those days, i.e. about 1922-23', writes 
K.C. Roy Chowdhury in his diaries, 
the vi/orkers preferred rich people as their [trade 
union] leaders. They were pleased to see the leaders 
come to meetings in their own motor cars. They had 
the mistaken idea that only the rich could successfully 
fight [for them] with the wealthy and big millowners. 
The ^oAdoA^ thought that trade union leaders who 
were themselves big advocates or barristers would 
fight for them in the court of law, free of charge.^^^ 
K.C. Roy Chowdhury called himself in his diaries 'A Friend of the Workers', 
but it is interesting to see how in his imagination the figure of the 
worker merged with that of the poor. For all his enthusiasm for socialism 
and s t r i k e s , t h e working class is often transformed in his prose into 
doAJ-dAa hiajtayan, the Hindu god Narayan in the shape of the poor.^^^ The 
working class or even 'socialism' could all be served from notions of 
'pity'. The sentiment was well expressed by a fictitious character called 
Mrs Guha (presumably modelled on the contemporary trade unionist Santosh 
Kumari Gupta) in Roy Chowdhury's play VhcUimagkaX (The Strike) when she 
remarked, 'Poor workers! There is not a single soul to listen to their 
complaints and tales of woe'.^^^ 
'After all it was helping the poor people', said Prabhabati Das 
Gupta, reminiscing in old age about the first general strike of jute mill 
workers, which forced the mill owners and the state alike in 1929 to 
recognize her as the workers' representative. 'l-Je were not doing trade 
union movement, we were helping the poor people'. 'So', asked she, 
explaining the absence of trade union membership and subscription, 'why 
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should we have money from them?' One may choose to dismiss this evidence 
as rationalization vi/ith hindsight or see it only as an instance of the 
mellowing, with age, of a once-radical spirit. But what does one do when 
the babu-coolie relationship comes refracting through the practice of 
trade unionism even at the height of working-class protest? The leaflets 
put out by the leaders of the Bengal Jute Workers' Union during the 1929 
strike illustrate the point. True, they spoke of 'oppression in the jute 
mills', of the worker's labour filling 'the bellies of the rich', described 
'truth and right' as being on the worker's side, and recommended organization 
and unity. Yet their language was densely inhabited by the babu's 
stereotype and assumptions regarding the coolie's helplessness and 
ignorance. 
Brethren - This is a very critical time ... So 
beware! It is said that some pleader has advised 
to the effect that your wages would be realized by 
action in the court. You are very simple folks, so 
you have been enmeshed in the plan of an ordinary 
pleader ... Ask the pleader to mention this matter 
to us, we shall give him the right answer.^^^ 
Necessarily then at the other end of the relationship stood the leader in 
her larger-than-life-size appearance - 'Mother Provabati', 'Mataji', 'the 
father and mother of the poor', as she was described in her union's 
pamphlets.^^^ And wherever she went was 'welcomed by the slogan UaXajl 
k i jcii ...'. 'That was my reward', she said, the reward of the dominant: 
'Practically, the whole of labour was under m y control'.^^^ By now we 
know this voice: the representative invariably turned out to be a master, 
as only masters could represent. 
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'Invariably?', one may still object. 'Your examples so far have been 
A.C. Banerjee, K.C. Roy Chowdhury and Prabhabati Das Gupta - people \i/ho 
were themselves somewhat elitist in their own minds. What about the 
generation of socialists and communists who followed them, men who tried 
to become one with the workers instead of wanting to dominate them, men 
who won the leadership of the jute workers' struggles in the 1930s and 
the '40s, and whose faith in socialist ideologies remained unflinching to 
the very end of their lives?' 
Before proceeding to answer our hypothetical interlocutor, let us 
fully acknowledge the transformation that socialist ideologies brought 
about in the Bengali bhadAoZok's understanding of the problems of the 
working classes in Bengal. In the nineteenth century the bhadMoZok viewed 
the working classes as a problem of morality, and the blame for some of 
the social problems created by the growth of factories fell squarely on 
the workers themselves. This view sometimes manifested itself in a 
middle-class desire to see an improvement in working-class morals. The 
Brahmo social reformer Sasipada Banerjee was the most notable example of 
this t r e n d . M o r e commonly, however, labourers were seen simply as a 
social nuisance, an 'annoyance', as a police report of 1896 put it, to 
'the quiet people' of the middle classes. The same report carried several 
references to b k a d M o k complaints regarding the 'unruly', 'noisy' and 
'rowdy' character of the mill w o r k e r s . T o w a r d s the end of the century, 
as industries expanded and Bengali labourers were replaced by migrants 
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was further reinforced by the addition of the traditional contempt that 
the bkadAolok had for the m^Aua, a derisive Bengali term for any native 
speak of Hindi. A poem written about the turn of the century by a Bengali 
Brahmi n school-teacher - \i/ho lived in Bhatpara and sa\i/ that sleepy village 
change beyond recognition with the establishment of jute mills and 
municipal offices, and with the influx of migrant labourers - will 
illustrate th is well. The poem is unremarkable for its literary qualities 
but captures in its bluntness the essence of bkadAolok perception of an 
immigrant and indigent working class: 
Well done, Bhatpara Municipality! 
Gone are the old jungles and bamboo-groves 
Of Kankinara and Jagaddal, 
Their places taken by palaces and bazars. 
Slums of mQA.ucu>, factories and their sprouting 
chimneys. 
The bazars now bustle with the ghostly meAucu> 
Buying and selling in their strange Hindi. 
On holidays, 
They loaf about the town in groups, 
Drunk, 
Singing songs that sound like the howl of dogs.^"^" 
It would be tedious and unrewarding to list here the racial prejudices 
of the Bengali bhadialok; suffice it to say that the importation of 
socialist ideas, however vague, did much to change many of these 
consciously-held attitudes. There developed a new ideological interest 
in the working people in the 1920s and it became a common practice to 
use words like 'worker' or 'labour' (or their Bengali or Hindi translations 
-d-^cun^iz, mazduA.) in naming middle-class organizations and 
journals. The existence in the 1920s and later of parties like the Labour 
Swaraj Party (1925), the Workers' and Peasants' Party (1928), the Labour 
Party (1932), etc. testify to this new ideological development in the 
bkadJialok. political scene. By the late 1920s some of this spirit had 
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even spilled over into the sacred world of Bengali literature. Tagore's 
irritated comment in 1928/29 - 'Do we enter a 'new era' in literature simply 
because so many writers [today] write about the coal-miner or the panwaLc?' 
- celebrates this new presence of the working class, if only negatively. ^  
To the Bengali bhadAoZok, the workers still presented a picture of 
moral degeneration, but in contrast to the nineteenth-century view, this 
'degeneration' was now assigned a cause (largely economic) outside of the 
worker's own morality and consciousness. The jute-mill worker, the AmnJXa 
BazoA. PaJyvLka said in 1928, was 'something less than a human being', but 
this condition was not of his own doing. This was a significant departure 
from the point of view of, say, Sasipada Banerjee. 'The modern industrial 
system' and the greed of the capitalist were now seen as the 'cause' of 
the worker's moral problems: 
Condemned to life in slums, ... working long hours in 
closed and stuffy atmosphere and victims of all 
allurements held out by easily available grog and drug 
shops, and ... deprived of the humanising influence of 
family life, he [the jute worker] is converted into 
something less than a human being ... [This] condition 
of life ... is incidental to the modern industrial 
system generally but ... in very few industries the 
disproportion between profits and wages is so striking 
as in this [the jute industry]. 
The same understanding informed K.C. Roy Chowdhury's play VkaA^nQhaX 
(The Strike) which was staged in Calcutta in 1926. The 'moral degradation' 
of the worker, the 'stinking, unhealthy hovels around the jute mills at 
Naihati' are all explained in this play in terms of capitalist neglect and 
exploitation. 'It is in the interests of the rich capitalist to treat 
the workers like beasts', says Shirish, who is by no means a radical 
character in the play.^'*'' 
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On this ideological ground was bred in the twenties and thirties a 
generation of bhad/ialok politicians whose commitment to their own 
ideological construct, the working class, was beyond question. Gopen 
Chakravarty, a Moscow-returned communist, gave a dramatic demonstration of 
the commitment in 1926 when he joined a jute mill in Bhatpara 'as a 
machineman in the steam room at Rs 14 a month'. 
Even this was not enough [he said in an interview] 
- so I rented a small cubicle in the jute line and 
lived with the workers ... and told [them] ... 
stories about [the] Russian revolution, Lenin and 
workers' raj, I also read out news from ?n.aJ:ap run 
by Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi and also from our Ganavayii.^^^ 
Gopen Chakravarty was not alone in showing such exemplary zeal for organizing 
the working class. Much of the political experience of the Bengali left in 
the '30s and afterwards can be written up - as indeed has been done 
sometimes - as stories of heroism and courage of men like Chakravarty. 
The impact of their commitment and activities is to be felt in the 
politics of West Bengal even today. 'The memory haunts', as a sensitive 
Bengali intellectual has recently written. 
the memory of early dreams, oaths devoutly undertaken, 
careers forsaken, temptations thrust aside. For those 
who took to socialism, there was ... a question of 
acute choice, one's convictions cut athwart one's 
class interests. They gladly made the transition. 
Forsaking homes and old loyalties, they fanned into 
the countryside to organise the poor peasants [and] 
pioneered the trade union movement in Greater 
Calcutta's jute belt 
Yet I will insist that even these people, for all their sacrifice 
and commitment, remained imprisoned in the babu-coolie relationship insofar 
as the nature of their contact with the working class was concerned. Let 
me demonstrate this by analysing a document that was authored by the 
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very same people as our hypothetical interlocutor referred to, the 
committed, self-sacrificing socialist-minded organizers of labour. 
In January 1937 the manager of the Fort Gloster Jute Mill came 
upon a leaflet going around among his workers who were soon to vote in 
the coming provincial elections. ^  This was the first time that the 
Bengal Legislative Council would have its Labour Members elected and not 
nominated. The leaflet in question aimed at persuading the workers to 
vote for Sibnath Banerjee. Banerjee, a Socialist, was then the President 
of the All India Trade Union Congress. His candidature was supported by 
the Communist Party and the Congress, and he actually won the elections. 
The document therefore was about representation. It asked the workers 
to elect tkoJji representative. A crucial task before the authors of the 
leaflet was to prove this identity of the representative with the class 
he would represent. Here of course there was an obvious problem. Banerjee 
was a member of the bhachalok community and therefore a babu. And so were 
the other contestants. How then could he represent the 'coolies', and why 
was his claim in this regard better than anybody else's? 
Faced with these problems, the leaflet began by introducing a 
real/spurious distinction between 'representatives' of labour. 
Friends, if we are to have [our] ... grievances 
redressed, we must make, on the one hand, all the 
labour organisations more powerful, and on the other 
... see that the ^nal labour representatives are 
sent to the Council ... Friends, you will be glad 
to know that there are eight seats for the Labour 
constituency[ies]. For these eight seats, if we 
can send representatives of labour ... then 
their interests are safeguarded. [Emphasis added] 
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But how could a 'babu' become a 'real' representative of the 'coolie'? 
More importantly, hovi/ would he make this 'reality' v-uible. to the worker 
when all the usual signs of bhacUalok existence set him apart from the 
working class? Our leaflet's answer was: by suffering himself, by making 
'sacrifices' in the interests of the workers. 'Real' representatives are 
'men who have dzvotad [emphasis added] their lives for the welfare of 
labourers' . 
To safeguard the interest of labourers. Comrade 
Banerjee has been to prison for many times. He was 
one of the accused in the Meerut Conspiracy case, 
and was in the lock-up for 2h years, but [was] 
afterwards honorably acquitted. A few days back he 
was fined Rs. 200/- by the ... High Court for 
delivering speeches to the Calcutta Corporation 
workers. From the above facts it is evident that 
there is nobody like Comrade Banerjee for upholding 
the cause of the labourers. If there is any man 
with n.Q,CLt [emphasis added] sympathy for the 
labourers, then it is ... Comrade Banerjee. 
The point was also made in another such leaflet published on behalf of 
Sibnath Banerjee. This other leaflet too 'quoted and glorified the 
sentences of imprisonment and fines that had been passed on him', and 
then asked the labourers, '"I have been prepared to suffer this for your 
sake, am I not the man for you?"'.^'^® 
So the display of 'sacrifice' - i.e. a demonstration of the 
willingness to share the poor man's suffering - was what made Banerjee 
better qualified to represent the workers. The claim to being a 'real' 
representative of the working class was thus based, in this argument, on 
the respect traditionally due in Indian society to the figure of the 
renouncer. It was a moral claim that arose from an old feudal system of 
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morality. There was in fact very little in common between this morality 
and the 'rationality' of the Leninist theory of representation. As is 
well known to any reader of iJJhcit 1-6 To Be Done.? (1902), the Leninist 
'representative' based his claim to represent the working class not on 
moral grounds but on his (supposed) access to superior, 'scientific' 
knowledge (i.e. theory) that was denied to the workers by their own 
conditions. 
Besides, an appeal to the idea of sacrifice was really an appeal to 
the power that flowed from inequality. In order to be able to make 
sacrifices, one needed to possess; he who did not possess could not 
sacrifice. The glory of the renouncer belonged to the 'possessor'. To 
talk of sacrifice was thus to talk of possessions, and hence of power. In 
the leaflet under discussion the authors needed to underscore as it were 
just 'how much' Banerjee had given up to become a 'real' representative 
of the workers. So they told the workers: 
Sibnath is an educated man and kcu> bze.n to EuAopo,, 
and for the last ten years he has been serving the 
labourers, Izaving many kigk po6t6 formerly occupied 
by him. Friends, please vote for Sibnath without any 
hesitation. [Emphasis added] 
But an 'educated man' who 'has been to Europe' and had held 'many high 
posts' was not a coolie or a worker but a babu. And the logic of 
identification-through-sacrifice ends up making this clear. The discourse 
thus silently subverted from within its own claims about democratic 
representation, and the babu-coolie relationship reappeared in the very 
act meant to cause its disappearance. Gopen Chakravarty, the Moscow-
returned Communist mentioned earlier, may have thought that the workers 
216 
accepted him as 'one of them', but they still called him the 'Union 
So it is not surprising that in spite of his ideology and sacrifices - in 
fact it was precisely because of his sacrifices that Sibnath Banerjee's 
union assumed no 'organisational form' for years and remained an 'out and 
out one man show', his 'zamindari'. Even a 'real' representative turned 
out to be a master. 
VIII 
Since \i/e do not mean to suggest that the Bengali followers of 
Lenin were insincere people who made a rather cynical use of the concept 
of 'sacrifice' only in order to manipulate the 'ignorant' workers, we 
need to ask another question: why was an idea steeped in feudal 
morality so central to a discourse that was self-consciously socialist? 
There was clearly more at work here than historians have cared to 
admit or explore. The solution to the paradox of jute workers' organization 
is usually sought in economic (or 'structural') explanations or in 
arguments about political repression by the colonial state. Yet, surely, 
no amount of economic reasoning or evidence of state-repression will ever 
explain why even the socialist message of democratic representation was 
ultimately translated and assimilated into the undemocratic, hierarchical 
terms of the babu-coolie relationship; nor will they tell us why Banerjee's 
pamphlet addressed to the working class spoke so compulsively of his 
education, overseas trips and 'successful' career. 
217 
Perhaps a helpful distinction to make here would be between ideology, 
a body of conscious ideas (like Marxism), and culture, the 'signifying 
system through which necessarily a social order is communicated, reproduced, 
experienced and explored^^° Ideologically, the Bengali left was committed 
to developing trade unions based on the democratic, contractual and 
voluntary procedures of organization that their theory of trade unionism 
entailed. In the culture of everyday life, however, they, as babus, related 
to the coolies through a hierarchy of status. Their education, their 
appearance, the language they spoke, the work they did, could all act as 
indicators of their authority and superiority over the coolies. The 
deployment of a system of u^xlb^e status-markers that divided people into 
hierarchical categories of status and power had always been an important 
function of the culture to which they, the bkadAalok, and the workers 
belonged. 'The working people', said Sasipada Banerjee in the nineteenth 
century, 'are in this country held as low, and as not important members 
of the society'.^^^ Years later, a young Sibnath Banerjee was to find 
the 'tattered clothes, bare feet, dirty appearance and the foul language' 
of the jute mill workers positively offensive to his bhadACitok 
sensibilities. ^  ^ ^ The bhadJialok clerks of the Burn Iron Works in Howrah 
staged a historic walk-out in Septem.ber 1905 when the management asked 
them to record their attendance by the same 'new mechanical system' as 
the coolies were required to use.^^® An attempt in 1923 by the Scottish 
manager of the Anglo-India Jute Mill to hold a meeting of all of his 
employees to discuss a welfare scheme met with a very similar fate. 'The 
babus ... refused to come to the same meeting as coolies, even if the 
latter sat on the floor. 
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It was these culturally-given relationships of power that entered the 
field of trade unionism as u/ell. In terms of their theory, the Bengali 
trade unionists no doubt aspired to build bourgeois-democratic organizations, 
In reality, however, they formed organizations based on 'loyalty', where 
authority did not flow through a grid of rules and procedures but derived 
directly from hierarchy and status. Photographs that I have been able to 
obtain of a May Day rally in Calcutta in 1934 clearly show the distinction 
between babus and coolies. The leaders were obviously the babus. Dressed 
differently from the coolies, they all sit around a table while the 
coolies sit expectantly on the ground, and, being literate, the babus do the 
paper-work necessary for organization (see the photographs attached). If 
this seems like stretching a point, let us recall what Indrajit Gupta, 
the C.P.I, trade unionist, was honest enough to admit in 1952. 'Ever since 
he can remember', said Gupta, 'the jute worker has understood by "union" 
nothing more than an office situated outside the mill and some union 
"babtu" whose job is to write occasional petitions and hold gate, bustee 
or mass meetings'.^^^ The photographs only illustrate the point. 
By refusing to see these obvious signs of the feudal concerns of their 
own, everyday culture, and by seeing the cultural only as an instance of 
the economic, the Bengali left remained trapped, ironically enough, 
within the same culture they would have liked to see destroyed. Ideology, 
in this case, was not enough to erase the ties of power encoded in the 
culture. These ties derived from an older, feudal paradigm of power, and 
if we are to talk about a paradox in the history of jute workers' 
organization, then this is where the paradox has to be located: at the 
intersection of ideology and culture. 
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Chapter 4 
APPENDIX 
TABLE 17 
Average value a n Rsj of money-orders sent by jute-mill workers 
Post-office Period I 1922-1930 
Period II 
1931-1937 
Fall from 
Period I to 
Period II 
Average 
fall in 
value 
Angus 18. 13 14. 31 21 .07 
Baidyabati 18. 07 13. 87 23 .24 
Bally 15. 23 12. 87 15 .50 
Bhatpara 18. 84 15. 37 18 .42 
Baranagar 17. 37 14. 29 17 .73 
Budge Budge 18. 07 15. 91 11 .95 
Fort Gloster 17. 01 12. 56 26 .16 
Garifa 18. 47 15. 20 17 .70 
Garulia 17. 59 14. 58 17 .11 
Ghusuri 16. 18 13. 68 15 .45 
Kamarhati 18. 27 15. 64 13 .45 
Kankinara 19. 23 15. 60 18 .88 
Khardah 16. 93 13. 42 20 .73 
Konnagar 15. 41 13. 92 9 .67 
Naihati 18. 86 15. 18 16 .41 
Ramkrishnapur 17. 95 14. 12 19 .51 
Rishra 17. 27 14. 08 18 .28 
Sankrail 19. 23 15. 34 20 .23 
Serampore 16. 77 13. 79 17 .77 
Shamnagar 18. 01 14. 46 19 .71 
Sibpur 18. 47 15. 61 15 .48 
Sodepur 12. 86 11. 13 13 .45 
Sonai 18. 04 16. 88 6 .43 
Telinipara 17. 17 14. 83 13 .63 
Titgarh 19. 92 16. 42 17 .57 
17.02 
Source: I.J.M.A. Ro^ fonXyb for the respective years (except the one 
for 1927 uhich I could not locate) and Viallace, Romance (1928), p. 108, 
The post-offices selected here are those whose figures, according to 
Viallace, 'may be taken [to represent] almost wholly jute employees' 
money'. 
May Day rally in Calcutta, 1934. 
May Day rally in Calcutta, 1934, 
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Chapter 5 
THE CULTURE OF PROTEST 
'There was no organization. Yet there was a great struggle. How 
indeed could that ever happen?' Abdul Momin wondered about this question 
in 1970 as he thought back to the stormy days of 1929 when he, as a 
young radical trade unionist, took a prominent role in conducting the 
first general strike of the Calcutta jute workers.^ In asking this 
question, Flomin raised an important issue: how indeed does one understand 
a case of working-class militancy that does not flow from, or result in, 
organization? Historians often seek to answer this question in terms of 
the material conditions of the workers. 'Grievances', 'demands', 'living 
standards' form the stuff of their analyses. We, however, shall argue 
here that to understand the nature of jute workers' militancy, one will 
have to look at the relationships of power and authority within the 
mills, for it was in these relationships that 'the will to protest' 
was rooted. This becomes clear if we examine an important feature of 
jute workers' protest - the ever-present tendency towards physical and 
personal violence directed against the authorities. 
By 'authorities', I refer to the managers and their European 
superintendents, called Assistants or European Assistants, in 
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the jute mills. They, as vue know, vi/ere mostly Scotsmen from Dundee and 
its neighbourhood; a Handbook and Guide, to Vanduz and Vl^tAict 
published in 1912 reported that 'the overseers, managers and mechanics 
in the Indian jute mills [were] almost wholly recruited from Dundee'.^ 
I overlook here whatever complexities may have characterized relationships 
LV-othZn the managerial hierarchy in a mill. I also overlook, in this 
chapter, the special role of the 6aAdah^ who occupied a grey zone 
between management and labour. I include them in my category of 'workers', 
and thus ignore the complex relations between the ^aAdcuu and ordinary 
workers below them. One reason for doing this is that in instances of 
protests the workers were often led by the 6afida/U themselves. 
II 
Let me begin with some typical cases of working-class protest in 
the 1890s. 
In 1895 there was a riot at the Kankinara Jute f^ ill after the 
manager had refused a wage-increase. The manager 'narrowly escaped', 
though 'Iron bolts &c., were thrown at him and his house was attacked'. 
Next year in the Baranagar Jute Mill, spinners, demanding increased 
wages, 'surrounded the Manager and the Spinning Master ... assaulted an 
Indian clerk and showered brickbats into the mill premises'.^ Muslim 
'coolies' at the Kamarhati Jute Mill were refused leave on the Id day in 
1895. They responded by striking the 'Manager and the durwans (gate-
keepers; armed retainers) by throwing brickbats at them.'' The same year 
234 
Hindu workers of a mill at Titagarh protested in a similar way when they 
were not allowed leave on the day of the Annapurna Puja (a Hindu religious 
festival). The manager was beaten up, as well as the police who came to 
save him.^ 
Two very well known instances of labour protest of these years were 
an 1895 strike at the Budge Budge Jute Mill and an 1899 strike at the 
Bowreah Cotton Mill. Regarding the former, an kmKAJtci Baza/i Pat/vika report 
ran as follows: 
On Tuesday last [June 1895] ... a serious riot took 
place at Budge Budge. Nearly seven thousand labourers 
of the Budge Budge Jute Mills mustered in the vicinity 
of the bungalow, where European employees of the mill 
reside. It appears that the labourers fell out with 
their Sirdar and proposed to strike if his services 
were not dispensed with. The mill authorities declining 
to accede to the prayer, the labourers in a body 
assembled and broke down the panels of the bungalow 
by pelting stones and brickbats. The Europeans fired 
on the mob ... along with two police constables ... a 
durwan of the mills has been assaulted by the mob.® 
The Bowreah Cotton Mill disturbance was caused by the reelers who for some 
time past had been pressing for a wage increase. This refused, the reelers 
struck work and the manager issued a notice closing down the mill. The 
events that followed are thus described in the words of the manager, 
A.M. Downs, himself: 
Soon after the reelers to the number of 2-300 surrounded 
the mill office with threats to murder me ... [Downs 
quickly collected four European officers around him]. 
I told them [the officers] that ... being 5 Europeans 
together they [workers] would leave us alone. I 
immediately left the office. We were surrounded and 
one man took me by the shirt front and demanded his 
wage. I ... told him to clear out. I then had a blow 
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on the right shoulder. When this took place I clubbed 
my umbrella and cleared a space around me, and one man 
received the blow on the body and smashed the umbrella. 
This was the only weapon in the hands of the Europeans. 
We were attacked by bamboos, brickbats and parts of 
the machines broken by workers for this purpose.^ 
The manager and the assistants eventually used gun fire but were 
themselves also rather badly hurt: 'One of my Assistants (Downs said) 
had his topi smashed; another lost his; mine was knocked off and my 
head cut open with a brickbat, the blood covering my clothes'. 
The details of such incidents are obviously bloodstained, but they 
help to underscore one point. Irrespective of their demands, working-class 
protest against mill authorities frequently contained a strong element 
of vengeance in it. In many of these protests, violence was directed 
personally at the manager, his European assistants, the d u J m c L Y U > , and 
when they were inaccessible, their houses and mill property. 
It is this element of personal violence that has prompted a recent 
study of the nineteenth-century Calcutta working class to describe these 
protests as exhibiting 'a somewhat primitive defiance of authority'.® 
The operative word here is 'primitive' and a little reflection on it may 
help us in setting the perspective of this chapter. In what sense was 
the jute-mill workers' defiance of authority 'primitive'? Destruction 
of mill property and 'physical violence against the employers', it is 
said in the study in question, 'reminds us in some ways of the 
Luddites'.^ This reference to the Luddites suggests two connotations for 
the word 'primitive'. It could refer to a particular period in the 
history of working-class protest in Bengal (presumably the early years 
of industrialization). On the other hand, it could have an ahistorical 
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status and could refer to an implicit (since this is never spelt out in 
the text under consideration) and a pnlonl classification of forms of 
protest into some 'lower' and 'higher' types. In fact a conflation of 
both these senses - the old/new and the lou/er/higher oppositions - is 
suggested in the way the study contrasts the working-class protests of 
the 1890s u/ith those of the 1870s and '80s - note for instance the use 
of words like 'transcend' and 'new': 'the miniature-scale deputations, 
"mobbings", strikes, violent troubles [of the 1890s] ... revealed that 
they [the workers] were trying to •tn.aiuce.nd the blind, individualistic, 
instinctive forms of reaction and to find neui, more powerful and 
effective forms of protest'.^" 'Primitive' then also seems to imply 
here 'blind, individualistic, instinctive forms of reaction'. 
Now there are serious historical and theoretical problems involved 
in looking at the history of working-class protest in Bengal in terms of 
a pre-conceived hierarchy of 'stages', based essentially on the peculiar 
historical experience of England.^^ Space will not permit a fuller 
treatment of the question here, but this chapter will seek to demonstrate 
that the metaphors of 'primitiveness', 'instinct' or 'blindness' are 
unfortunate in the present context. They do not help us to 
understand why working-class protest in the Calcutta jute mills was 
frequently marked by a strong degree of physical violence or personal 
vengeance. It will be argued here that we do not understand a particular 
expression of defiance until we have examined the particular forms of 
manifestation of the 'authority' that is under challenge. The way the 
mill worker chose to register his protest had something to do with the 
way he related to authority. Far from being 'blind', it depended on how 
actually he saw authority. 
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Besides, employment of personal violence/vengeance against managers 
was not just a nineteenth-century phenomenon in Calcutta. It characterized 
much of working-class protest in the twentieth century as well. For 
instance, at the Birla Jute Mill in Budge Budge, one day in March 1937, 
when strikers from a neighbouring mill came in a procession, waving red 
flags, and 'paraded in front of the mill', the spinners got out 'in a 
body' and 'assaulted the European E n g i n e e r T h e manager of the 
Kankinara Jute Mill was 'assaulted' in another case of labour protest in 
January 1937.^^ Later in the year in June, again, as he was 'remonstrating' 
with the spinners for 'disobeying mill regulations', he was 'suddenly hit 
by a b o b b i n ' . A note from the district magistrate of the 24-Parganas 
said: 
Yesterday's trouble arose when an Assistant Manager 
warned one of the operatives for bad work. He refused 
to obey the Assistant Manager's orders and [said that] 
he must have the Manager's orders. The Manager then 
came to the spot and upheld the Assistant Manager's 
orders. The man refused to obey and was then asked to 
leave. He refused to do so and struck the Manager on 
the head with a bobbin. A number of other operatives 
also threw bobbins at the Manager and [the] Assistant 
M a n a g e r ^ 
A strike caused by a reduction of staff at the Northbrook Jute Mill in 
December 1937 featured a similar kind of violence. 'The mill hands', a 
government report said, 'were excited'. They 'became rowdy ... and 
indulged in rough play by throwing bobbins - one spinner being rather 
badly hurf.^^ In July 1939 the weavers of the Samnugger Jute Mill 
'attacked the European Officers inside the mill in a body' over what 
the police thought was 'a trifling matter' and assaulted them, damaging 
some mill property too in the process.^^ In August of the same year the 
weavers of the India Jute Mill 'assaulted the manager and two European 
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Assistants', as the police report said, 'without any provocation'.^® 
Earlier in 1936, a strike in Hukumchand Jute Mill on 9 April was marked 
by working-class violence whereby 'four Europeans were injured' and a 
duAwan killed.^® Even when there was no actual physical violence against 
the manager, there was always a possibility of this occurring. There was 
a strike in May 1937 at the Khardah Jute Mill, caused by the dismissal 
of a few spinners. No violence was seen in this case, but the management 
handed over to the police 'some iron bars' that had been found with the 
spinners and the police thought that 'this trouble ... might [have] led 
to an outbreak of violence'.^® 
Should all my illustrations appear to come from the nineteen-thirties, 
here is the text of a telegram that the Bengal government sent to Delhi, 
regarding a 'riot' at Anglo-Indian Jute Mill on 18 May 1926: 
Mill hands demanded increased wages and attacked 
[Manager's] office, outside crowd broke in mill gates 
and pushed European Assistants to their quarters. The 
European Assistants who are members of auxiliary 
force fired nine shots in air with service rifles and 
dispersed crowd. ^ ^ 
Such examples could be multiplied. The manager of the Bally Jute Mill 
'went to surprise the workers of the weaving department' one day in 
June 1926. He was immediately 'attacked by 260 to 300 weavers and 
assaulted by many of them who threw shuttles, bobbins and other missiles 
at him causing injuries'. The manager thought that his decision to suspend 
'the wages of four sirdars of the department ... [had] led them to 
organise an attack on him'.22 During the 1920-1 phase of 'industrial 
unrest' in Bengal, certain similar incidents occurred. The strike of 
6 July 1920 at the New Central Jute Mill, Howrah, occurred over the 
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arrest of some weavers accused of 'a serious assault upon [a] European 
A s s i s t a n t ' L a b o u r protests in the Viellington Jute Mill or the Union 
South Jute Mill in early 1921 exhibited very similar features - 'assaults, 
on managers or assistants'.^'* 
Even the so-called 'blind, individualistic' form of protest was quite 
in evidence in the twentieth century. In November 1926, Razak, a mill hand 
belonging to the Hooghly Jute Mill, was 'charged with having assaulted 
seriously the Mill manager, Mr Wilson'. 
It is alleged [a newspaper report said] that the 
accused was having a chat with some coolies and the 
mill manager took him to task for it. The accused grew 
furious and struck the manager with a lathi which 
separated the thumb from the forefinger of his hand.^^ 
VJhat does such protest signify? Why did defiance of authority take 
the expression of personal vengeance? To answer these questions we need 
to examine the mode of functioning of authority in the mills. The next 
two sections focus on this aspect of the problem. 
Ill 
The nature of managerial authority in the Calcutta jute mills comes 
cut very clearly in some of the documents pertaining to the mid-1930s, 
which, as seen in the last chapter, were years of crisis when such 
authority was challenged by a massive upsurge of labour protest and 
strikes, organized under Communist leadership. The captains of the 
industry, the Government of Bengal and the Indian Jute Mills Association 
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then set about introducing certain 'reforms' in jute mill labour-
management practices. Sir Edward Benthall tried at this time to get his 
managers to accept 'reforms' like Whitley Councils or works committees, 
labour officers, welfare officers alongside 'healthy' (which meant 
employer-promoted, anti-Communist) trade unions. 
It is interesting to note that Benthall's proposals met with strong 
opposition from the managers. He was quickly warned against doing anything 
that undermined the authority of the manager in the eyes of the workers.^® 
Two of his managers objected to the idea of a works committee on the 
ground that the workers would read this only as a sign of the manager's 
weakness.^^ Indeed, managerial sabotage made ineffective some of the 
works committees set up under pressure from Benthall. One committee soon 
ran out of topics to discuss as managers could not find issues on which 
consulting the workers could be considered worthwhile.^® 
Benthall recognized the nature and strength of this opposition, and 
the manager's point of view was soon accommodated within his general 
strategy for containing labour unrest. He gave up the idea of purely 
western-type Whitley Councils where workers and managers sat as 
supposedly equal partners and took decisions jointly on matters affecting 
production and the worker's life. Such equality would be too un-Indian. 
If managers and workers were to get closer together through some 
institutional arrangement, then that arrangement had better be a'panchayat' 
(traditional Indian village council), which was 'indigenous', rather 
than a Whitley Council, which would be 'foreign'.^^ For, as Benthall 
eventually came round to accept in 1941, there was 'still much' in the 
'Ma-Baap' relationship that was supposed to exist between the manager 
and the worker in a jute mill.^° 
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'Ma-Baap' literally means 'parents'. Managers obviously claimed 
that they were in loco poA^wtU to the worker.^^ The worker was a 
'child' and was thought incapable of 'rational', 'adult' behaviour. He 
could be easily led astray; strikes for instance were always seen as the 
handiwork of 'ringleaders' or 'outsiders'.^^ He was unreasoning and 
unpredictable, and managers often expressed surprise at the 'suddenness' 
of working-class protest.^^ The worker was therefore child-like. A 
typically parental statement which Sir Alexander Murray ''whom we 
have met in earlier chapters) introduced into the body of the report 
of the Committee on Industrial Unrest (1920/21) ran as follows. Note 
the key words: 'Labour, in its ignoA.CLnce., is certain to make uyiA^cuonabl& 
demands which could not be granted without destroying industry, but 
{^Ajmnz^^ in refusing such demands needs to be mingled with much patience 
and con^idoAcuUon' 
This statement encapsulates the two necessary aspects of a 'Ma-Baap' 
authority. On the one hand, managers had to be seen as dispensers of 
'parental' justice (showing the 'patience' and 'consideration' that 
Murray mentioned). Approaching the manager with complaints about an 
oppressive ^OAdaJL was obviously an indication that managers were seen 
and even partly accepted in this role. Even in some of the Communist-led 
jute-mill strikes of 1937, workers frequently demanded that there should 
be 'no dismissals except by the manager or a European' - an obvious 
reference to the oppression the workers suffered at the hands of the 
or their accomplices, the Bengali mill-clerks.^^ But, on the 
other hand, being seen as patient and kind was not enough; managers 
also needed to be seen as disproportionately powerful figures, embodying 
the 'firmness' of Murray's prescription. The power-relationship 
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between the manager and the worker had to be visibly as asymmetric as 
between an adult and a child. 
The exemplary manager was someone whom the workers would 'look 
up to ... 04 a iiOnX. God'. This is how John Finlay, the manager of 
the Hastings Jute Mill, was described in 1894 by a visitor from 
Dundee: 
John Finlay ... is the Nestor among the mill men now 
... [He] has tact, mother-wit, and common sense in 
the management of the workers. He is intimately 
acquainted with their language and character, and 
the consequence is that things go on smoothly. There 
are no better workers in the world than those in the 
Indian jute mills. A paXoAnal doJ^patUm suits them 
exactly. l-Jhenever they get to believe in their manager 
as one who will be kind though firm with them, who, 
while demanding absolute obedience, will give them 
absolute fairplay, their loyalty is secure. They look 
up to him as a sort of God.^^ 
This quotation overestimates the importance the manager normally attached 
to learning the worker's language or about his character. According to 
an official report of 1906, the average jute-mill manager, 'usually a 
kindly Scot from Dundee', knew 'but little of the language which his 
employees talk[ed] ... [and] often [could not] freely communicate with 
them'. He did not have 'much acquaintance with their manners and 
habits' either.^^ The description seems closer to reality and is borne 
out by the evidence of the Benthall papers. One persistent complaint 
of Benthall and his partners during the frequent jute-mill strikes of 
1937 related to the absolute lack of managers and supervisors who knew 
the language of the workers well enough to be able to act as mediators 
between labour and capital, especially at moments of increased tension 
and hostility.^® But the shallowness of the manager's knowledge was 
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never seen to stand in the way of his 'Ma-Baap' authority. In 1923, a 
lady doctor investigating the conditions of female workers in the jute 
mills came across typical instances of assumed 'deification' of the 
manager. The manager of the Baranagar Jute Mill No. 2 told her how the 
'temporary wives [of workers] go over to other men, upon which there is 
trouble, and then the manager is required to give a decision ... [He] 
said his Sunday mornings were often given up to such work'. At the 
Lothian Jute Mill, the manager pointed out to the doctor a Bengali 
woman worker. 'Once when one of her "husbands" had been beating her 
when she was pregnant, she appealed to Mr. Macnab [the manager] who, 
when he found the offence was proved, dismissed the man from the mill.' 
Another instructive case was the manager of the Fort Gloster Jute Mill: 
The manager of this mill succeeded his father, and has 
himself been here 20 years ... I noticed as we went 
round the mill h2. did not ko^-ctcUo. to hit mH.keA6 
tlghXly Mlth ka> cane.. He himself settles disputes 
among the workers, gives divorces etc. He allows a 
wine shop and toddy shop inside the workers' village, 
says there is less 'budmasheri' and he has more 
control over his workers if they get drunk inside the 
village than out.^^ 
Such arrogation by the manager of absolute authority to himself was 
obviously dependent on the worker seeing him as absolutely powerful, 
while in reality the manager's actual powers were often quite limited.'*® 
For the 'Ma-Baap' relationship to work, it was necessary for the manager 
to have an overpowering presence and for the worker to be made to feel 
it. If this were not so, no manager would have dared to walk among his 
workers, alone, flicking his cane about, hitting them casually, as the 
Fort Gloster Mill manager did in the incident mentioned above. 
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What made the manager appear so powerful and big, and the worker 
powerless and small? What was the technology, so to speak, of such 
magnification? 
IV 
It is when we touch on this question of 'magnification' what we 
realize that the manager's authority was essentially colonial. It 
derived more from the colonial situation than from technology or any 
other factor internal to the production process. The word 'colonial' 
is meant here to include what was indigenous to Indian society. There is 
of course no denying that the authority of the mill manager was 
bolstered up by his position as a member of the ruling race. But, in 
some respects, one also cannot help noticing the essentially Indian 
nature of this authority. Hence the close resemblance - often commented 
upon in the nationalist press - of the jute-mill manager's authority 
to that of the nineteenth-century indigo-planter in Bengal, who in 
turn modelled himself on the Bengali (or north-Indian) landlord. 
The Scottish manager in a Calcutta jute mill was something that he 
could never have been at home. Our 1894 visitor observed: 'The jute mill 
manager in India is a much more important personage than his brother 
in Dundee ... He lives in a spacious bungalow, beautifully furnished, 
and has quite a retinue of servants to attend to him' Thus 
it was the typical signs of ostentatious colonial power that made 
the manager more important than he would have been in Dundee: 
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'spacious bungalow', lavishly furnished, a large 'retinue of servants'. 
The words speak of plenitude and excess, which marked the life-style 
of the Scottish assistant as well. The Scotsmen in Calcutta presented 
such a novel spectacle to the Dundee gentleman whom we have been quoting 
so far that he proceeded to record their life-style in utmost detail. 
To an Indian reader, many of the details would seem obvious and trivial, 
but their presence in the pages of the Vunde.2. VtoA Book goes to show 
how strange and exotic they must have appeared to the readers in Dundee. 
The Scottish jute-mill assistant, it was reported, 'lives well'. '[He 
has] a bearer, a Mahcmedan, who helps off and on with his clothes, takes 
charge of his room, attends him at table, stirs his tea, lights his 
pipe'. And this is how the assistant spent his daily life: 
When a mill man gets up in the morning — his 
attendant brings him a cup of tea with some toast 
and sometimes a couple of eggs. This is called 
ckota kciziAl (little breakfast). When the real 
breakfast time comes, he sits down to ^cveAal 
courses, consisting of fish, stewed steak and 
onions, eggs, curried fowl and rice, with the usual 
addenda of tea or coffee, with bread, butter and 
jam. Instead of the tea, some prefer beer or iced 
water, while others take a peg. The 'peg' is a great 
Indian institution ... It consists of a glass of 
whisky, a bottle of soda water, and a lump of ice all 
tumbled into a tall glass ... The 'peg' is responsible 
for the downfall and early death of many a fine 
promising young man ... The tiffin (luncheon) ... is 
less elaborate than the morning meal ... and when the 
day's work is over, and bathing and dressing 
accomplished, the whole chummery sit down together 
to their evening meal consisting of a soup, fish, 
joint, side dishes, pudding and fruit. The various 
fruits in season are on the table at every meal. A 
plentiful supply of ice is provided by the Company.'*^ 
Nutrition was obviously not at the centre of such an eating routine 
- the reference to the 'peg' makes that clear. Eating was a ritualized 
expression of a colonial ruling-class culture, a well-defined culture 
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with its own vocabulary - ckota hazixl, 'peg', 'tiffin' - signifying, 
again, excess and plenitude. An American gentleman who lived and 
worked in the jute-manufacturing circles of Calcutta in the 1920s 
noted with interest the emphasis his European colleagues placed on 
their living styles. He wrote: 
Europeans in India must keep up a certain standard 
of living. In fact, this is so vital to the white 
man's prestige that most of the big firms will not 
allow their juniors to marry on less than a thousand 
rupees a month. And this did not go far when I was 
in Calcutta. Take the servants alone, a married 
couple must keep ... Ten servants seem a lot for a 
couple with modest means, but there is no way of 
cutting down.'^'^ 
There was an irony of history in all this. For the mill managers 
and assistants were often themselves of working-class o r i g i n . B u t 
out in the colony, they were transformed overnight into members of the 
ruling class and the ruling race. They sat on municipal committees, 
were made Honorary Magistrates,'^'" and socialized with the British civil 
servants in the colonial bureaucracy. The private and public statements 
of the civil servants sometimes bore unintended testimony to the 
closeness and warmth of this relationship. 'Social life in Hooghly was 
brisk', reminisced T.G. Holman, an I.C.S. officer serving in Bengal 
in the 1920s and 30s. 'Alethea and I had many happy times with the 
gentlemen in jute at Angus [Mill]. They had a delightful swimming bath 
and a very well kept nine-hole golf course, where I had the good luck 
to win the Chinsura Challenge Trophy A note written by N.V.H. 
Symons, the District Magistrate of Howrah, in June 1937 on the occasion 
of a strike at the Belvedere Jute Mills is also quite revealing. This 
is how Symcns expressed his views on the strike: 
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McKay, the manager of the mill is a very decent 
fellow, youngish and on perfectly good terms with 
his labour, and I should say competent and 
conscientious. It is very bad luck on him that he 
should keep on having these troubles and I am sure 
he has done nothing to deserve them."^® 
In short, the managers became the bearers of the colonial rule in 
ma^cU)^^ Bengal. Even bkacUiatok enterprise and social-reform 
movements in the mill areas often depended crucially on their patronage.''^ 
An interesting example of such colonial transformation is the career of 
James Robertson of Dundee, vi/ho went out to Bengal in 1874 as the manager 
of Samnugger Jute Mill. A certificate from the Douglas Foundry, Dundee 
dated 25 January 1866, described him as one who 'has served a regular 
apprenticeship of 5 years to us as a machine maker and has been with us 
as a journeyman for some months'.^® But two farwell addresses that he 
received in 1885 when he retired from Samnugger Jute Mill show him in a 
very different light. One address, from the local residents, mentioned 
how 'mill employees and the villagers ... looked upon him as the promoter 
of their welfare and happiness'. Another, from the secretary of a local 
school, was even more supplicatory in its tone: 
Mr. James Robertson ... the worthy gentleman, whose 
good feelings towards the natives ... induced him to 
commisserate the want of an English School — It is 
he, who favoured [the school] with a donation and ... 
took a lively interest in the Examination and 
distribution of prizes ... To preserve his memory 
hereafter, we beg of him for [a] miniature in 
photograph ... to be suspended in the school.^^ 
The effect of such colonial 'magnification' of one's power and 
status was not lost on the mill manager or his assistant. To quote the 
1894 visitor again: 
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When the mill assistant arrives out in Calcutta his 
circumstances undergo a change. He may have been 
known in Dundee as Sandy Tamson: but out here he is 
changed at once into Alexander Thomson, Esquire, 
weaving master, and all his letters are so addressed.^^ 
The effect was not lost on the worker either. This was the context 
for K.C. Roy Chowdury's statement, mentioned earlier, that the jute 
mill workers always preferred a 'rich' Indian as their spokesman when 
it came to dealing with the 6(ihA,b6, and that they were very pleased 
to see trade union leaders come to attend meetings in their own motor 
cars.^^ In other words, the worker registered the signs of managerial 
authority and wanted his leader to match up to them. 
In the jute mills of Bengal, then, managerial power worked mere by 
making a spectacle of itself and less by the quiet mechanism of 
'discipline' that acts through the labour-market, technology and the 
organization of work.^** In the 'classic' case of metropolitan capitalism, 
we may recall Marx's words once again, the 'place of the slave-driver's 
lash is taken by the overlooker's book of penalties'.^^ In the colonial 
capitalism of Bengal, as I shall now proceed to show, the lash remained 
more important than the fine-book. 
If we look at the manager's authority through the worker's eyes, 
three characteristics of such authority stand out. They are related 
but separable. 
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Firstly, dtxtho^uXy WCL6 p2JiJ>onatLZtd. Factory rules were seen as 
the manager's will. Issues like vi/age-increases, wage-cuts, dismissals 
or lock-outs were perceived as matters of his personal choice. A telling 
case was a riot that broke out at the Anglo Indian Jute Mill on the 
morning of 18 May 1926. The mill had just laid off some workers. So the 
atmosphere in the mill was tense. It had also changed its working hours 
as a result of which women workers expected a rise in their wages. 
In making his morning rounds at 6.30 in the mill a 
mob began following the Manager round and a few bobbins 
were thrown. The Manager then went into his office 
which was immediately surrounded by a crowd of 
2000-3000 — deputations were sent to the Manager to 
ask him to increase the wages. On his saying that it 
was net in his power, bricks were thrown at the 
office windows and the windows ... were smashed.^^ 
Much violence followed. A later police report repeated that the raising 
of wages was indeed not within the manager's power: 'Managers have no 
say in the matter of wages, which are controlled by the [Managing] 
A g e n t s W h y did the workers not believe this? Because they were 
used to seeing authority as an unrestrained expression of the manager's 
personal will. On the Friday preceding the riot - which was also their 
pay-day - the same manager had refused to pay them when he heard 
'some murmuring' among the workers. He had warned them instead that 
he would cancel all due wages unless workers (then on strike) joined 
work by the following Monday. In the absence of explicit service or 
wage-regulations in the industry, such a warning could have only 
appeared to come from the manager personally. 
Even in the course of daily routine - conversations with the 
workers, managers and assistants projected their authority not only 
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in the imperative, but often in the first person singular. A sample of 
'useful sentences' taken from a manual of spoken Hindi^® - put together 
for use in jute mills - will make that clear. It should be noted that the 
word used to mean 'I' u/as 'ham' (or 'hum') which literally meant 'we'. 
The British in India used it often as a substitute for the royal 'We'. 
The sentences thus sought to impress upon the mind of the worker a sense 
of the manager's (or the assistant's) 'sovereignty', his unlimited power. 
(a) Agar turn karkhana men 
phir jhagra karega to 
ham tumko jawab dega. 
(b) Tum do mahina hua 
ghar gaya tha. Ham 
tumko abhi jane nahin 
dega. 
(c) Tum abhi ek mahina 
talab baghair kam_ 
karo. Agar tumhara 
kam achcha hoga to 
ham tumko barabar 
rakhega. 
(d) Jo admi kal der se 
aega ham uspar 
jurmana karega. 
(e) Ham jaise bolta hai 
waisa karo nahin to 
kam chhor do. 
(f) Tum donon ka kasur 
hai. Ham donon ko 
jawab dega. 
(g) Agar Bara Sahib 
dekhega •to_wuh 
bahut gussa hoga. 
If you quarrel again 
inside the factory, 
I shall sack you. 
It's now only a couple of 
months since you've been back 
from home (village). I shall 
not allow you to go now. 
You work now for a 
month without any 
wages. If your work is 
satisfactory, I shall 
keep you permanently. 
I shall fine anyone who comes 
in late tomorrow. 
Do as I say, or give up your 
job and leave. 
You are both guilty. I 
shall sack you both. 
Look, if the Bara ('Chief') 
Sahib happens to see this, it 
will make him very angry. 
Small wonder, then, that authority was seen in personal terms. As a 
Bengal government report once said: 'The ensuing of trouble on the 
appointment of a new Manager is not an infrequent occurrence'.^^ 
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Apart from being personalized, aixtkofujty wcu> zxc^^lvz. I use the 
word 'excess' in opposition to the word 'economy'. In Marx's (or 
Foucault's) discussion of capitalist discipline, managerial and 
supervisory authority is seen to operate through an articulated body 
of rules and legislation which have the effect of ensuring an economy 
in the use and exercise of managerial p o w e r . I n the jute mills of 
Calcutta, however, there prevailed the idea that the managers should be 
in complete and unchallenged control of their labourers. No 'outsider' 
could be allowed to intervene in the manager-worker relationship. Thus 
in October 1905, the manager of the Fort Gloster Jute Mill lost his 
temper when he saw some of his clerks and workers wearing Aakhe^.^'' 
The ^akhee to him was a sign of the presence of the 'outside agitator'. 
He 'struck a Bengali clerk and two or three Mohamedan mill-hands' 
which led to a strike.^^ During the Khilafat movement in 1920, the 
manager of the Union Jute Mill came across 'a hartal [strike] leaflet 
posted up on the wall of the mill'. In a dramatic demonstration of his 
anger, not only did he tear it off the wall but he also 'trampled it 
under foot' before the watching eyes of his workers.^^ Managers' 
reaction was the same when the Government of Bengal intervened to settle 
the 1929 general strike. A deputation of employers to the Governor 
bitterly complained how, as a result of such 'unfortunate action ... 
control of labour had ... passed out of the hands of the employers'.®'' 
The demonstration of excessive authority was also used for 
retaining labour. For, in a highly imperfect labour market, there was 
also the fear of temporary but serious labour shortage. The following 
report from 1918 brings out this aspect of the problem: 
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A manager ... starting a new mill heard that a mill 
across the river was out on a strike and so he sent 
a sardar with a launch to get some of the labour. The 
sardar came back without the labour and was ordered 
to go back once more. But he again returned alone. 
To the manager's question he replied that there was 
a sahib with a gun standing on the ghat [steps leading 
from the river-bank to the river] daring him to come 
6 5 near. 
T h i r d l y , atUhonAXy bon.2, mcui\ii> tOAAon.. E x c e s s i v e a u t h o r i t y 
obviously depended on a certain use and demonstration of physical force. 
Managerial power had a necessary extra-legal dimension to it. 
There was the Voluntary Artillery Force of which 'nearly every jute 
mill assistant' and manager were members.^® The object of raising the 
force was to meet labour unrest 'with arms'.^^ As some of my examples 
will have shown, this was no empty threat. Besides, throughout the 
period under discussion, assaulting the worker physically was an 
extremely common practice - far too common, in fact, for it to be 
overlooked as any individual manager's personal failing. The nationalist 
press was always full of complaints about this aspect of managerial 
behaviour. A report that appeared in the of 2 August 1906 
describing how the manager of the Indian Jute Mill once kicked one 
of his weavers while 'using abusive language at the same time' was 
typical of the genre of such reports. Jute-mill workers, it is said, 
often compared their bosses to ill-tempered horses, as in dealing with 
both one faced the danger of getting kicked.^® Matters came to a head 
in 1926 when a Scottish assistant actually killed a weaver by kicking 
him in a fit of anger.^^ The ensuing scandal and uproar in the press, 
and mounting working-class grievance over physical 'torture', forced 
I.J.M.A. to assure the government in 1929 that 'there will be no 
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corporal punishment' in the m i l l s . T h i s was not a very effective 
assurance, for we hear of physical assaults by managers and assistants 
as late as 1938 or 1940.^^ By then the assumptions underlying the 
so-called 'Ma-Baap' relationshop had obviously become parts of a strong 
managerial tradition in the jute mills. 
Even more vicious, from the worker's point of view, was organized 
managerial terror (as distinct from sporadic physical assaults) that was 
unleashed on labour at moments of protest. In the flow of such excessive, 
organized managerial violence, the police, the 6cuid(Vvi, and the duAwayU> 
often acted as capillaries, aiding the flow. 
Sumit Sarkar records in his aforementioned book an early instance 
of this. The workers of Fort Gloster Jute Mill had gone on strike in 
March 1906. 'On the night of 12-13 March', Sarkar writes, 'mill durwans, 
a mob of upcountry coolies and some police constables launched a violent 
attack on the neighbouring villages of Khajari, where many of the 
[striking] workers lived'.^^ Abdul Momin, one of the organizers of the 
1929 general strike, mentions the use by managers of hired Kabuli 
'goondas' when the strike was on.^^ During a strike at the Ludlow Jute 
Mill in May 1928, the manager one day let off 'the blacklegs' (working 
in place of the strikers) 'two hours before the usual time', and they, 
'assisted by the Jamadars [ duniOaiU] and other servants of the mill, 
armed with lathis, swords, sticks and daggers, set upon the [striking] 
workers in their quarters and inflicted serious injuries on them'. A 
month later at the same factory, the women went out on strike. One day 
during the strike the manager 'induced' (in the language of a newspaper 
report) the women leaders of the strike to come to his office: 
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Thereafter the gates were locked up and strikers were 
threatened with prosecution if they failed to rejoin 
at once. The police and the Jamadars of the mill 
continued to intimidate them all along. On their 
refusal to resume work, several of the leaders were 
severely assaulted and immediately put under arrest. 
The rest of the women workers were ... assaulted and 
dispersed, being forcibly dragged by their hair. 74 
It should be emphasized once again, however, that this projection 
of authority in personalized, excessive and terrorizing terms was not 
a European invention on Indian soil. Nor was it a European monopoly. 
Even after making allowances for the haughtiness and arrogance of a 
ruling race, the evidence points to remarkable similarities between 
the managerial style described above and that obtaining in the Indian-
managed cotton mills in Bengal. The Communist-run newspaper Ganccbani 
published a report in 1928 which described how the workers of the 
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mill (near Dacca) had been treated by the mill-
management on demanding a rise in wages. The Bengali manager of the 
mill - who eventually forced them out of the factory with the help of 
his duAWaivS - hurled a shower of abuse on the workers, using the Bengali 
eguivalents of 'bastard', 'swine', and 'son of a b i t c h T h e details 
of the following police-report on a strike at the Indian-owned and 
Bengali-managed Bangoday Cotton Mill (on the outskirts of Calcutta) 
are also instructive: 
On ... 6.4.[19]37 in the afternoon one Kartic Ch. Dey, 
weaver, while working in the Bangoday Cotton Mill was 
assaulted by one Ganesh, Head Jobber of the weaving 
department ... At this other weavers of the department 
took objection and complained ... to the weaving-in-
charge Godu Babu who took no action but threatened 
with further assault and discharge. So these Bengali 
weavers determined not to work in the company and 
wanted their pay. As arranged by Godu Babu these 
weavers about 64 in number ... went to the mill gate 
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on 1A.1>1 at 11.30 hrs to take their pay, when 
some Darwans and collies [coolies] came out of the 
mill gate with lathis and under the direction of 
Godu Babu and the mill manager Kunja Babu assaulted 
the ... weavers ... causing injuries.^^ 
VI 
The strong resemblances between the managerial styles of the 
Scottish jute-mill manager and the Bengali cotton-mill manager point to 
the existence in both cases of a culture obsessively concerned with the 
employment and maintenance of the visible signs of domination and 
subordination. However much the British in India may have improvised on 
it, this culture was undeniably Indian in origin and it refused to come 
to terms with the bourgeois notion of 'contract' that, theoretically at 
least, underlay the wage-relationship between labour and capital. 
Abusing the worker verbally or physically, addressing him in the 
disrespectful form 'turn' (see the Hindi sentences quoted above) or the 
even more disrespectful 'tui' (which was used by the Dhakeshwari Cotton 
Mill manager) were all signs of the worker's lowly social status and, 
insofar as he accepted them, of his subordination. 'Ma-Baap' 
relationship was thus the name that managers gave to their near-feudal 
domination. Up to a point, it must have worked. But as workers' protests 
show, the relationship broke down quite often. When exactly did such 
moments occur? 
Let us go back to the case of the Anglo-Indian Jute Mill manager 
in 1926, the gentlemen who was subject to much working-class violence 
when he pleaded his inability to grant a wage-increase. As we know. 
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workers thought this to have been his personal choice. But that was to 
be expected; authority perceived as personalized could be only 
'arbitrary'. But arbitrariness was not sufficient to provoke protest. 
If it were, jute mills in Bengal would never have seen any moments of 
'peace'. In this case, the manager was seen as not just 'arbitrary', 
but also 'unfair'. He was arbitrary in an unfair way. The comb-Lnation 
was explosive. The workers here believed - wrongly, but that does not 
matter - that while other managers in the mills had already agreed to 
a wage-increase, the gentleman here was holding this back quite 
unreasonably.'^ The supposed agreement of the other managers had already 
made the demand reasonable and just. So in holding it back, the manager 
was withholding something that the workers thought was due to them. He 
was therefore unfair and deserving of punishment. 
Time and again, through instances of working-class protest, we 
return to the worker's notion of 'fairness' and 'justice'. The worker 
reacts when he sees himself being deprived of something that he thinks 
is justly his. Such an injured sense of fairness and complaints about 
the manager's unreasonableness permeate the following petition that the 
workers of eight jute mills of the Titagarh area sent to the District 
Magistrate in 1931. This was a time when the mills were laying off 
thousands of men. Managers, fearing trouble from outside workers, had 
ordered entries into or exits from the mills to be strictly controlled. 
The petition is indicative of the workers' view at a time of heightened 
tension: 
... at the time we are working in the mills we find 
ourselves imprisoned, as it were, with no liberty 
even to go to answer the calls of nature. If any of 
us pressed by an urgent call goes cut his token is 
257 
taken away and he is dismissed. If any of our 
relatives in our houses happen to fall ill or if 
any danger befalls any member of our family at the 
time \i/e are working in the mills, we cannot get 
any information as the gates of the mill are kept 
closed and no one is allowed to go in or come out. 
We do not see why this rule should have been 
introduced, regarding closing of gates 
The petition is quite clear on the working class 'logic' of protest: 
'... when for many years in the past the gates were kept open during 
working hours there was no trouble whatsoever in the working of the 
mills'. Thus it was not because there was trouble that the gates were 
shut - which would have been the managerial view - it was because the 
gates were shut that there was trouble. In point of fact, this was not 
a 'true' explanation; there had been much trouble before even when 'the 
gates were kept open'. But the 'truth' of the statement lay elsewhere: 
the closing of the gates symbolized the manager's unfairness, and it 
was this that called for protest.^^ 
In the absence of more documents from the workers themselves, their 
notion of fairness or justice is difficult to disentangle and analyse 
in depth. Yet some aspects of the question are clear. The worker's 
idea of fairness was related to his idea of what was customary (or 
/uioaz). 'Unfair' was what was not done. If attending to ailing relatives 
or 'urgent calls' was his 'duty' and therefore customary - even if it 
meant interrupting work - then that was fair. Whoever or whatever 
stopped him from doing so was unfair. 
Chitra Joshi in her work on the Kanpur (in Uttar Pradesh) textile 
mill workers - workers from the same cultural region as the jute mill 
workers - has identified a notion of 'fair wage' that the workers there 
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had.®° A similar notion can be discerned in the case of jute mill 
workers too. A 'fair' wage was what a labourer in a neighbouring mill 
received (or what a neighbour working for a different mill did). In 
other words, fair was what was seen as 'customary'. Therefore, if one 
manager granted a wage-increase (for whatever reasons) and another in 
a neighbouring factory refused to do so (for whatever reasons, again), 
the latter was unfair, because he was denying workers what had become 
customary (in other mills) and thus rightfully theirs. The general 
strikes of 1929 and 1936/7 provide good illustrations of this. This 
was also at the heart of some of the important conflicts of 1920 -
the year of 'industrial unrest'. At the Hooghly Jute Mill in November 
1920, the spinners asked the manager for a wage-increase 'alleging 
other mills are getting it'. The manager denied this, but - and this 
is significant - 'says if others get it they shall also'. The spinners 
went on strike, and the strike quickly spread to the mills in the town 
of Howrah - the Ganges, Fort William and Howrah Jute Mills. The strikes 
broke out on the same day, ended on the same day, and all had the 
same demand for 25 per cent wage increase. The only way the government 
could explain the spread of this strike which originated in a single 
isolated mill on the other side of the river was by pointing out that, 
though isolated, the Hooghly Jute Mill 'belongs by intercourse to the 
Howrah group, quite a proportion of the labour of the Howrah mills 
living in its neighbourhood'.®^ 
To appear 'just', however, an idea did not always require the 
force of real tradition behind it. An arbitrary reference to the kanoon 
(law) of the land or to a superordinate authority was often sufficient 
to establish something as time-honoured (and thus a matter of 'right'). 
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much the same way as insurgent peasants would invoke the authority of 
the /laj against an oppressive landlord. In April 1936, for example, 
the workers of the Hooghly Jute Mill went on strike and the authorities 
issued notices asking them to vacate their rooms in the mill's cooly-
lines. Much violence resulted. But what preceded the violence is even 
more interesting. Debendra Nath Sen, a Communist leader, told the 
strikers: as you pay rent and as you are employees in their Mills, 
the proprietors have no right to eject you all of a sudden ...' . In a 
later meeting, another leader, Abdul Aziz, was even more forthright: 
'The notice given by the Sahib is not He. doe^ not aont^o^m to 
the, law-i) tht GoveAme.nt' Of course, both Sen and Aziz were wrong 
in their knowledge of the law, as a prolonged court-case later proved. 
But the argument worked. When the manager went to the lines with his 
assistant and duAWan^ to evict the workers, they were greeted by a very 
heavy dose of working-class anger and violence.®^ 
It is easy to see that the worker's notion of fairness became 
inextricably bound up with the questions of defending what was 'customary 
and thus with his traditional sense of honour and dignity. This came out 
strongly in strikes over alleged acts of misbehaviour toward women by 
assistants or duMJOan^, where striking was a matter of protecting the 
women's IzzaX (honour).®'* Another good example is the case we have 
cited earlier of the manager of the Union Jute Mill who tore up a 
Khilafat leaflet in 1920 and trampled it under his foo% in the presence 
of his Muslim workers. He was 'chased to his private quarters by a 
number of workmen who threw brickbats at the doors and windows'. The 
workers later told the police that 'as there were certain religious 
verses quoted in the notice, the trampling under foot was ... insulting 
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to their religion'.®^ In other cases of protest, too, there always 
remained an element of the worker's dignity being at stake. In December 
1905, when two 'ringleaders' of the protesters at the Fort Gloster Jute 
Mill were arrested, workers 'promptly went on strike, and ... told the 
... police ... that in arresting the two men they had all been insulted'. 
In January 1933, when the 'Burra Sahib' of the Waverly Jute Mill 'roughly 
handled some of the weavers whose production did not prove satisfactory', 
it was not just 'bad yarn' that the weavers complained of. They actually 
'resented ... this alleged bad behaviour and ... severely assaulted 
him with shuttles and iron instruments, necessitating his removal to 
the hospital' 
Thus it was at points when the manager was not only arbitrary but 
both arbitrary and unfair (and thus unreasonable and insulting) that 
there was protest. At these moments the 'Ma-Baap' relationship broke 
down. It not only broke down: more important, the terms of the 
relationship became instantaneously reversed.®® The manager's view of 
the worker as a 'child' was replaced by the worker's view of him as 
a 'despot'. Working-class vengeance took the place of managerial terror, 
and protest now bore marks of retaliation which the worker needed to 
stamp on the manager's body (since authority was personalized) or on 
the body of his assistant or duAtoan or on objects bearing a relationship 
of contiguity®^ to them, such as their bungalows, quarters or offices 
(that is, mill property). Using the anthropologist's language, we may 
schematize this 'reversibility': 
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Manager _ _ Unreasonable-Poviyerful 
Worker "' Unreasonable-Powerless 
Despot _ _ Terror 
Child '' Vengeance 
Manager's Violence 
Worker's Violence 
Protesting, then, became a ceremony of defiance. The rebel worker 
inverted the terms of his relationship with the manager or the supervisor 
and overturned the two major everyday signs of his subordination: abusive 
language and physical violence. This inversion of relationships can be 
seen in most instances of working-class protest in the period under 
study. But an example from the nineteenth century would probably serve 
to show it in its pristine clarity. We reproduce here a letter that the 
authorities of the Alliance Jute Mill wrote to I.J.fl.A., reporting 
a 'disturbance' at their mill on 6 July 1897. 
We continued full working until about 10.30 A.M., 
when notice was brought that a large gang of men 
armed with tcuthie^ had attacked the gate, burst it 
open, and were surrounding the Mill. As things looked 
serious the engine was stopped, and the Europeans 
went off to their houses to arm themselves, but 
before they got back to the compound the Mill was 
surrounded by two to three thousand excited men all 
armed with tatkioJ^, and with their clothes tightly 
tied up, shouting all kinds of abusive language and 
making threatening gestures with their sticks. The 
engine, the governor gear was broken, and other 
damage done. It was only the prompt appearance of 
some of the Europeans with fire-arms that prevented 
the rioters from continuing their course of destruction 
and attacking the European quarters, upon which a 
body of men were marching. When asked to state their 
reason for causing the disturbance the only reply 
was a shout of defiance, with abusive language, a 
brandishing of their IcutkloJ^ and a shower of bricks. 
A few shots fired in the air, and a charge or two of 
snipe shot at their legs, got them to retire as far 
as the gate which they again attacked with their sticks 
and broke to pieces. This and the throwing of bricks 
appeared to satisfy them for a time.^° 
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The coming of the nationalist movement in the twentieth 
introduced competing ideologies and organization into the field of 
industrial relations in Bengal. The whole scene of labour movement 
became literally more colourful in the 1930s as the left in Bengal 
started celebrating such ceremonies as May Day, Lenin Day, November 
Day, etc.^^ 'The [red] flag with the insignia of the hammer, sickle and 
star and revolutionary slogans are a common feature of most demonstrations 
in Calcutta and most of the speeches which are made at these ... 
demonstrations advocate communism', noted the Chief Secretary of Bengal 
in 1937.^^ Along with this went a constant effort to undermine the 
authority of the British. A police report of 1939 gives a good description 
of the kind of 'manuscript posters' that the Communists often circulated 
in mill-areas inciting the mill-hands against the mill authorities and 
Europeans. 
This poster exhibits a picture of a man calling 
himself ... a revolutionary holding a revolver in his 
hand and with the other holding a rope tied to the 
neck of a man who has been styled ... a two-footed 
monkey probably meaning [a] European.^^ 
All this of course had significant influences on the working-
class as the scale and intensity of labour protest in the 1930s suggest. 
As the nationalist movement gained momentum and the legitimacy of the 
British presence suffered erosion, workers naturally felt more encouraged 
to challenge the authority of their superiors at work. Yet it is possible 
to recognize a continuing structure in the nature of working-class 
defiance of authority all through the history of 'political mobilization' 
of labour. There are, for example, uncanny similarities between the 
modes of labour mobilization of the Swadeshi^'* period (1905-08) and 
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those, under Communist leadership, of the nineteen thirties. The red 
badge replaced the /lafe/iee, slogans like 'Mazdur ki Jai' (Victory to the 
Workers) replaced 'Bande Flataram' (Glory to the Motherland), but the 
'bourgeois' nationalism of the Swadeshi bhadAolok and the Marxism of the 
later bhadAolok Communist often spoke to the worker with the same voice. 
Thus if the sight of the worker wearing the Swadeshi angered the 
manager in 1905, this is what Zaman, a Communist leader, told the workers 
of a jute mill in 1938: '[He] ... asked workers ... to enter the mill for 
work with red badges on and with lathis. He gave them instructions to 
assault anybody objecting to their wearing badges'.^^ In 1905 Aswini 
Banerji, the Swadeshi nationalist labour organizer, told his followers 
'that it was the slave who tempted, invited, nay compelled tyranny and 
that if they could return 2 blows for one, their burra sahibs ... would 
begin to respect them'.^^ Years later, in 1937, the Communist Niharendu 
Dutt Majumdar had the same message for the working class: '— if any 
workman was assaulted by a manager, the workers should retaliate by 
hitting him back'.®^ The particular ideological content of the 
preachings do not seem to have been crucial. 'Bande Mataram' was as 
good as 'Mazdur ki Jai' when it came to signifying defiance. At the 
Kamarhati Jute Mill in June 1937, spinners charged with bad work defied 
the manager's order to leave, and 'struck the manager on the head with 
a bobbin'. 'A number of other operatives also threw bobbins at the 
Manager and Assistant Manager' whereupon the police arrested 'several 
of the rioters'. 'Immediately a crowd of about 1000 workmen assembled 
in front of the thana [police station] shouting slogans such as 
"Mazdur ki Jai'" and demanded their release. When asked why, the 
'ringleaders' replied 'It t m t h e ^ o ^ d e A ' H o w similar to the 
incidents at the Fort Gloster Jute Mill in December 1905, where one 
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day, when a 'considerable amount of unrest' already existed in the 
workers' minds over a recently concluded strike, the cry of 'Bande 
Mataram' was 'taken up by one department after another', the European 
assistants 'hustled about the place', and the police were told by the 
workers, on arresting two people, that '"all brothers in the mill, all 
brothers in Bengal; that in arresting the two men they had all been 
insulted'" 
These similarities across the separation of decades are not 
accidental. They arise from the fact that both the Swadeshi bhadAolok 
and his later Communist successor had to address themselves to the already 
existing working-class notions about defying authority. These notions 
were rooted deep in the worker's understanding of authority and in the 
manager's projection of it. Physical violence against the employer was 
not necessarily a 'primitive' defiance of authority; it was rather an 
acknowledgement of the way authority was represented in the jute mills 
and elsewhere. In the very nature of defiance was mirrored the nature 
of authority. 
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Chapter 6 
OF SOLIDARITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Their poverty gave the jute mill workers a sense of identity and 
a certain sense of social stratification as well. Even when issues like 
religion divided them, there still remained, in their own minds, a 
fundamental distinction between themselves as 'poor people' and others 
who seemed well off. 'We are poor people and [we] work in mills'^ is 
how a group of Muslim mill-hands once described themselves in 1896 while 
requesting help from wealthier Muslums in fighting their Hindu fellow-
workers who were just as poor and who would have possibly described 
themselves in very much the same terms. Overlapping with the rich-poor 
distinction was the distinction the workers made between themselves and 
their employers. During times of strikes and industrial tension, 
especially after the 1930s, the workers suspected any affluent-looking 
stranger moving about in their midst of being a 'spy' working for the 
employers. For instance, a group of Bengali sociologists who had decided 
in 1944 to live in a working-class slum in Jagaddal in order to research 
the living conditions of the workers soon discovered that 'the employment 
of a cook and servant promptly led to their being doubted as agents of 
jute mill owners'. It was only after they had 'dismissed the servants'. 
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taken turns at [the] cooking of their meals' and explained their mission 
to the workers that they \i/ere able to 'disarm suspicion' and make 
'friendly contacts'.^ 
If this was one expression of an emergent, though elementary, class 
consciousness on the part of the jute worker, there were other expressions 
as well. The strike-wave of 1937-38 was accompanied by some very impressive 
demonstrations of working-class solidarity. The government documents 
belonging to these years, speak of the workers of the Nahaiti Jute Mills 
'receiving monetary assistance from the workers of certain other jute 
mills' while on strike in December '37, or of some '530 spinners' of the 
Dalhousie Jute Mill striking work 'in sympathy with workers on strike at 
the Northbrook Jute mill'.^ On 12th November 1937, to give yet another 
example, more than 2500 workers at the Cheviot Jute mill stopped work in 
'sympathy with the workers on strike in the Caledonian Jute Mill'; they 
even made (unsuccessful) attempts 'to bring out the workers of the 
Budge Budge Jute Mill' in support of the same cause. 
F'or more than fifty years, however - that is, for the entire period 
under consideration - this emergent identity of belonging to a class 
remained enmeshed in other narrower and conflicting identities of the 
jute worker such as those emanating from his religion, language, 
habitat, etc. The 'gulf between the ... Hindustani [i.e. Hindi-speaking] 
and Bengali workers', the lack of 'strong fraternal ties' between them, 
always presented the trade union organizer with special problems of 
working-class unity.^ Sometimes the 'gulf was so large, that 'the 
Bengali labourer [would] not bathe in the same tank with the Hindustani 
labourer' as they considered the latter ' d i r t y A n d there was besides, 
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the perpetual problem of what (in the language of Indian nationalism) is 
called the 'communal question', i.e. the problem of antagonism between 
Hindu and Muslim labourers. Thus, its impressive manifestations 
notwithstanding, the class-identity of the jute-mill workers remained 
remarkably fragile and easily gave place to the other identities 
created by race and religion. 
This was most dramatically revealed in the 1930s and '40s when the 
workers' hostility towards their employers was matched by an equally 
strong sense of hostility between large sections of the workers themselves, 
resulting in a series of bitter feuds between Hindus and Muslims. There 
was for example a 'serious' riot between Hindu and Muslim workers at 
Gouripur (24 Parganas) at the time of the Bakr Id festival in 1932.^ 
Extreme feelings of hostility between the Hindu and the Muslim workers 
of the Oriental Jute Mill at Budge Budge were reported on the occasion of 
the Bakr Id festival in March 1934, while 'at Shyamgunge, at the site of 
the G.D. Birla Jute Mill to the south of Budge Budge', violence erupted 
between the two groups and 'a very ugly situation likely to have resulted 
in bloodshed' was averted only by strong police action.^ On the 3rd June 
of the following year the Muslim workmen at the India Jute Mills at 
the Serampore abstained from work and fought with 'brickbats and soda-
water bottles' attempts by local Hindus to demolish what they, the 
Muslims, regarded as a mosque.^ 'Tense feelings' and 'a likelihood of a 
fracas' between Hindus and Muslims at Kamarhati and Titagarh were reported 
to the police in 1938.^° In Titagarh and Kankinara, the Hindus and the 
Muslims took turns in complaining to the government about each other's 
unfriendliness. In June 1938, the 'Hindus of Kankinara' wrote to the 
government describing a riot between them and the Muslims 'during the 
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Holi festival day last' when 'several' Hindus were injured and 'one 
killed'. Besides, 'Hindu houses' and women were attacked 'in front of 
the Kankinara big mosque'. The news of this incident, said the Hindus, 
'ran into the city like ... wildfire and Mussalmans began to assault 
Hindus wherever they found them lonely [sic]'.^^ A petition from some 
60 Muslims of Titagarh in October 1938 on the other hand complained 
of Hindu arrogance in playing music before Muslim mosques during the 
celebration of Hindu festivals. In his note on this petition, H.J. 
Twynam, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, admitted 
that it was 'unfortunately true that a state of communal tension exists 
at Titagarh at present' and pointed out that 'numbers taking part in 
the Durga Puja procession [this year] were a good deal above normal 
In March 1939, the situation turned ugly once again when the 
celebration of the Hindu festival of Holi was marred by an outbreak of 
Hindu-Muslim riots among the mill-hands of Metriabruj, Titagarh, 
Khardah, Kamarhati, Naihati and Jagaddal, in which both lives and 
properties were lost.^^ Tension between the two groups was evident again 
in 1940 when the government felt constrained to refuse permission to 
'the Hindus of Kamarhati' to take out a religious procession 'at 
Kamarhati Agarpara Jute Mill [coolie] line'. The government based its 
decision on the ground that 'the processionists definitely refused to 
proceed unless allowed to go a r m e d ' . I n March 1940, a communal riot 
at Bansberia in Hooghly was acknowledged by the government to have had 
'injurious reactions on Hindu-Muslim relationship in the Mill area 
generally'. ^ ^ The state of feelings can be gu^ged from the way the ^ 
members of the two communities often proceeded to describe each other. 
On 11 March 1940 some Muslims of Gouripur wrote to the government 
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asking for protection from attacks by Hindus. The letter described the 
upcountry Hindu workers of 'the jute mill area in the suburb[s] of 
Calcutta' as 'deadly enemies of Muslims', their 'cherish[ed] desire ... 
[being] to harrass and oppress' the latter.^® These antagonisms received 
an ultimate and gruesome expression in 'the communal riots of 1946-47 
and ... the subsequent riots of 1950' which, to quote Indrajit 
Gupta, 'particularly affected the jute mill areas of Barrackpore, 
Hooghly and Howrah'.^^ 
At first sight, these conflicts of race and religion among the 
workers may appear to reveal a totally different aspect of the workers' 
consciousness than that expressed through conflicts between the workers 
and the authorities (eg. strikes). In every instance of jute workers' 
strikes, however, 'there [was] aJiiMa.ij6 ... the po6i>i.biJLU:y\ as the 
government put it in 1929, 'of communal and even racial clashes'.^® 
At the very height of the general strike of 1937, the government noticed 
'acute communal [i.e. Hindu-Muslim] tension' among the workers in the 
mill-towns of Kankinara, Jagaddal, Khardah and Kamarhati. The tension 
had in fact been 'augmented by the strikes' in which 'the Muhammadans 
[were] very unwilling' to participate. 
At Jagatdal [the government said], one Muhammadan 
Sardar of Meghna Mill - Mulla sardar - had kept 
Meghna running by bringing in his Muhammadan workers 
of the mill in a body. They were one day attacked by 
the Hindu strikers (Rajputs) of Anglo-India Middle 
Mill ... and there is great ill-feeling over this 
on both sides.^ ^  
One can adduce more such instances of strikes turning into 'communal' 
conflicts. In March 1937, a strike at the Birla Jute Mills ended in a race 
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riot between the strikers and the 'loyal' workers, the strikers being 
'local Bengalee men' and the loyal workers, Hindi-speaking upcountry 
people.^" A very similar situation occurred at the National Jute Mill in 
December 1938 with the difference that here the lines of division between 
the 'strikers' and the 'non-strikers' were based on religion and not 
language. The result was a Hindu-Muslim riot 'on the morning of the 
5th [December]' as the authorities tried to re-open the mill with the help 
of the non-strikers. A police report said: 
About 400 workers attended [the mill]. Almost the 
whole of these men were Muhammadans. About 7 0'Clock 
a crowd of about 300 men composed of recently 
dismissed workers and strikers attacked the cooly 
lines of the men who were working in the mill. The 
Muhammadan coolies working in the mill received ... 
information [of this] and seizing weapons from the 
mill rushed out to defend their quarters [and] 
a riot started between the two parties - the one 
party being mainly Muhammadan and the other mainly 
Hindu 
Here is another example. Six Hindu spinners of the Standard Jute Mills 
were dismissed in November 1938 for assaulting the manager. Their 
dismissal caused a strike on 14 November and resulted soon in sympathetic 
strikes at a few other mills, forcing the closure of five of them, the 
strike thus affecting some 30,000 workers altogether. This was no doubt 
an impressive instance of workers' solidarity against the employers. On 
the night of the 16th November, however, 'a free fight' ensued between 
'the strikers and the loyal workers at Tittagarh', which, the government 
reported, 'later took the form of a communal [Hindu-Muslim] riot [in which] 
one man was killed and several persons injured'.^^ When the local authorities 
tried to arrange a peace-making meeting of the leaders of the two 
communities, 'it was found difficult to persuade the speakers to discuss 
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the communal trouble without reference to the strike in the local mills'. 
The Muslims resented 'being out of work because the Hindus \i/ish[ed] to 
strike'. At this meeting, it \i/as reported, 'the Flahomedans continually 
referred to the fact that all the workers [were] without wages because 
6 Hindus [had] a disagreement with the management'.^^ 
These strikes and the religious and racial riots discussed before 
help to isolate an important aspect of the jute workers' culture that 
we wish to emphasize here. Clearly, this culture was capable of generating 
militant protests and an anti-employer outlook, as the discussion here 
and in the preceding two chapters will have made clear. It would appear 
that the workers did have an awareness of being poor and oppressed and 
on occasions gave some remarkable demonstrations of a sense of solidarity 
against their employers. Yet all collective public actions of the 
workers were marked by an inherent ambiguity. An act of revolt against 
the authorities, e.g. a strike, always had the potential of turning 
into its opposite, a fight among the workers themselves, e.g. a religious 
riot; a religious or racial riot, on the other hand, contained a necessary 
element of rebellion against authority, an extreme manifestation of 
which were the strikes based on 'religious' or 'racial' demands. 
This duality characteristic of the collective and public acts of the 
working class usually receives explanations that are either narrowly 
political or political-economic in orientation. None of these explanations, 
we shall argue, gives us any clues to the nature of the consciousness 
that was expressed in the ambiguity inherent in collective actions by 
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jute workers. Expressive of a class-mentality that had been, as it were, 
caught for ever in a state of incipience (being perpetually inter-twined 
with religious and ethnic mentality), this duality was rooted in something 
we have emphasized throughout this study: the pre-bourgeois nature of 
the jute worker's culture. The question of the development of class 
consciousness among industrial workers in a society where relationships 
retain a predominantly pre-capitalist character is thus - we will finally 
seek to show - far more problematic and open ended than is usually 
conceded in optimistic histories of the Indian working class. 
II 
Sympathetic observers of the working class often explain the weakness 
of worker-solidarity in terms of the seeds of division deliberately sown 
among workers by the interested people from the ruling classes (naturally 
including the employers). We should listen carefully to their argument 
- especially as it applies to the present context - for it is not without 
some force to it. 'The real gravity of this communal disruption', wrote 
Indrajit Gupta, referring to Hindu-Muslim riots in the jute-mill areas 
in the 1950s, 'lies in the latent anti-Muslim sentiments lAikich hcivz 
{^OitOAZd among the non-Muslim workers ... by the poisonous anti-Pakistan 
propaganda carried on by reactionary leaders ...'. The workers had been 
'provoked and incited by communal reactionaries into regarding their ... 
fellow workers as enemies'.^^ 
Stated so baldly, this sounds like a crude theory of manipulation 
and conspiracy. Yet we could do worse than Gupta by ignoring altogether 
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the existence of such 'provocation' and 'incitements'. For example, in the 
same letter of 1940 in which the Muslim mill-hands of Naihati described 
their up-country Hindu fellow-workers as 'deadly enemies to Muslims', 
they also made a pointed reference to the doings of the Arya Samaj 
which, in their view exacerbated such 'enmity'. Thanks to 'the activities 
of the Arya Samaj' over 'the last two years', the letter told the 
government, the Hindu workers' hostility had turned to 'open violence'. 
The latter's decision to take out processions on the day of the Holi 
festival - 'with a large number of armed Hindu Gundas with exciting 
slogans full of abuse to Muslims and their faith', accompanied by 'a lorry 
full of brickbats and soda water bottles' that were hidden from view by 
'15 strong durwans of the Gouripur Jute Mill' sitting on them - was, 
according to the letter, quite a new feature in Hindu-Muslim relations 
in that area. So, allegedly, was also the Hindu demand that they be 
allowed to play music while passing by mosques. 'This year', the authors 
warned, 'the situation appears more grave [due to] the increased activities 
of the Arya Samajists combined with [those of] the disciples of Shyama 
Prasad and Mo[o]nje' 
On the side of the Muslim worker, too, much of the sensitivity he 
showed towards religious issues in the 1930s and '40s had to do with the 
activities of the Muslim league, of politicians like H.S. Suhrawardy and 
the backing they recijeved in these years from the employers and the 
government. The strike-wave of 1936-38, the prospect of India's self-rule, 
and the success of the Bengali left at the elections of 1937 (in which 
all the eight labour seats were won by them) had unnerved the European 
employers and the British bureaucrats in Calcutta. To many of them 
'labour conditions' now looked like 'becoming increasingly difficult'.^' 
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Their nervousness vi/as reflected in their reactions to the jute workers' 
general strike of 1937. Arguing from the premise that the strike could 
not have had a 'real economic basis ... [as] otherwise labour surely would 
have protested long before',^® the employers soon talked themselves into 
believing their own, imagined scenario of an imminent Bolsheyik 
revolution. The strike was 'purely political', declared I.J.M.A., 'with 
the workers being exploited for communistic and political purposes having 
as their object the overthrow of ordered government'.^^ That this was not 
an act of empty grandstanding by I.J.M.A. is suggested by the following 
private note from Benthall to one of his colleagues in 1937: 
What we have to be careful about [wrote Benthall] 
is that congress or the Communists do not form 
proper Labour Unions - "proper" in the sense that 
they conform with the definitions of the [Trade Union] 
Act and use those unions as the nuclei of revolution 
in accordance with the standard Communist method of 
working.^ ° 
The militant mood of the workers only confirmed some of the worst fears 
of the employers and the government. An official report on 'Strikes in 
various jute mills in the district of 24 Parganas' in 1937 described the 
'general attitude which has been growing among mill workers' as 'one of 
defiance' and concluded that 'there is no doubt whatever that communistic 
ideas are rapidly spreading among them', producing 'a contempt for and 
defiance of authority'.^^ Understandably therefore the authorities were 
more than pleased to be assured by H.S. Suhrawardy, the labour minister 
in the new ministry, that his Muslim League unions were 'the best antidote 
to communism', that his men were 'at least taught two things' - as he 
told Benthall over a private lunch in 1940 - 'respect for the employer 
and respect for the government'.^^ Suhrawardy's strident advocacy of 
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anti-communism had caught their attention even earlier and his success 
in weaning a substantial section of the Calcutta dock workers away from 
the Communists during a strike of 1934 had won him praise from the 
government and the employers alike.^^ The bond between Muslim league 
ministers like Suhrawardy or Khwaja Nazimuddin and the European employers 
was further reinforced by the fact that the new ministry depended for its 
survival on the support of the European bloc in the Bengal Legislative 
Assembly. The ministry therefore - as Nazimuddin was reported to have 
said to a colleague of Benthall's - was 'particularly anxious ... to avoid 
a break with the Europeans, especially over labour p o l i c y T h e employers 
responded warmly to the gesture. Benthall advised his friends in Bird 
and Company to 'go on keeping in close touch with Shaheed [Suhrawardy]',^^ 
and proceeded to congratulate 'Fazl [sic] Huq, Shaheed and [Nazimuddin] 
... on the capable way in which ... [they had] ... met the menace of 
communism that surrounded the [1937] jute mill strike'.^^ This was 
followed up by a round of lunches and dinners and men like Suhrawardy 
were now allowed a degree of 'familiarity' and 'intimacy' with the 
European businessmen which surely would have been denied to most other 
Indians. Benthall's description of a private lunch he once hosted for 
Suhrawardy in 1940 ended as followed: 
My guest had two helpings of each course and finished 
off with a large cigar which by 3.30 pm. proved too 
much for him. After being revived with ice water, he 
decided it was time to get back to work and departed 
• 3 8 
with many pleasant personal compliments. 
The support that the jute-mill owners gave to the Muslim League unions 
was not simply confined to dinners and lunches, however. Suhrawardy, on 
his part, clearly saw them as an important source of funds for his 
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organizations. 'To get these [White Flag] unions going', he told 
Chapman Mortimer in 1937, 'vi/e need money, and my proposal is that the 
[jute] Mills should provide this'. Asked if any possible public knowledge 
of such funding would not be too embarrassing, his calculated reply was 
that 'no one would know'.^^ It is difficult to tell from the evidence of 
the Benthall papers to what extent Suhrawardy succeeded in achieving this 
objective, but of active employer-support for his Muslim League Unions 
we are left in no doubt. I.J.M.A. assured him in July 1937 that the 
'Association Mills had consistently refused to have anything to do with 
the self-styled labour leaders, to wit the communist agitators who were 
the casue of all trouble'. Instead, they 'would be prepared to recognize 
... [Suhrawardy' s unions] and deal with them'.''° Once, when Suhrawardy 
complained to a high official of Bird and Company about the attitudes of 
some of their jute-mill officers towards his unions, the gentleman 'asked 
Mr S., if he had any complains of this nature, to ask Lewis or anyone 
else he pleases to send them pfvivatilty to me so that I could investigate 
them'.'*^ Benthall offered him similar advice from time to time: 
I said that so far as building up Labour Unions is 
concerned, our greatest difficulty was the personnel 
that he [Suhrawardy] employed and the cases that he 
brought up. As regards personnel, "If only he could 
establish cI.06Z working conditions with the managers 
he would make wonderful progress with the Trade 
Unions. Further, I said that the mistake which his 
Unions made was to take up bad cases ... He could save 
himself much trouble and build up more quickly if he 
could instruct his chosen men to approach our 
organization pnyivaXzly to find out whether the case 
was good or not.'*^ 
Now, a major ingredient of the 'antidote to communism' that 
Suhrawardy wanted to administer to the working class was an emphatic 
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assertion of Hindu-Muslim differences. In the appeal to religion he 
found an answer to communism. The Communist trade unionist A.M.A. Zaman 
made the following complaint to the government in July 1937: 
One Mr. Mohiuddin of Howrah, in the name of the 
Hon ble Labour Minister [Suhrawardy], is forming 
several unions on communal basis in Bhadreswar 
P[olice] S[tation] area and Serampore P.S. area ... 
[He] is carrying on his propaganda with some 
called Maulvis and religious heads against my 
lawful union. 
Zaman did not fabricate his complaint. On 23rd August 1937 the Police 
Superintendent of Hooghly warned the District Magistrate of the trends 
of 'the last two months' which showed that there was 'a danger that the 
rivalry between the unions of Zaman and Mohiuddin may develop on communal 
lines and that Mohiuddin has definitely been trying to detach the 
Muhammadans from Zaman's union by using the religious appeal'.'*'^ He also 
quoted another Intelligence Boranch report (of 8th August 1937) which 
described 'the Maulana of the Dalhousie Jute Mill mosque [as having] 
indulged in enlisting members on behalf of Mohiuddin on communal basis 
by saying that Zaman was not a true Muhammadan ... that no true Muslim 
could join it [Zaman's union] ... [and] that the Muhammadan workers 
who helped the Hindu strikers with money etc. were 
The activities of parties like the Arya Samaj or the Muslim League 
thus have to be taken into account in any attempt at a comprehensive 
historical understanding of religious conflict among the jute workers 
in the 1930s and later. But what made the Muslim League unions into a 
specially effective force in the 1930s was not simply their religious 
appeal but also the support they received from the employers. In their 
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propaganda to the ordinary vuorkers, Suhravi/ardy' s men made a point of 
mentioning the fact of this support, thus adding to the heavenly rewards 
of being a 'true Muslim' the promise of some tangible, concrete and 
immediate materialbenefits as well. 'Mohinddin's party' , we read in the same 
police file as mentioned above, enlisted members '[by] saying that his 
union [was] the true Muslim union and [that] it [was] being backed by 
the mill companies. Labour Mininister and the government'. At this, the 
report added, 'many Muhammadans who were of Zaman's party were enlisting 
their names in Mohiuddin'soffice' . Some of these new members gave the 
following as their reasons for joining Suhrawardy's union (note especially 
points 2, 4 and 5): 
1. That the union was the true union of the Muhammadans. 
2. That the rents of the coolie lines will be removed. 
3. That the sardars who ... take bribes will be discharged. 
4. That all the appointments and discharge will be made 
by the companies according to the instructions of the 
Presidents and the Secretaries of the Unions. 
5. That the union will be patronised by the ministers, it 
being a union of the Moslem L e a g u e . 
Indrajit Gupta's argument, then, that the jute workers were 
'victim[s] of all sorts of fissparious tendencies and disruptive prop-
aganda' or that they were 'always liable to be provoked and incited by 
communal reactionaries into regarding their ...fellow workers as 
enemies' is not to be laughed away. Yet the poverty of this formulation 
is obvious in the statement itself. One can turn Gupta's expression 
around and ask: why were the workers 'always liable' to be provoked into 
divisive conflicts? 
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The tradition of Hindu-Muslim riots predates even the form-
ation of the Muslim League (1906) and cannot be explained by the 
latter's politics alone. Elsewhere I have documented and analyzed some of 
these riots that occurred in the mid-1890s, and in which the mill-hands 
of Standard Jute Mills, Titaghur Jute Mills, Titaghur Paper Mills, Lower 
Hooghly Jute Mills, Upper Hooghly Jute Mills and Hastings Jute Mills 
were involved.''^ Riots of this kind punctuate jute workers' history for 
the entire period under consideration. 'A disturbance took place at 
Naihati at the BakA-l-Jd of 1898 with reference to the kuAbanl [animal 
(cow) sacrifice]', wrote the Commissioner of The Presidency Division in 
1900. 'The Muhammadan mill-hands of Gouripur wanted to sacrifice kine at 
Garifa, a village near Naihati, to which the Hindus objected', and this 
led to the disrurbance.® Two years later, in 1900, the Hindu mill-hands 
of Naihati were reported to be 'still bitterly opposed to the slaughter 
of kine there'. The District Magistrate of the 24 Pargana wrote: 'The 
feeling among the Hindu hands of the Gouripore Jute Mill is evidenced by 
the serious riots which broke out on the 12th April 1900 on the mere 
suspicion, which proved groundless, that a calf had been killed by the 
Muhammadans'. '[An] excited crowd of Hindi mill-hands armed with IcutlvU,^  
broke into the Muhammadan quarter and proceeded to wreck the houses and 
beat the occupants who were chiefly women and children.'"^® 
In the years that followed, Muslim and Hindu religious festivals 
like Bakr Id, Muharram, Holi, Durga.Puja continued to be the occasions 
when serious divisions surfaced between the two groups of mill-hands 
resulting sometimes in violent disputes. Bakr Id disturbances, for 
instance, were reported from Telinipara (Hooghly) in 1913. Another 
Hindu-Muslim riot among the workers of the Angus Jute Mill in the same 
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year - during which 'the Muhammadans of the Angus Mill went dou/n to the 
Northbrook Mill to get help from thier eo-religionists' - was explained 
by the authorities as 'a relic of the Tittagarh riots many years ago'.^° 
Telnipara was to become a scene of 'prolonged rioting' in 1922 and by 
1926 the official practice of posting "a small force of military police' 
there 'during important Muhammadan festivals' was considered to be a 
'customary' one. 'A few men [were] also sent to Champdany and Rishra', 
the other important mill-areas where violent conflicts between Hindus 
and Muslims were always a strong possibility.^^ Bakr Id riots occurred 
at the Garden Reach area in 1924 when '600 Hindus attacked a group of 
300 Muslims who were ... performing Ko^ban-l [and] killed one and wounded 
37'.^^ In October 1926 the Hindu and the Muslim mill-hands at Naihati 
fought each other with 'lathis, bayonets and naked swords' after the 
Hindus placed 'an idol on the ground near a mosque', allegedly to 
'insult' the Muslims.^^ In March 1927, to give another example, the 
Muslim labourers at Serampore began to assert their 'right to kill cows' 
as a result of 'Hindu Muslim tension regarding music before mosques'.^** 
Tension between the two communities was also reported in 1927 from 
Ramkrishnapur in Howrah (where 'there was a disturbance during the last 
VufiQCL P u j ' a festival') and Rishna in Hooghly.^^ The issue of 'music before 
mosques', especially at the time of Hindu religious festivals, often 
caused serious rioting at Titagarh and Kankinara till a 'committee of 
Hindu [and] Muslim leaders was formed [at Kankinara in 1927] ... [to] 
avoid rioting on the day of the immersion of Durga pratima [idol, image] 
A more determined search would no doubt produce many more examples 
of such religious or racial conflicts in the jute workers' history. One 
could of course explore the individual and unique nature of the circumstances 
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surrounding the origins of each of these outbreaks and stress the role 
played at different times by organizations like the Arya Samaj or the 
Muslim League (or their likes) in making the workers deviate from the path 
of class-solidarity. But one could also question the fragile nature of 
this solidarity itself and inquire into the reasons for its fragility 
in the case of the Calcutta jute-mill workers. Narrowly political 
explanations emphasizing 'provocations' and 'incitements' do not throw 
any light on questions of underdeveloped class-consciousness. 
Ill 
Let me anticipate here an answer usually offered in response to 
these questions by scholars who expect 'economic' factors to act as the 
ultimate limits on - if not as the determinants of - the course of 
human history. The very structure of the labour market in the jute 
industry, it will be said, created conditions conducive to the growth 
of racial and religious conflicts that were subversive of class-
solidarity. Two significant aspects of the labour market would be of 
crucial importance to this argument: the sardari method of recruitment 
and control which emphasized the primordial ties of the worker, and the 
keen competition for employment inevitable in a market which was 
overstocked with unemployed labourers and where the unskilled nature of 
work made every single worker easily replaceable. These factors would seem 
to make it understandable that the workers should find their religious, 
linguistic and geographical bonds useful in obtaining and retaining 
employment. Did not religious or racial clashes, then, ultimately reflect 
the competitive nature of the labour market which, thanks to its 
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organization, reinforced religious and racial solidarities? The problem of 
working-class unity and the question of class-consciousness would then 
appear amenable to an explanation (and solution) that gave primacy to 
the economic. 
It is of course undeniable that, in their concern to create and 
maintain a steady supply of cheap unskilled labour, the jute-mill 
owners developed a labour market in which a host of 'informal' relations 
and methods came to acquire important economic functions necessary for 
the running of the industry (see Chapter 3 above). For the mill workers, 
kinship and village connections often provided the network for the flow 
of information regarding the state of the market. One heard of and obtained 
employment through these connections. Foley, who investigated the labour 
market for the Calcutta industrial belt in 1905-6, noted this while 
travelling in the district of Saran (Bihar). 'I believe', he said, 'the 
rates and conditions of work in the Calcutta industries are well known in 
this district'. 
There is a constant i'low to and from the mills, and 
one man will inform a whole village as to what his 
earnings and his work have been. To test this I 
attended a chaukidari parade. Several chaukidars told 
me, as I thought correctly, what some weavers from 
their village had made in a Jute Mill, and a third 
seemed to know a good deal about jute presses.^^ 
The importance of these family or village or other community ties 
was stressed in many of the interviews of individual jute workers, recorded 
for the Royal Commission on Labour in 1929. 'My brother is working in the 
Standard [Jute] Mill; I got my job through my brother', said Prakash, a 
boy from U.P., who worked at the Titaghur Jute Mills. Kalil, a weaver 
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from Ghazipur (U.P.) owed his job at the Anglo-India Jute Mills to his 
uncle who did 'weaving work in this mill'. Jamrath, an 'ordinary weaver' 
at Titagarh 'secured [his] employment through one of [his] village men 
who was working in the mill'. Lachanao, a migrant boy-worker, had 'heard 
from his father that there was work in the mill'. Behari Rai, an up-
country spinner at the Angus Jute Mill, had heard about vacancies at the 
mill from 'some of his village folks' who worked there. Noormahamad, a 
weaver at Titagarh who was born in Jaunpur (U.P.) was 'only a boy ... when 
his mother was compelled to send him to work in some of the jute mills in 
Calcutta, being advised to do so by many of her well-wishers some of 
whom were mill employees of this province'. The fact that 'so many of 
his villagers were in the wearing [department]' aroused in Noormahamad 
the ambition to become a weaver. The final realization of this ambition 
was also something that he owed to his village connections. '[He] used to go 
in his leisure to the Weaving Department to help his villagers in their 
work ... [and] thus acquired good practice in the art of weaving'. Dar 
Basona, to give another example, came to Calcutta from Madras along with 
a co-villager 'who was a jute mill worker' and found, through his help, 
'cooly's job' at Titagarh. Abdu] Khan, another jute worker, was brought 
from Gaya to Calcutta by a cousin 'who was a sirdar in the Champdeny 
Jute Mills' and who 'had him admitted in the said mill as a shifter boy 
in the Spinning Department'. 
Very similar were the stories of Birc, an Oriya 'calendar cooly' 
at the Champdany Jute Mills, Jumrathi Miah, Khedoo Miah, and Mohan Noonia, 
the first two being weavers and the last a worker in the Machine 
Sewing Department of the Victoria Jute Mills. Biro came to Rishra from 
Cuttack 'with one of his countrymen' who worked at Rishra and 'through 
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his help he secured a job as a drawing cooly in Rishra Jute Mills', 
Jumrathi came from Bal^a (U.P.) 'with his brother who was a weaver in 
Victoria Mill ... [and] at once obtained employment in the Spinning 
Department', Khedoo had been sent by his father 'with some of his fellow-
villagers to look for work in a jute mill'; and Noonia, another person 
t 
from Balsia, was found employment at the Shamnagar Jute Mill 'by a relative 
who was a worker in that Mill'. At the apex of the network of such 
relations of course stood the 6aAdcUi with his methods of recruitment and 
control that we have already described in chapter 3. 'In some of the mills', 
the Royal Commission was informed by the Kankinarrah Labour Union, 'if the 
Burra [Head] Sirdar (weaving supervisor) happens to be native of Chapra 
district, most of his men (weavers) under him are relatives of Chapra' 
5 
Apart from the question of employment, the insecurity of the jute 
worker's life - caused by poor wages and the absence of service-rules -
gave his village, racial or religious ties a new economic significance 
in the city. Since the mills discouraged family migration (see chapters 1 
and 3), most jute workers retained some links with their villages. Data 
collected for eleven jute manufacturing concerns in 1929 showed that the 
'number of non-Bengali persons born in Jute Mill lines or neighbourhood 
who have been employed solely in Jute Mills and who do not normally leave 
the neighbourhood for a native village' to be about 2.57 per cent of the 
total number employed by these concerns.^^ Moreover, in the absence of 
service-rules, employment in the mills was rather irregular. The majority 
of the jute workers were, in the words of R.N. Gilchrist, 'short service 
workers'-®" Dargmar Curjel was told by several mill-managers during her 
investigations in 1922-23 that about one-third of the workers in any 
mill were always 'on the move'.®^ Information collected from eleven mills 
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in 1929 regarding the 'length of service' of their labourers is 
summarized in the table below. It will be seen that more than sixty 
per cent of the workers had worked in their respective mills for less 
than five years, even though it was always believed that employment in 
the jute industry was the only source of livelihood for the majority of 
the millhands, at least some ninety per cent.®^ 
In a life characterized by poverty and such insecurity of work, a 
labourer's need for economic and physical support from his or her 
kinsmen (real or putative), linguistic or religious community, naturally 
extended far beyond the stage of obtaining employment. These traditional 
relationships impinged on several aspects of the worker's daily life. 
Two contrasting pieces of evidence go to show how crucial such support 
could be even to the question of sheer physical survival of the worker. 
The Civil Surgeon of Howrah made an enquiry in 1912 into the circumstances 
of the '100 or 150' people who died every year at the Howrah General 
Hospital of 'dysentery, diarrhoea and other similar diseases which [could] 
be attributed ... to starvation'. The inquiry revealed that these men were 
'the flotsam and jetsam' of the labour market in Howrah, people who for 
some reason lacked the support of village or kinship connections in the 
city. Such labourers, the Civil Surgeon said, 
have great difficulty about cooking their food as 
they have not the means to provide themselves with 
suitable huts and have not the opportunity to cook 
their food properly; they live on parched grain or 
other indigestible diet with the result that they get 
bowel troubles which with ordinary suitable treatment 
and diet would be of little account. They become too 
weak and, their money exhausted, they then lie up in 
some corner of a_hut or even in the open air and 
practically starve until ... the police bring them to 
the hospital in a perfectly hopeless situation.®^ 
TABLE 18 
Name of Mill 
(I) 
Proportion of 
total male 
employees working 
less than 5 years 
(II) 
Average 
of (I) 
(?o) 
(III) 
Proportion of 
total female 
employees working 
less than 5 years 
(?o) 
(IW) 
Average 
of (III) 
Gouripur 51.5 66.2 
Shamnagar 61.8 68.7 
Titagarh 57.8 69.5 
Clive 65.8 75.6 
Victoria 68.1 62.2 73 71.6 
Champdani 74.2 71.9 
Hastings 51.6 72 
flowrah 70.7 79.5 
Delta 69 62.7 
Lawrence 63.6 79.3 
Budge Budge 50 69.2 
Source: W.B.S.A., Com. Dept Com. Br., April 1930 A19-20, 
hO 
MD 
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In complete contrast \i/as the case of Narsama Kurmi (a female jute worker 
interviewed during the proceedings of the Labour Commission; the story of 
whose survival emphasized at every point the support she had received 
from members of her native 'community'. When she first arrived at 
Howrah from Madras, Narsama 'could not speak ... Hindustani'. Someone 
'she had met on the train ... put her on a tram car and told the driver 
to put her off at the Madrassi [coolie] lines'. 
The tramway man told her to get off about the place 
that she lives in now, and there she saw some 
people of her own country to whom she was able to 
speak. One of the Madrassis took her to a sirdar of the 
mill ... [who] gave her work in his line in Howrah 
[Jute] Mills. 
The ties of language, religion or village thus served the worker 
well in regard to his need for accommodation and shelter. A dismissed 
upcountry worker, the Royal Commission was told, could live in working-
class slums on credit provided by the sardar 'till he got a job'.^^ Such 
help could also be provided by 'relatives'. Mangari and her husband, 
both workers at the Titaghur Jute Mills, were 'posted in the house of a 
relative' of theirs when they first arrived from Madras.®^ So was 
Gobardhan, another worker at the same mill who came to Titagarh from 
upcountry as a young man of twenty. He 'stayed with a relative who 
secured for him a job as a cooly in the Preparing Department in the local 
jute mill' 
In ill-health and bad times, too, the workers often fell back on their 
'traditional' relationships. 'I had fever a year ago', said Gowri, a 
female worker of the Standard Jute Mills who was interviewed by the 
Royal Commission. 
298 
I did not go to the doctor [she said] because I was 
too weak and unable to move, nor did the doctor come 
and see me ... I paid Rs. 3 to Rs. 5 to a man who came 
to my house and treated me. He is a man of my caste, 
but he is not a qualified doctor.®® 
Muthialu was another worker who 'did not go to the doctor' when she 
had eye trouble. She said: 'I put in my eyes the medicine other people 
gave me'.®^ Curjel's investigations of 1922-23 into the condition of 
women workers brought to light the case of a Muslim woman called Mia 
whose existence depended to a large extent on the material assistance 
she received from her co-religionists. Mia was 35 and had three children 
to look after, having been deserted by hier second husband; Curjel found 
her being 'supported by the charity of a number of Mahomedan workers i n t h e 
mill lines' 
In choosing to emphasize (through violent feuds or otherwise) the 
bonds of race or religion, the jute-mill worker did not, therefore, 
behave in an 'irrational' manner. He may have imported a peasant-culture 
into the industrial setting as he migrated from the countryside; but the 
retention of some of the key elements of this culture in his new environ-
ment was not a simple matter of nostalgic behaviour on the part of the 
migrant peasant. The structure of the labour market was such that the 
primordial ties of language, religion or kinship - ties that are especially 
strong in pre-capitalist cultures - had a practical and economic utility 
to the worker in his struggle for survival in the face of poverty and 
insecurity. They helped him protect his standard of living. Is it 
surprising then, it will be asked, that these relationships should bulk 
large in his consciousness and undermine his sense of class solidarity? 
'Utility', the celebrants of Political Economy will tell us, is the key 
to the secrets of consciousness. 
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IV 
In a fundamental sense, however, this understanding misconstrues 
the jute workers' consciousness. The ties of kinship, religion, language 
or race were of course of much economic utility to the jute worker. But 
to see in this 'utility' the workers' Kucuon. for valuing and retaining 
these bonds is to invest the jute worker with a bourgeois rationality, 
since it is only in such a system of rationality that the economic 
utility of an action (or an object, relationship, institution etc.) 
defines its reasonableness.^^ 
The jute workers, on the contrary, acted out of an understanding 
that was pre-bourgois in its elements. It was not that they did not value 
things economic - poverty itself would have often brought home to the 
worker the value of money. Yet the 'economic utility' and the 'reasonableness' 
of an action were different categories, the former often subsumed under 
the latter. A very good example of this is provided by the opinion that 
Behari Rai, a Brahmin upcountry spinner working at the Angus Jute Mill, 
expressed in an interview in 1929 regarding the problem of jute workers' 
indebtedness. Debt was incurred, said Rai, not though whimsical, 
thoughtless action (6hok) on the part of the worker but through 'necessity'. 
He himself would 'never go into debt because he wanted to buy something 
beyond his means'. Yet it is interesting to see what Rai saw as 'necessity', 
'Caste, or fellow men', he said, 'determine[d] how much an individual 
should spend ... [since] caste itself [carried] an obligation as to 
spending'. Being a Brahmin, he was obliged 'to spend far more than if he 
were less highly born'.^^ To Rai then, it only stood to reason that one 
should go into debt, if necessary, in order to protect one's honour and 
300 
position within one's caste even though the 'economic utility' of such 
ation could indeed be negative. The bourgeois notion of 'utility' thus 
is not of much assistance in understanding a pre-bourgeois consciousness 
such as Rai's.^^ 
There was another important aspect to this consciousness - the 
absence of individualism and individualistic identities that mark a bourgeois 
culture. The individual jute mill worker never appeared 'in the dot-like 
isolation' in which Marx placed the individual industrial worker belonging 
to a bourgeois society; the jute worker in Calcutta always conducted 
himself - to use Marx's words again - 'only as a link, as a member' of 
a 'community' defined, somewhat ambiguously, by the primordial links of 
religion, language, habitat etc.^** 
The point can be illustrated by exploring the jute worker's sense 
of 'honour' which, as seen in the last chapter, often informed working-
class protest in the jute mills.'People of my district do not bring their 
families to these industrial areas here', said Abdul Hakim, a jute-mill 
worker from the Darbhanga district in Bihar when he was interviewed by 
the Royal Commission on labour. 'If I brought my family', he added,'my people 
would laugh at me'.^^ 'My wife does not work [in mills]', explained another 
worker, a Bengali, '[as] in Bengal our wives do not work'.^^ Indeed, so 
dishonourable, in Bengali eyes, was factory-work for women that almost all 
of the Bengali women interviewed by the Factory Commission of 1890 
declared that they would not let their daughters become mill-workers unless 
they were really desperate. Digambari, a woman working at the Howrah 
Jute Mill said: 'Unless Bengali women are widows, they do not come to 
work in mills'.^^ Sookvaria, a woman from Chapra, however, was of a 
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decidedly contrary opinion -'she [would] bring her daughter to work when 
she [was] sufficiently old It is clear that the sense of honour 
expressed in these statements referred back to a notion of 'community' 
which the workers saw as the ultimate arbiter and dispenser of honour 
and shame. The worker's identity was merged in that of the 'community'. 
In the examples given above, 'community' was primarily defined by 
habitat and 1 anguage. In addition to these two factors, religion was 
another, perhaps the strongest, source of a notion of 'community' and 
therefore of a communal sense of identity and honour as well. In the 
statement of Behari Rai quoted earlier on, his sense of honour was clearly 
a part of his overall sense of belonging to a community of 'fellow-men', 
the 'community' being defined here by the ties of caste (hence kinship) 
and religion. Gopen Chakravarty, the Bolshevik leader mentioned in our 
chapter on organization, has left us a graphic account of how important 
religion was in giving the jute workers a sense of 'morality' and 
'honour'. In 1928 Chakravarty and his comrades organized an historic 
march of industrial workers in the jute mill areas. 'The plan had a two-
fold objective - the first was to rally support of the entire working 
class of Bengal behind this struggle [strikes of 1928] and secondly to 
rouse and organise the jute workers through the process.' In Chakravarty's 
words: 
VJe took the marchers to the bank of the Ganges. There 
they rested while we went to the market to purchase 
[food] ... It was then that we received a shock. The 
marchers, who had remained firm in class battle and net 
flinched in the face of bullets, would not dine together 
- so deep was their prejudice of caste and religion. As 
they put it, "Jan dene sakta, lekin dharam nehi dene 
sakta" [We can give our lives but not sacrifice our 
religion].^ ^  
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A worker, it would seem, would rather suffer than be put to shame in the 
eyes of his 'community'. Kamala, a drawing machine feeder at the Howrah 
Jute Mill told the Royal Commission on Labour that her husband had been 
sick and unemployed for the past three months at the time of her interview. 
Kamala therefore had been 'obliged to borrow the sum of Rs. 20 ... [paying] 
interest at the rate of Rs. 2.8 per month'. Living, as Kamala herself put 
it, was 'very hard now'. Yet her husband refused to 'take medicine from 
the mills dispensary' and the reason he gave is significant in the 
context of our present discussion: '[he] says it will break his caste'. 
Being a 'virtuous Muslim', simiarly, was a matter of honour. It was 
to this communal sense of honour that the Muslim League trade unions 
appealed, for instance, as we have seen above. Noormahamad, the Titagarah 
Jute Mill weaver quoted earlier, prided himself on being a 'virtuous 
Muslim'. He drank tea 'twice daily', smoked bAJvl, and 'at the weekends 
[was] in the habit of going to the cinema in Calcutta' but 'being rather 
a virtuous Muhammadan himself, [he had] never indulged in any other vice'.®^ 
The question of honour (or shame or insult) of an individual was thus 
subsumed under the notion of communal honour. An insult inflicted on an 
individual member of the community, howsoever defined at the time in 
question, could be construed as an insult to the whole community. And 
conversely, the individual perpetrating the insult could easily be seen 
as acting on behalf of another community. This is why racial or religious 
conflicts could be sparked off by events which historians often regard 
as 'trivial'. A 'serious communal trouble' was 'provoked' at Naihati in 
March 1934 (during the Id festival) by 'a Muhammadan boy ... running 
through the streets with hands covered with blood and shouting and 
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cheering, and secondly, [by] another Muhammadan ... washing [sacrificial] 
meat at a public hydrant'.®^ At Budge Budge the same year a Hindu-Musli im 
riot started 'through [a] Muhammadan taking meat for his own consumption 
into the [coolie] lines of the Orient Jute Mill At the time of 
the Holi festival in 1939, a riot broke out between Hindu and Muslim 
labourers at Metiabruj. According to the government, 'the trouble started 
over a Hindu throwing red water on a Mahomedan without any warning ... 
[when] the Mahomedans attacked the Hindu [coolie] lines in a body'.®'' 
Why were these individual acts, 'trivial' by our judgement, capable 
of provoking such strong and collective reactions? Precisely because 
they were seen as gestures calculated to offend the sense of honour of 
a community. Such a communal sense of honour speaks of the non-
individualistic, pre-bourgeois nature of the identity that the jute-mill 
worker had. And so innate to the worker's consciousness were the identities 
flowing from religion or race that some of the insults and counter-insults 
traded during 'communal' conflicts attained highly codified, symbolic 
forms that were charged with explosive potentials. The playing of music 
by Hindu religious processions in front of mosques, debates over the 
routes through which the sacrificial cow would be taken during the Bakr 
Id festivities, 'alleged desecration of the KoMan', the singing of 
'objectionable songs' by Hindus while passing by mosques - these issues 
figure with monotonous and predictable regularity in all accounts of 
Hindu-Muslim riots among the jute-mill workers.®^ 
Another such issue was the question of women's ^zzat (honour). 
This was once again a question of the honour of the community, which is 
why the 'molestation of women' of one community by men from another was 
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considered a grave communal insult. A 1938 report on a Hindu-I^uslim 
conflict at Kankinara mentioned attacks by Muslim on 'Hindu houses and 
w o m e n ' . A riot between Bengali and upcountry labourers at Baurea in 
November 1928 was caused by a piece of 'false information' reaching the 
Bengalis that the upcountrymen 'had entered [their] ... villages ... and 
had been molesting their womenfolk'.®^ Yet another riot in December 
1938 between the Hindu workers of the National Jute Mill who had gone on 
strike and the 'loyal' Muslim workers broke out when the strikers 
reportedly 'started molesting the women and children in the [Muslim] 
coolie lines' . ® ® 
All this however should not lead us to imagine that the 'communities' 
were separated into water-tight compartments by their irreconcilable 
differences, that the Hindus and the Muslims, for instance, were always 
out for each other's blood. While workers belonged to a culture that 
lacked any idea of the individuality of the individual, their notion of 
a 'community' based on the primordial loyalties of religion, language, 
habitat, kinship etc. could only be ambiguous.®^ This was because a 
'community' defined by such loyalties was necessarily a self-contradictory 
entity. People sharing the same religion for example could be divided by 
language (or habitat) and vice versa. It needs to be emphasized that 
this both lessened and aggravated the danger of the outbreak of any 
particular type of 'communal' conflict. For while in some cases a 
religious unity could be formed that cut across the language or ethnic 
barrier, this barrier itself could in other cases stop a religious 
conflict from spreading. In still other cases, one could have the 
divisions of language and habitat overriding those of religion, as in 
the case of conflict between Bengali workers and the upcountry people. 
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This ambiguity inherent in the notion of primordial 'community' 
however does not take au/ay from our basic argument - that the 'distinctions 
based on birth' - e.g. religion, language, kinship etc. - were central to 
the jute-mill worker's sense of identity. He conducted himself even in 
the 'political' sphere of his life 'only as a link, as a member' of 
mental 'communities' based on these distinctions. He was never, in other 
words, the 'bourgeois citizen' (even though the Indian constitution 
today defines him as such) that Marx described in his early essay 'On 
the Jewish Question'. Unlike in the case of the 'citizen', the jute 
worker's political culture, lacking any bourgeois notions of the equality 
of the individual, had not split him into his 'public' and 'private' 
selves; and he had not, unlike the citizen, relegated all 'the distinctions 
based on birth' to the sphere of the 'private', the non-political. To 
quote Marx on this point: 
The dissolution of man into Jew and citizen, 
Protestant and citizen, religious man and citizen, 
is not a denial of citizenship or an avoidance of 
political emancipation: it is p o l i t i c a l mancipcuU-On 
'Ct6eJL{j, it is the p o t i t l c a l . way of emancipating 
oneself from religion.^" 
In this sense, the jute mill worker had never been 'politically' 
emancipated from religion. Religion therefore - or we could say, ethnicity 
or language or other similar loyalties - formed the stuff of his politics. 
This was so even at moments of confrontation between labour and capital. 
Mobilization for class-battles (e.g. strikes) often based on 
emotional appeals to the primordial ties of the worker and to their 
communal sense of honour and shame. During the 1929 general strike, it 
was publicized by the trade union organizers that Hindu and Muslim 
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u/orkers had sworn by their religions to support the strike. Strike-
breaking, it u/as said, would amount to beef-eating for the Hindu and 
pork-eating for the Muslims.^^ A group of Muslim weavers told the 
authorities of the Birla Jute Mill at the time of the strike that 'if 
they resumed work they would be visited by bands of hooligans from other 
areas on strike and would have half their beards shaved off, which is a 
crowning insult to Mahomedans, the beard having religious significance'. 
Apparently, the threat of dishonouring the womenfolk of non-strike (or 
non-striking; women was also used during this strike. 
9 2 
9 3 
Thus the elements of solidarity that went into the making of 'strikes' 
were not all that different from those that made up a case of racial or 
religious conflict. This was why, as the government had said, 'there [was] 
always a possibility' of racial or religious violence breaking out in 
the middle of a strike by the workers. Whether or not the 'possibility' 
would become an actuality was partly dependent of course on circumstances. 
But we cannot explain the logic of workers' consciousness by referring to 
these circumstances alone. As we have tried to explain here, in the jute 
workers' mind itself, the incipient awareness o^belonging to a class 
remained a prisoner of his pre-capitalist culture. In the absence of 
notions like individualism, citizenship etc. in this culture, the class-
identity of the worker could never be distilled cut of the pre-capitalist 
identities that arose from the relationships he had been born into. This 
of course did not stop him from rebelling and sometimes led to temporary 
but remarkable instances of solidarity, but both the organization and 
solidarity of jute workers retained their essentially fragile nature. 
The class-aspect of the jute workers' consciousness that we have 
encountered in this chapter and in the previous one IA thus explainable 
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in terms of Gramsci's diagnosis of the 'purely Italian concept of 
"subversive"' - 'a negative rather than a positive class position' 
The "people" is aware [wrote Gramsci] that it has 
enemies, but only identifies them empirically as 
the so-called ^ignonl ... This "generic" tiatred is 
still "semi-feudal" rather than modern in character, 
and cannot be taken as evidence of class consciousness 
- merely as the first glimmer of such consciousness, 
in other words, merely as the basic negative, polemical 
attitude. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
In focusing on the questions of culture and consciousness in the 
history of Calcutta jute-mill workers, it has not been our intention 
to replace techno-economic explanations by cultural ones. We do not, for 
instance, see culture as being causally responsible for everything that 
happened in the jute workers' history. Ours has rather been an endeavour 
to question the primary determining role that is usually given to 
technical and economic factors in many Marxian accounts of labour-capital 
relationship. We have in other words opposed a reductionist view of 
culture and consciousness and contended that the inherent logic of a 
particular culture (or consciousness) cannot be derived from a political-
economic argument. 
At the level of empirical history, we have tried to demonstrate that 
even the so-called economic and technological factors operate only 
within a particular cultural context and are in turn influenced by the 
latter. The history of the Calcutta jute workers clearly would have 
been different if the industry had required a more skilled, stable and 
structured labour force - that is to say, if the industry had gone in 
for technological innovation. At first this may sound like a simple 
techno-economic argument. Yet, as we have shown in Chapter 2, the 
question of technological stagnation in the jute industry cannot be 
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separated from the strongly mercantilist mentality of the men who ran 
the managing agencies and this 'mentality' cannot be reduced to any 
single, overriding economic factor. Or take the guestion of 'discipline' 
inside the jute mills. As we have discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, economic 
and technological explanations are of only limited help here. One has to 
take into account the consciousness of the workers, their notions of 
authority and the general cultural traditions of the British colonialists 
in India who always sought to legitimize their presence in terms that 
(they thought) the 'natives' would understand. Hence their attempts to 
imitate what they perceived as Indian forms of authority . 
At a more theoretical level, however, we have (hopefully) drawn 
attention to the point that Marx's analysis of the labour-capital 
relationship within the capitalist method of production takes a hegemonic 
bourgeois culture for granted. And this assumption informs his discussion 
of 'disciplinary authority' of capital and of capitalist production 
relations in general, relations that involve the consciousness of the 
workers. The importance of this assumption in Marx's understanding 
becomes clear when one looks through Marxian categories at a group of 
industrial labourers such as the Calcutta jute workers whose culture was 
pre-capitalist and who belonged to a society where e\/en the elites were 
far from being bourgeois vyy 'Vkiir -D^A^IOOK. 
It is not however simply a question of being clear about 
the nature of Marx's categories that concerns us here. The argument is 
of historiographical and, one liopes, political significance. Historians 
writing about Indian factory workers have not paid any particular 
attention to the pre-bourgeois nature of the worker's culture and 
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consciousness. This is so mainly because the worker's culture has not 
been seen to pose any special problems for the development of class-
consciousness or working-class organization. All problems of class-
consciousness or organization have usually been explained by economic 
or political factors like underdeveloped industrialization or 'reactionary' 
conspiracy and propaganda. Recently, moreover, all these factors have 
been brought together in that one supreme demiurgic concept of modern 
Indian nationalist historiography: colonialism. The result has been a 
neat hut unfortunate argument with respect to the phenomenon and problems 
of class consciousness, an argument that begins by obliterating all 
distinctions of culture and cons^ousness between industrial workers of 
different countries. The first-generation workers -tn atl cou.ntnA.ej,, we 
are told in effect, exhibit certain 6-lmilaA forms of pre-capitalist 
behaviour and mental attitudes, and the guestion as to how these attitudes 
might change into a working-class consciousness is answered in terms of 
changes in the economic structure of the society. Thus a study of the 
Calcutta jute workers' behaviour in the 1870s and '80s has lately 
asserted: 
it should be noted that the sort of responses referred 
to above was not peculiar to factory workers of Bengal 
or India in the seventies and eighties of the last 
century. That in the classic British case and in the 
Initial pQJilod oi all the. lndLi6tnJ,atu>ing counttleJ 
[my emphasis] the early workers behaved by and large 
in a similar fashion is too well known to merit any 
repetition here. 
The second step in this argument states that what really makes a 'class' 
of this mass of factory workers by developing class consciousness in 
their minds is intensive industrialization: 
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But in Britain (.and other industrialising countries 
of the nineteenth century) such problems were 
transient in history — the elements of pre-
capitalist habits of mind arid behaviour, in the 
u/ork er's attitudes or in the total social structure, 
were transcended through the cumulative progress of 
the Industrial Revolution which accounted for the 
transformation of workers into a working class 
within the broader society, and also for the growth 
of working class consciousness and action, ethos and 
culture. 
The third step, then, is to argue that in the Indian case, because 
'genuine capitalist industrialization was ruled out by the colonial 
order', it is 'no wonder that even second or third generation workers 
remained rootless, part human, half proletarian, wretched creatures'. 
Thus 
it may be noted that the kind of activities in which 
the worker in England or France or Germany in the 
early period of industrialisation participated cr the 
economic, political, social outlook exhibited by them 
or the type of organisation they formed, are not to 
be found here [Bengal]. The colonialised character 
of the industrial situation ruled these out. 
So, if the working class in India did not show a developed class 
consciousness, the blame, in this analysis, lies sguarely with 
colonialism.^ 
Yet F.P. Thompson, upon whose authority some of the statements 
guoted above seem to have been based, argued precisely against the 
understanding that 'the Industrial Revolution ... accounted for the 
growth of working class consciousness and action, ethos and culture 
In a celebrated passage of Tfie Making o^ the EnglUk Wo i^fexKtg Clcu>6 
Thompson wrote: 
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The making of the working class is a fact of political 
and cultural, as much as of economic, history. It VL'as 
not the spontaneous generation of the factory system. 
Nor should we think of an external force - the 
'industrial revolution' - working upon some nondescript 
undifferentiated raw material of humanity, and turning 
it out at the other end as a 'fresh race of beings' 
... the Industrial Revolution ... [was] imposed, not 
upon raw material, but upon the free-born Englishman 
- and the free-born Englishman as Paine had left him 
or as the Methodists had moulded him. The factory hand 
or stockinger was also the inheritor of Bunyan, of 
remembered village rights, of notions of equality 
before the law, or craft traditions. He was the 
object of massive religious indoctrination and the 
creator of political traditions. The working class 
made itself as much as it was made.^ 
Here Thompson takes us back to the question of culture and 
consciousness in working-class history. The culture of the working man 
in pre-industrial England had obviously developed certain important 
bourgeois notions such as that of equality before the law. But it does 
not follow that, given the most 'favourable' material conditions, any 
pre-capitalist, pre-industrial culture will develop such notions with 
equal or greater rapidity. While all pre-capitalist cultures share one 
feature in common in that they are all p/ie-capitalist, they of course 
remain very specific and different in terms of their internal logic, 
their inherent mechanisms for the production of meanings. Because they 
differ from one another in these respects, they pose their own special 
problems of transition and change when called upon to perform tasks the 
essential terms of which derive from the Western, bourgeois culture. The 
end-result of this transition is by no means a foregone conclusion and 
this is why we have contended that the question of 'class consciousness' 
must remain an unpredictable, open-ended question in the history of the 
Indian working class. One thing however -06 predictable about this history 
the struggle to change it. 
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Chapter 7 
NOTES 
1. Ranajit Das Gupta, 'Material Conditions and Behavioural Aspects', 
pp. 26-7, 150. 
2. E.P. Thompson, The Making o^ the Engtuh iUo^lUng Clcui-i (Harmondsworth, 
1968J, p. 213. 
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GLOSSARY 
Bakr Id: 
Bhadralok: 
Chota Haziri; 
Durvi/an(s): 
Fatka: 
Izzat: 
Muslim festival commemorating the Patriarch 
Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac. 
lit. gentlefolk; respectable people of the middle 
class. 
The Anglo-Indian institution of 'little breakfast' 
Gatekeepers; security men; armed retainers, 
lit. bubble; speculative market 
Honour. 
Khilafat: lit. 'Caliphate'. Refers to the pan-Islamic movement 
in India in support of the Turkish Sultan after the 
First World War. 
Ma-Baap: 
Maiji/Mataji; 
Merua: 
lit. mother-father; parents. 
Mother. 
A deTisive Bengali term for any native speaker of 
Hindi. 
Musjid: Mosque. 
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Panchayat; 
Panwali: 
The traditional Indian village council, 
Female seller of betel-leaf. 
Sahib: Boss; generally referred to the Europeans in 
colonial India. 
Sardar: 
Swadeshi 
movement: 
lit. headman, chief; jobber in the jute mills. 
(Svi/ades\i: one's native land) anti-partition agitation 
in Bengal, 1905-8. 
Thana: Police station. 
Zamindar: Landlord. 
